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Chapter 1
Introduction
Pronominal reference is central to one of the classic puzzles of formal se-
mantics, namely what does an utterance containing a pronoun, an open
sentence, mean. In answering this question, meaning should clearly be
conceived of as something context-dependent. Take a simple example like
“he VP”. How such a sentence is interpreted is determined by the (con)text
it occurs in. In a discussion about X, the utterance expresses that X has
the property described by the VP. Whatever precise semantics we decide
on, it will have to imply that the pronoun refers to an individual that is
salient in the current discourse.
At first sight, plural pronouns are no different from singular pronouns;
they merely appear to refer to plural objects salient in discourse rather
than salient atomic entities. Although the semantics of a plural pronoun
differs only trivially from that of a singular pronoun, we will see that by
not limiting our attention to singular anaphora, more kinds of anaphora
emerge. For instance, whereas quantified singular NPs such as ‘every stu-
dent’ can only antecede singular pronouns in their scope, quantified plural
noun phrases like ‘all students’ or ‘most students’ can stand in an anapho-
ric relation even at the extra-sentential level.
(1.1) Every student thinks he wrote an excellent paper.
(1.2) Every student wrote a paper. #He thought it was excellent.
(1.3) Most students think they wrote an excellent paper.
(1.4) Most students wrote a paper. They thought it was excellent.
Quantification and its role in setting up antecedents in discourse will play
an important part in this thesis, since quantificational noun phrases chal-
lenge two of the basic assumptions that I will make here, namely (i) that
pronouns are to be interpreted uniformly as variable-like entities with
hardly any meaning themselves and (ii) that the variation in pronominal
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reference is not due to ambiguity of the pronoun, but rather it is a result of
variation in context. These assumptions are well-established in formal se-
mantics and are central to the tradition of dynamic semantics. Quantifica-
tional noun phrases, with their potential for numerous anaphoric effects,
form a well-known complication. The basic problem is this: how can all
these effects be due to the (same) context? The challenge then is to devise
a sufficiently sophisticated semantics of quantification and a sufficiently
fine-grained notion of context and show that the interaction between the
two results in the reported patterns of anaphora.
In this first chapter, I will start with a systematic overview of the is-
sues that play a role in this thesis, starting with the very basics of the
relationship between pronouns and context.
1.1 Interpreting pronouns in context
It is easy to accept that the meaning of an expression containing a pronoun
is dependent on the context such an expression occurs in. It is notoriously
difficult, however, to indicate what this relation is like exactly. This is
especially so since pronouns seem to be able to stand in several kinds of
relations to their antecedent.
For the better part of the second half of the 20th century, there has
been a lively debate on how to analyse different occurrences of anaphoric
pronouns. An initial contributor to this debate was Peter Geach. In his
1962 book, he stated that anaphoric pronouns in natural language corre-
spond to the bound variables of predicate logic. Together with a second
hypothesis due to Geach, namely that indefinite noun phrases are existen-
tial quantifications, this makes it possible to analyse (1.7) which contains
a pronoun which is said to be ‘referentially used’ as (1.8). This analysis is
comparable to the more straightforwardly bound variable interpretation of
(1.5) as (1.6).
(1.5) Every man knows he is mortal.
(1.6) (∀x: man(x)) (x knows x is mortal)
(1.7) A man walked through the park. He whistled.
(1.8) (∃x: man(x)) (x walked through the park & x whistled)
Evans (1977) criticised such a view on many points. First of all, he ques-
tioned how the pronoun ‘he’ in (1.7) can be a bound variable when it is
outside the scope of its operator. Second, given Geach’s strategy, it seems
difficult to explain the difference between the alleged bound interpretation
of ‘he’ in (1.7) and the impossibility of such a reading in (1.9).
(1.9) Every student wrote a paper. # He also read a book.
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These objections focus on the fact that if pronouns are variable-like, then
in (1.7), the pronoun ‘he’ should not be a bound, but rather a free variable.
Just like –intuitively– the pronoun in (1.9) is free since it is out of the
scope of the universal quantifier. The example in (1.9) cannot mean that
every student wrote a paper and read a book. It appears then that the
problem with (1.8) is a matter of compositionality. In order to derive the
truth-conditions of the first sentence one will have to analyse it as a closed
quantificational sentence. Subsequent anaphoric pronouns should not be
able to change this meaning.
One might think, however, that the limit to the scope of a quantifier is
merely an unfortunate characteristic of predicate logic and that the first
sentence in (1.7) should be meaningful without closing off the scope of the
existential quantification. This is the point made by dynamic semantics.
Dynamic theories of meaning assume that the meaning of a full expres-
sion should not be identified with its truth-conditions, but rather with its
potential to change the context.
The notion of context used here and in the rest of this thesis is defined
as a medium supplying values for variables or other labels of subjects in-
troduced in discourse. Anaphoric reference is possible to those values that
are specified somewhere in the context. 1
As long as this context provides a value for x, an occurrence of x will be
dynamically bound whether or not it is in the classical scope of an operator.
So, while in predicate logic (1.10) is ‘open’ due to the free last occurrence of
x, in dynamic logic x is dynamically bound by ‘∃’. In fact, in a dynamic set-
up, (1.8) and (1.10) mean the same thing: they express the same potential
to change the context.
(1.10) (∃x: man(x)) (x walked through the park) & x whistled
Still, in order to account for the contrast between (1.7) and (1.9), dynamic
theories of meaning will have to assume that not every noun phrase has
the same kind of context-change potential. According to the second dogma
of Geach we mentioned, an indefinite NP corresponds to an existential
quantifier, as in (1.10). In the dynamic logic, then, the existential quanti-
fier is dynamic (i.e. it contributes change to the context), while the univer-
sal quantifier is static: it does not export a value for its ranging variable.
So while after processing (∃ x: ϕ)(ψ) the context contains information about
the value for x, after processing (∀x: ϕ)(ψ) this is not the case. That is:
(1.11) (∃x: ϕ)(ψ) & τ = (∃x: ϕ)(ψ & τ )
1 ‘Context’ as used here should not be confused with some other frequent appearances of the
word, such as the situational configuration in which an utterance is specified, the set of (labels
for) discourse subjects introduced or the set of possible worlds one is willing to entertain (see
Visser 1998 for discussion). Context as used here represents a set of labelled values which
stand for the singular or plural individuals that play a role in the (representation of) the
discourse.
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(1.12) (∀x: ϕ)(ψ) & τ 6= (∀x: ϕ)(ψ & τ )
According to the view held by dynamic semantics, interpretation always
occurs in context and context is always created by interpretation. The sec-
ond sentence in (1.9) is infelicitous since it is interpreted in a context which
does not supply a potential value for the pronoun ‘he’. That is, the univer-
sal quantification in the first sentence does not change the context in such
a way that it contributes a suitable value for ‘he’. In contrast, the first
sentence in (1.7) does contribute such a value.
While accounting for the issues sketched above there is a third objec-
tion raised by Evans against Geach that is more problematic for dynamic
semantics. Some cases of pronoun use are neither prototypically bound
uses (such as (1.5)), nor are they prototypically referential (such as (1.7)).
Consider (1.13):
(1.13) Few senators admire Kennedy; and they are very junior.
Notice that if we were to treat the plural pronoun as a bound variable, the
sentence would read that few senators at the same time admire Kennedy
and are very junior. This, however, could be true in a situation in which
most senators admire Kennedy, but very few of these admirers are junior.
But this is not the meaning of the sentence. What the plural pronoun does
appear to refer to is the set of all senators that admire Kennedy.
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward way of deriving such a read-
ing in a dynamic approach. Obviously, “few senators” cannot be treated as
an existential quantification in the same way indefinites were. For a start,
“few senators admire Kennedy” does not even guarantee there are any
such senators. Moreover, were “few senators admire Kennedy” to change
the context by adding a set of few Kennedy-admiring senators to it, this
would not create the correct anaphoric effect. The pronoun is clearly ex-
haustive in reference: not just some small set of senators that admire
Kennedy are supposed to be junior, but rather the small set of senators
that admire Kennedy have that property.
Evans calls all pronouns that are neither bound nor ‘go proxy’ for their
antecedent ‘e-type pronouns.’2 In his view, both ‘he’ in (1.7) and ‘they’ in
(1.13) are e-type. He proposes to treat them as terms that receive their
reference through the reconstruction of a description from the antecedent
sentence. Thus, in (1.13), ‘they’ is interpreted as ‘the senators who ad-
mire Kennedy,’ just like in (1.7), ‘he’ could be interpreted as ‘the man that
walked through the park.’ This approach has been called the e-type strat-
egy.
2It is important to make a distinction between the class of e-type pronouns as defined
here and Evans’ treatment of these pronouns. In the literature, an e-type pronoun is often
used as being synonymous with a pronoun that has been analysed as corresponding to some
reconstructed definite description. In what follows, I prefer to use the term to refer pre-
theoretically to a class of pronouns.
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In Evans’ analysis, pronouns are either bound or referential (i.e. e-
type). Bound variable pronouns, in contrast to e-type pronouns, have
to occur in construction with their antecedent (i.e. they have to stand in
some syntactic relation with their antecedent, such as, for instance, the c-
command relation.) This means that intersentential pronominal anaphora
is always e-type.
Again, some complications arise. It turns out that while the dynamic
approach failed for discourse pronominals in a context containing a quan-
tificational antecedent like “few senators,” the e-type approach runs into
problems with simple indefinites.
If pronouns refer like definite descriptions, then they impose unique-
ness requirements on their referent. This is especially clear in examples
like (1.14) (from Heim (1982), who credits the stoic Chrysippos). An e-type
strategy is in danger of analysing this example as saying that if a man is
in Athens, the unique man in Athens is not in Rhodes.
(1.14) If a man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes.
Although quite some work has been devoted to solving this problem and
discussing its relation to the semantics of conditionals, quite simple exam-
ples, like (1.15), show that the problem is actually very basic.
(1.15) Three men came in. They ordered beer.
The e-type strategy will have to explain why in (1.15) the pronoun does not
refer to the set of all men that came in, but rather to just the three men-
tioned in the linguistic context. The element of maximality that played an
important role in (1.13) is absent from (1.15). Strikingly, a dynamic ap-
proach has few problems with (1.15) if we assume that the first sentence
expresses the existence of a set of three men that came in and changes the
context by adding this set to it.
What I have sketched here is the core of a complicated debate which, fol-
lowing Geach’s work in the sixties and Evans’ work in the seventies, had
its high-point in the eighties with the emergence of dynamic approaches
to meaning (Kamp 1981; Heim 1982) and subsequent attempts at reinter-
pretations of the e-type strategy (e.g. Neale 1988; Heim 1990).
This thesis has its roots in the dynamic semantic tradition, but it tries
to analyse exactly those cases which do not naturally follow from the orig-
inal setup of that tradition. The key aspects of the problematic examples
like (1.13) are quantification and plurality and their anaphoric potential.
This is what I will focus on in this book. A closer look at the relation be-
tween the semantics of quantificational expressions and the antecedents
they present will make clear which are the important issues.
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1.2 Pronouns and sets
Let us assume that any simple declarative English sentence of the form
[[Det N′] VP] is, in principle, representable as a tripartite structureD(A)(B)
consisting of a determiner D, a restrictor A and a (nuclear) scope B. The
truth-conditions of such a structure depend on the set of individuals that
make up A, the set corresponding to B and the relation between sets ex-
pressed by D.
A well-known (near) universal of natural language determiners is that
they are conservative (Barwise and Cooper 1981). That is, D(A)(B) ex-
presses the same proposition asD(A)(A∩B). The scope-denotation relative
to the restrictor-denotation, i.e. (A ∩ B), turns out to be the set of entities
which seems to form an antecedent in Evans’ example (1.13). That is, if
we represent the semantics of this example as in (1.16), then the reference
of the e-type pronoun ‘they’ in (1.13) is the intersection of λx.senator(x)
and λx.admire(x,Kennedy). We call this set the reference set or, sometimes,
simply refset.
(1.16) few(λx.senator(x))(λx.admire(x,Kennedy))
(1.17) very-junior( (λx.senator(x)) ∩ (λx.admire(x,Kennedy)) )
Following Evans’ observations, we could radically hypothesize that all e-
type pronouns take the reference set of a quantificational structure as their
antecedent. Interestingly, there are two reasons why this does not seem to
hold: (i) not all quantificational structures license subsequent reference
to the (full) reference set, and (ii) sets associated with a quantificational
structure other than the refset seem to be able to antecede a discourse
pronoun as well.
The first problem relates to the uniqueness and maximality issues we
briefly discussed above. For (1.14), the proposal implies that the pronoun
‘he’ picks up the set of men in Athens, but our world-knowledge tells us
that other than the singularity of the pronoun suggests, the set of men in
Athens is not a singleton set. For (1.15), according to our faulty hypothesis,
the pronoun refers to the set of men coming in. The antecedent sentence,
however, merely describes a set of three men and says nothing about this
total set of men entering.
In sum, there are two ways the reference set can be involved in ana-
phora. In other words, e-type pronouns come in two varieties: (i) those
that refer to the reference set, and (ii) those that refer to a subset of the
reference set.
The second mismatch between e-type pronouns and reference sets is
illustrated in (1.18) and (1.19), where in both examples, the plural pronoun
refers to a set distinct from the refset.
(1.18) Few senators admire Kennedy. Most of them prefer Carter.
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Figure 1.1: Sets associated with a structure D(A)(B)
(1.19) Few senators admire Kennedy. They admire Carter instead.
The continuation in (1.18) is interpreted as stating that the majority of
senators admire Carter. This means the plural pronoun ‘them’ has to refer
to the set of senators, the denotation of the restrictor. Similarly, the con-
tinuation in (1.19) seems to express that the senators that do not admire
Kennedy admire Carter instead.3
Let me, at this point, introduce some more terminology. Given a quan-
tificational structure D(A)(B), we call the set A the maximal set and the
set-theoretical difference between restrictor and scope A − B the comple-
ment set. Sometimes I will use abbreviations as indicated in figure 1.1.
We have seen that reference to the reference set (1.13), the maximal set
(1.18) and the complement set (1.19) is possible. Note, however, that these
last two types of pronominal reference are not generally available.
(1.20) Two senators who admire Kennedy bullied Carter. They are very
junior.
(1.21) Most senators admire Carter. # They admire Kennedy instead.
The example in (1.20) can only be understood to mean that the two bullying
senators were junior, not that the senators who admire Kennedy are in
general junior. Similarly, in (1.21), the pronoun cannot be used to refer to
the senators who do not admire Carter.
We see then that not just one but several sets associated with a quan-
tificational structure allow for subsequent pronominal reference to them,
but that not all of these sets are proper antecedents in all contexts. In
3If the reader is of the opinion that (1.19) is not felicitous or does not agree with the
paraphrase given here, then she is referred to chapter 3, where the exact status of such
examples is examined in much detail.
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order to understand these restrictions we have to analyse what the re-
lation between a set associated with a quantificational structure and the
constraints on its use for anaphora is.
I will show in chapter 3 that whereas reference to the maximal set and
the complement set seems to be constrained by the properties of the an-
tecedent determiner, refset reference turns out to be free: any quantified
structure provides the context with an antecedent corresponding to the ref-
set or a subset of the refset. Reference sets are completely ordinary salient
antecedents. In contrast, the cases in which pronominal reference to the
complement set is allowed turn out to be rather special. While the infelicity
of (1.21) seems to be generally accepted, the felicity of examples like (1.19)
is not undisputed. Pronominal reference to the complement set is amarked
type of anaphora. Chapter 3 will show that pronominal complement set
reference is only possible under strict conditions. The non-emptiness of the
complement set should be, first of all, be inferable. Moreover, there should
be no set with higher salience available which also leads to a consistent
interpretation, when chosen as an antecedent for the pronoun. The sta-
tus of the maximal set is different from that of the complement set. When
possible, pronominal reference to the maximal set is not marked. I will
argue that the availability of the maximal set as an antecedent is related
to whether or not a determiner presupposes the existence of its domain of
quantification.
I have made two points concerning reference to sets here. First, stan-
dard examples of e-type pronouns come in two varieties: those that refer
to the reference set and those that refer to a subset of the reference set.
Second, other occurrences of e-type pronouns may refer to the maximal set
or to the complement set.
I assume that theories of e-type pronouns aim at providing a model
of the referential possibilities of pronouns. Since reference to the comple-
ment set is not a common referential possibility and is constrained by more
factors than the semantics of its potential antecedent alone, it is outside
the scope of such theories. What is left then is maximal set reference and
the two types of reference to the reference set. The first of these, how-
ever, seems independent of the mechanisms, which according to the theory
put forward here, are responsible for the creation of referential possibili-
ties. The issue of reference to the maximal set is more a question of how
a theory of presupposition links up to such a mechanism. The reference
set and its subsets thus seem to be the antecedents which pose the real
challenge for theories of e-type interpretation. Let us therefore return to
the discussion of the dynamic strategy, with its straightforward account
of non-maximal reference and the e-type strategy with its straightforward
account of maximal reference to the refset, by focusing on a theory which
accommodates both kinds of reference.
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1.3 Discourse Representation Theory
The discourse representation theory of Kamp and Reyle (1993) offers a
reconciliation of Geach and Evans. In many senses, discourse represen-
tation theory (or DRT) is set in the dynamic semantics tradition. DRT
proposes to treat both indefinites and pronouns as existentially closed free
variables (Kamp 1981). Quantificational noun phrases like “few senators”
and “every man”, however, are static, but they do allow the creation of
an antecedent from the material in the quantificational structure they
form. That is,“few senators admire Kennedy” does two things: first, it tests
whether the world is such that few senators have the property of admir-
ing Kennedy. Second, it changes the context by making the set of x’s such
that x is a senator and x admires Kennedy (i.e. the reference set) available
for future anaphoric reference. This antecedent forming operation is called
abstraction, and it should be clear that it owes a lot to Evans’ original idea.
In (1.22), this process is exemplified in pseudo-formal terms.
(1.22) (few x: senators(x))(x admires Kennedy) &
Y = λ y. y is senator & y admires Kennedy
Notice that the truth-conditions of the sentence (the top line of (1.22)) re-
sults in a formula in which the quantifier ‘(few x: senators(x))’ has limited
scope. The reference set antecedent, however, is set up without a quanti-
fier, thus leaving the variable Y free. In DRT, free variables are interpreted
existentially. In this way, all occurrences of a free variable co-refer. With
respect to (1.22), this means that future occurrences of Y are interpreted
as the senators that admire Kennedy.
The explanatory power of the abstraction procedure is impressive. For
instance, it explains why (1.9) is infelicitous. The only antecedent that
can be formed is a set (the set of students that wrote a paper) and such
an antecedent cannot be picked up by a singular pronoun. In contrast, as
predicted, the plural form is fine.
(1.23) Every student wrote a paper. They also read a book.
(1.24) (∀x: student(x))((∃y: paper(y))(wrote(x,y))) &
X=λz.[ student(z) & (∃y: paper(y))(wrote(z,y)) ] &
X read a book
This example illustrates why plural pronouns deserve special attention in
a theory of discourse anaphors. The discourse representation theory of
Kamp and Reyle (1993) is no doubt still the most complete theory of plural
anaphoric reference. However, one might wonder why if quantificational
structures generally allow for subsequent anaphora, they still have an in
principle static representation and why they need an additional referen-
tial component, whereas for indefinites, truth-conditions and antecedent
formation go hand in hand. This triggers the question whether we can
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rephrase the analysis of e-type pronouns in discourse representation the-
ory in terms of a generalised dynamic treatment of quantification.
This question is of interest not only because we are uncomfortable with
Kamp and Reyle’s analysis for reasons of simplicity, elegance or unifor-
mity. This thesis aims to devise a theory of (plural) pronominal reference
in discourse which fits into the Fregean and Montagovian tradition of com-
positional, bottom-up meaning derivation, which is in sharp contrast to the
top-down architecture of discourse representation theory.
In order to better understand what I mean by this, let us focus some
more on discourse representation theory. In chapter 2, we go into the de-
tails of DRT’s analysis of plural pronouns, but let us for now concentrate
on what kind of theory DRT is.
DRT enables the semantic analysis of a discourse by translating the
discourse into a discourse representation structure (a DRS) and, subse-
quently, interpreting these intermediate representations. The interpreta-
tion process starts with a syntactic structure in an otherwise empty DRS.
Using so-called construction rules the DRS is expanded and transformed
to form an interpretable representation. The construction rules use the
syntactic representations (trees) as well as the present semantic content
of the DRS itself as triggering configurations for adding semantic mate-
rial to the DRS. That is, the interpretation process is fully mediated by
representations.
This is in contrast to the more traditional approach of Montague Gram-
mar (Montague 1974), where an explicit distinction is made between the
construction of an interpretation and the logical content. The derivational
part is given by the simply typed lambda calculus (Church 1941). Sen-
tence constituents are represented by lambda-terms and combinations of
such terms ultimately result in first order expressions through beta re-
duction. In this way, Montague captured the link between grammatical
structure and logical structure. Each lexical entry specifies exactly what
its semantic contribution is and in what way this contribution fits into the
grammatical structure.
The architecture of Montague grammar follows the principle of compo-
sitionality (attributed to Frege (1884)): what matters to the interpretation
of an expression is the interpretation of its parts and the way these parts
are combined. In Montague’s strong interpretation of this principle, both
the syntax and the semantics of a disambiguated language map to alge-
braic structures. Moreover, each syntactic structure maps to exactly one
semantic structure. DRT is not strictly compositional, since the semantic
contribution of parts of expressions cannot be abstracted from the con-
struction rules. Although there is a mapping from syntax to DRSs and one
from DRSs to truth-values, there is no structural correspondence between
the syntactic mapping and the semantic one.4
4Formally, what one would want to derive is a homomorphism between the algebra of
syntactic structures and the algebra of semantic structures.
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Compositionality, however, does not prohibit the use of representations.
A compositional theory might, for instance, use some intermediate repre-
sentational level in order for it to be more comprehensible. However, such
representations should, in principle, be dispensable. In DRT, they are not.
1.4 Rational reconstructions
The empirical success of DRT gave rise to the search for theories with po-
tentially the same empirical coverage that can model compositional mean-
ing derivation without making use of representations. The rationale is
that if meaning corresponds to context-change potential, there should in
principle be no need for intervening representations. As Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1996) put it: “what undergoes change in the dynamic process of
interpretation are semantic objects, not representations.” A theory of dis-
course is non-representational when, in principle, it can do without any
level of representation. That DRT is not such a theory is intuitively clear,
but it follows most convincingly from the abstraction procedure used for
plural reference. The introduction of an antecedent by a quantificational
sentence is not due to its interpretation (quantifiers are static in DRT), but
due to reusing representational material in an abstraction.
As a compositional alternative to DRT, Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991)
introduced dynamic predicate logic (DPL). DPL has the syntax of first or-
der predicate logic, but a semantics which fully respects the slogan ‘mean-
ing is context-change potential.’ Subsequently, Groenendijk and Stokhof
proposed dynamic Montague grammar (DMG, Groenendijk and Stokhof
1990), which incorporated the insights fromDPL in the traditional Fregean
and Montagovian view on meaning derivation.
In DPL, predicate logical expressions are interpreted as relations be-
tween assignment functions: functions mapping variables to individuals.
For instance, ‘A man came in’ is represented as ‘∃x(MAN(x)∧CAME_IN(x))’.
This formula expresses a relation between two assignment functions f and
g, where g differs at most from f by assigning to x some individual which is
a man that came in. Subsequent expressions can now take g as an input as-
signment. For instance ‘he sighed’ can simply be translated as ‘SIGHED(x)’
which expresses an identity relation (returning the input assignment) if
and only if g(x), the man who came in, sighed.
The study of so-called rational reconstructions of DRT does not end
there, however. In the formulation of the dynamics of a semantics, there
are many design choices which lead to different empirical and formal re-
sults. Most of the work in the dynamic predicate logical tradition, however,
focuses on ordinary cases of dynamic binding and does not have a lot to say
about DRT’s treatment of quantificational noun phrases. Often, this is be-
cause only singulars are studied. Van den Berg 1996, however, presents a
plural dynamic predicate logic. This work will play an important role in
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this thesis.
Van den Berg focuses on the fact that plural antecedents in discourse
are often the result of an NP embedded in a quantificational structure. For
instance, in (1.25), it is the singular noun phrase ‘a paper’ which antecedes
the plural pronoun in the second sentence, which is to be interpreted as
the set of all papers written by a student.
(1.25) Every student wrote a paper. They weren’t very good.
This example presents yet another referential possibility triggered by quan-
tification. Rather than the refset, in (1.25) a set closely related to the refset
is referred to by the plural pronoun, namely the set of values for the indef-
inite that were encountered during quantification over students.
It turns out, however, that the relation between the set of papers and
the students that wrote them remains accessible in discourse. In (1.26), the
singular pronoun ‘it’ is dependent on the ranging value of the distributor
‘each’. That is, the second sentence in (1.26) can only mean that every
student submitted the paper he or she wrote to L&P.
(1.26) Every student wrote a paper. They each submitted it to L&P.
The plural pronoun in this example takes the reference set as its an-
tecedent. Quantifying over this set, using the floating quantifier ‘each’
in this case, accesses the atomic individuals that make up the refset. The
VP is said to be true of all these atoms. Somehow, it appears, by accessing
atoms in the refset, the related (atomic) papers become accessible as well.
In fact, the quantor ‘each’ is not necessary to make the use of a singular
pronoun to refer to individual papers felicitous. In (1.27), the second sen-
tence, when interpreted distributively, yields the same effect as in (1.26).
(1.27) Every student wrote a paper. They submitted it to L&P.
Examples like these lead van den Berg towards a particular design choice
for the plural version of DPL. Instead of having expressions denote rela-
tions between assignments of pluralities, in van den Berg’s work, predicate
logical formulae express relations between pluralities of assignments. So,
for (1.26) the first sentence collects assignments g such that g assigns a
student to (say) x and a paper written by this student to (say) y. While the
collection of assignments gives us information about the groups involved in
the sentence, the individual assignments carry specific information about
the atoms. The details of this analysis will be discussed in chapter 4.
Van den Berg’s insight concerning the architecture of context is not
the only design choice which interests us, however. In chapter 5, we will
focus on the relation between anaphora and variables. If a pronoun is
like a variable, then all the potential reference-resolutions of a pronoun
should be retrievable by choosing a different variable for the pronoun. All
potential antecedents should thus have their own label. This can become
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problematic with respect to the dependent anaphora of, for instance, (1.26).
Both ‘it’ in (1.26) and ‘they’ in (1.25) have the same antecedent, namely the
noun phrase ‘a paper’. The two pronouns, however, refer quite differently
and, as we will see, this difference cannot be explained by the difference in
number feature. Potentially, then, the indefinite ‘a paper’ should be able to
contribute two variables to the context.
I will study this problem in the light of a related, more technical prob-
lem with predicate logical formalisms. The dynamics of an existential
quantifier forces us to manage variables carefully. If we translate ‘a man’
with ∃x(MAN(x)), we assume that in the discourse preceding this noun
phrase no other noun phrase quantified over the variable x, since were
such a quantification to exist, the introduction of ‘a man’ would cause all
previous information we have gathered about x to be lost.
In order to avoid such variable clashes, I will present a variable free
reformulation of van den Berg’s work. This will be based on the system
of incremental dynamics (van Eijck 2001). This way we will not have to
worry about what variable we choose for any NP. In fact, what I will show,
moreover, is that the move to this variable free system enables a solution to
the problem of having to have enough antecedents to cover all referential
options of pronouns.
All this will be necessary before we can finally come to a dynamic se-
mantics of quantification which has results comparable to those of DRT.
The idea is that the tri-partite structure of quantification is interpreted as
a comparison between two extensions of the input context. The restrictor
specifies the possible (atomic) values that matter to the quantification. The
nuclear scope collects those atoms which satisfy its predicational require-
ments and finally the determiner is a test of whether the set of possible
values and the set of actual values stand in the appropriate quantifier re-
lation. If this test succeeds, the set collected by the scope is automatically
accessible in the subsequent discourse.
Working out the details of such a theory is far from easy, however. For
instance, the extended context due to the restrictor clause is merely a re-
source for the interpretation of the nuclear scope. That is, at no point is
the maximal set available as an antecedent. Only when the restrictor’s
content is presupposed (and thus present in the informative component of
context) will reference to the maximal set be possible.
The resulting formalism is a typed incremental variable free formalism
which is far from compact. With the growing complexity of the phenomena
(e.g. dependency structures), the complexity of the semantics increases as
well. I take this to be an important aspect of this thesis as well. Given our
goal to formulate a non-representational bottom-up alternative to DRT’s
treatment of plural anaphora, we ask how much structure in context is
needed once representations are banned.
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1.5 Plan of the thesis
This thesis, then, focuses on how the compositional interpretation of an
expression in some context generates a context allowing the subsequent ac-
cessibility of all referential possibilities for pronouns. The emphasis will be
onmodelling complex anaphoric phenomena, in particular those involving
plural pronouns. A central topic is the set of restrictions plural pronouns
impose on their antecedents.5
The structure of the thesis is as follows:
In chapter 2, I provide the necessary background information concern-
ing discourse representation theory and dynamic predicate logic. I focus
in particular on the simple formal basics of dynamic interpretation that
gives us the vocabulary we need to develop the extended models below.
Moreover, I give a detailed introduction in DRT’s treatment of plural ana-
phora.
In chapter 3, I turn to the issue of reference to sets and discuss the
constraints on pronominal anaphora with antecedents other than the ref-
erence set. Most attention is paid to to the phenomenon of pronominal
reference to the complement set, given that this type of reference cannot
be accounted for naturally within theories of quantification and anaphora
(especially not in DRT). The informal model of plural antecedents which
is proposed forms the basis for the formal proposals to follow and this will
justifies the fact that, in our formal model, the complement set is never
generated as an antecedent.
In chapter 4, I introduce the work of van den Berg and compare it to
two other proposals. My main concern is to establish that van den Berg’s
motivations for his particular notion of context are well-founded and are
compatible with the types of structure the other proposals assume context
to have. At the same time, it allows us to critically examine some other
aspects of existing non-representational theories of plural reference, most
notably the dynamics of distributivity.
5Since plurality plays such an important role in this thesis, a few words on important
studies in the linguist semantics of plural expressions are in order. In the early Montague
semantic tradition, at least two extensions to plurality are well-known, namely Hausser 1974
and Bennet 1974. Link 1983 proposes an algebraic account of plural issues like distributivity
and mass terms. The issue discussed in this thesis is anaphora. Two other branches of
research in plurality deserve to be mentioned, although the results of such studies are largely
glossed over here and are only indirectly relevant for this dissertation.
First of all, there is the question whether or not plural objects are internally structured.
Key papers are: Landman 1989, Schwarzschild 1990 , Schwarzschild 1991 and Krifka 1991.
A second important research topic with respect to plurality is the analysis of the distribu-
tivity/collectivity distinction, the analysis of other readings and the question of how many
readings a sentence with multiple quantification has. Scha 1981 is an important source of is-
sues and proposals of how to deal with distributivity, collectivity and cumulativity. In the late
eighties and early nineties of the previous century, this evolved into a lively debate. Key pa-
pers are: Link 1987, Gillon 1987, Lønning 1991, Lasersohn 1995, van der Does 1992, Verkuyl
and van der Does 1996.
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With van den Berg’s work at the background, I turn, in chapter 5, to
the question of how anaphora is represented in such a theory. After ar-
guing that the choice of which label to give to antecedents should be de-
pendent on the context, I reformulate van den Berg’s formalism within
van Eijck’s framework of incremental dynamics. This enables us to define
a sufficiently rich dynamic interpretation of distributivity. Subsequently,
I present a derivational counterpart of this semantics and discuss how
pronominal interpretation is to be integrated in this approach.
Finally, in chapter 6, the dynamic semantics of quantification is dis-
cussed. Here, the refined dynamic semantics of distributivity of chapter 5
will be generalised and this will lead to a dynamic interpretation of dis-
tributive quantification. This will show that the additional mechanisms
used by DRT to account for plural pronominal discourse anaphora can be
discarded in a fully dynamic framework.

Chapter 2
Background:
E-type Interpretation
In this chapter I set out to present a detailed introduction into the basics
of interpreting pronouns in context.
We focus on the formal alternatives that are available for the analy-
sis of e-type pronouns in general. As we saw in the introduction there
are basically two options: either we account for e-type pronouns by giving
them a semantics of their own (e.g. by considering them as reconstructed
descriptions) or we dismiss the distinction between e-type and non-e-type
pronouns and account for e-type effects using a sophisticated semantics
sensitive to the contexts e-type pronouns occur in. Traditionally, the for-
mer strategy is called an e-type strategy, while the latter approach is asso-
ciated with dynamic semantics.
This thesis is not meant to contribute to the discussion about which of
these approaches leads to better results. Rather, I try to present a suffi-
ciently strong analysis of quantification and plurality which allows us to
view plural pronominal anaphora as objects which take their antecedent
from a context which is built up dynamically. Nevertheless, in order to get
more grip on the subject, we will start by briefly considering some variants
of e-type strategies in section (2.1). Then, in section (2.2), the basics of
discourse representation theory and dynamic predicate logic are discussed
extensively. This will provide many of the notions that are essential for an
understanding of the rest of the thesis. Finally, in section (2.3), I focus on
DRT’s treatment of plurality.
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2.1 E-type strategies
E-type strategies have in common that they try to model the observation
that e-type pronouns can be paraphrased by a definite description con-
structed from material in the antecedent sentence.1 They differ in how
such a reconstruction comes about, e.g. whether a pragmatic, semantic or
syntactic operation is involved.2 Cooper (1979) proposes a pragmatic strat-
egy in which e-type pronouns are analysed as ‘the R(x)’, where the relation
symbol R is resolved by pragmatics. Heim (1990) discusses alternative
forms of pragmatic e-type strategies and points out some problems. One
important defect is that pragmatic strategies ignore the role of a linguistic
antecedent, witness the contrast between (2.1) and (2.2).
(2.1) Every man who has a wife sits next to her. = Heim 1990 (ex. 57)
(2.2) *Every married man sits next to her. = Heim 1990 (ex. 58)
For an e-type strategy to work, it seems that the reconstruction should
be sensitive to the syntactic environment of the antecedent. Heim pro-
poses such a syntactic account. The link between e-type pronouns and
their antecedent is regulated by a single transformation rule (see Heim
1990, p. 170).
(2.3) X S Y NPi Z ⇒ 1 2 3 4 + 2 5
1 2 3 4 5
where: 4 is a pronoun
2 is of the form [S NPi S]
The rule says that a sentence S occurring in some context containing some
noun phrase indexed i enables a subsequent co-indexed pronoun to be in-
terpreted using the syntactic material in S. The symbols ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’
express the contextuality of this rule. The sentence ‘S’ and the e-type pro-
noun ‘NPi’ are not required to stand in any particular syntactic relation,
they appear in their own context. The newly formed ‘augmented pronoun’,
i.e. ‘4+2’, is interpreted as a definite description.3
1There has been much discussion on how serious one should take this paraphrase and
whether e-type pronouns go proxy for definite descriptions (as most of the ‘modern’ proposals
claim) or whether the reference of the pronoun is fixed by a description. Evans himself re-
jected the proxy view. But see Neale 1988 (p. 158–169) for a defence in favour of the proxy
view.
2Adopting some e-type strategy to e-type pronoun interpretation does not mean that one
accepts Evans’ distinction between bound variable and e-type pronouns. One could choose for
a strong theory proposing that all pronouns are interpreted via the e-type strategy.
3Interestingly, Irene Heim herself observes a problematic issue involving plurality (Heim
1990, p. 172–173). When e-type pronouns are accounted for by a syntactic reconstruction
process, then plural pronouns as in (i) would be analysed as ‘the papers that x turned in’
instead of ‘the papers the students turned in.’
(i) Every student turned in a paper. They were all identical. = Heim 1990 (ex. 79)
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(2.4) [[it [Detx α] β]] g = the unique d such that [[α]] g[x/d] = [[β]] g[x/d] = 1
Alternatively, Neale (1990) introduces a semantic rule to come to an inter-
pretation of the e-type pronoun as a definite description:
“If x is a pronoun that is anaphoric on, but not c-commanded by
‘[Dx:Fx]’ that occurs in an antecedent clause ‘[Dx:Fx](Gx)’, then
x is interpreted as the most "impoverished"definite description
directly recoverable from the antecedent clause that denotes ev-
erything that is both F and G.” Neale 1990 (p. 182).
The uniqueness condition in (2.4) is also implicit in Neale’s rule and even-
tually leads to predictions which are too strong (just like Cooper’s prag-
matically saturated definite descriptions would). For instance, in (2.5), we
are forced to interpret ‘he’ as the unique man in Athens.
(2.5) If a man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes.
Most of the modern work on e-type strategies is dedicated to resolving the
uniqueness issue (see e.g. Lappin 1989; Kadmon 1990; Neale 1990; Chier-
chia 1992; van der Does 1993). I would like to leave the discussion at this
point, however. The (interesting) finesses of modern e-type strategy pro-
posals are beyond the scope of this thesis. What is important from our
point of view is the idea that at least some pronouns are descriptive in na-
ture. Interestingly, when adopting a strong version of the e-type strategy,
one wherein all pronouns correspond to descriptions, the differences with
dynamic semantics start to blur, since such a strong theory will have to
explain how in every context the right descriptions are recoverable. The
remaining difference seems to be only due to the fact that dynamic se-
mantics naturally restricts itself to talk about predicate logic and variable
binding. In van der Does 1993, however, a system is presented in which
dynamic semantics and the e-type strategy seem to converge. Moreover,
as I already suggested in the introduction and as we will see in more de-
tail in the current chapter, the discourse representation theory of Kamp
and Reyle 1993 also uses elements from the e-type strategy by modelling
maximal discourse anaphora using a reconstruction process.
2.2 Dynamic semantics for singular anaphora
Since this thesis focuses on the tradition of dynamic semantics, I will dis-
cuss the formal and conceptual aspects of this approach extensively. What
may be called ‘dynamic’ about dynamic semantics is that it involves a
notion of interpretation which contributes some kind of change. In dy-
namic semantic theories, the meaning of an expression is said to be its
‘context-change potential.’ Apart from a notion of context change, dynamic
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semantic theories have in common that pronouns are systematically anal-
ysed as ordinary bound variables. The distinction between ‘types’ of pro-
nouns, such a e-type vs. bound, is a result of how these variables are eval-
uated. The notion of context standardly involves assignment functions
and consequently different contexts result in different variable evalua-
tions. Roughly, bound usages of pronouns are explained as variables which
are evaluated with respect to iterated contexts; the iteration being instan-
tiated by some operator (quantifier) in the scope of which the pronoun
occurs. Referential usages of pronouns are variables evaluated in a con-
text which provides a determined value for this variable. E-type pronouns
are now to be explained as variable evaluations which, due to contextual
circumstances, do not naturally fall under the previous two classes. The
main point, however, is that from a dynamic semantic point of view, there
is no useful distinction between kinds of pronouns, since all pronouns cor-
respond to variables in context.
For instance, the case of inter-sentential anaphora in (2.6) is explained
by considering the variable corresponding to he in a context which under-
determines the value for this variable.
(2.6) A man came in. He sighed.
The conditional in (2.7) is analysed as a universal quantifier over contexts
satisfying the antecedent clause. (See Lewis 1975; Kratzer 1986.)
(2.7) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
(2.8) All cases in which x is a farmer, y a donkey owned by x, are cases
in which x beats y.
The pronouns in the consequent clause can simply be analysed as bound
variables, since they are evaluated in individual contexts in which x is a
farmer owning donkey y.
Notice that this has immediate advantages over an e-type strategy.
First, with respect to Heim’s argument that a linguistic antecedent is a
necessary ingredient for pronominal reference, notice that a dynamic ap-
proach has a semantic explanation for this need. In Heim’s examples (2.1)
and (2.2), repeated here as (2.9) and (2.11) respectively, the set of mar-
ried men coincides with the set of men who have a wife, but the way these
constituents change the context differs in an important way. In the para-
phrase (2.12), there is no variable available for the pronoun ‘her’.
(2.9) Every man who has a wife sits next to her.
(2.10) All cases in which x is a man such that there exists a y being x’s
wife is such that x sits next to y.
(2.11) *Every married men sits next to her.
2.2 DYNAMIC SEMANTICS FOR SINGULAR ANAPHORA 21
(2.12) All cases in which x is a man such that x is married are such that
x sits next to -?-.
Second, issues of uniqueness do not play a role in dynamic semantics. The
example in (2.5) is repeated here with a dynamic paraphrase. Notice that
whatever value is chosen for ‘a man’ will be the value for ‘he’, but that
nothing is said about how many such values exist.
(2.13) If a man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes.
All cases in which x is a man and x is in Athens, are cases in
which x is not in Rhodes.
In the introduction to dynamic approaches to meaning below, I focus on
two frameworks: Kamp (1981)’s discourse representation theory and Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof (1991)’s dynamic predicate logic. This creates an over-
simplified image of dynamic semantics. In what follows, many contribu-
tions and discussions are not discussed, such as, for instance, the seminal
papers Heim 1982, Rooth 1987, Barwise 1987, Chierchia 1992 and Groe-
nendijk and Stokhof 1990.
2.2.1 Discourse Representation Theory
Although of paramount importance to the emergence of dynamic seman-
tics, discourse representation theory (henceforth, DRT) should not really
be seen as a part of that tradition. DRT fits in the Geachean tradition of
viewing pronouns as variables, but ‘meaning’ in DRT certainly does not
correspond to context-change potential. As we will see, some elements of
dynamics do exist, though.
The key feature of the discourse representation theory presented in
Kamp 1981 is that all ‘types’ of pronouns, as well as indefinite NPs, can be
accounted for by translating them as predicated plain variables. The spe-
cific effects responsible for the seemingly different types of pronouns are
caused by interactions with operators introduced by other syntactic ma-
terial. Likewise, the quantificational force of an indefinite is established
by the context it appears in. The difference between an indefinite and a
pronoun is due to nothing more than the fact that the former corresponds
to a ‘new’ variable, while the latter corresponds to an ‘old’ one.
In DRT, given a syntactic form, the representation of the meaning of
that form is generated by applying construction rules. For instance, the
rule for pronouns says that a variable should be selected and used for pred-
ication (conform the rest of the sentence). By recursively applying such
rules, sentences result in discourse representation structures or DRSs,
which “can be regarded as the mental representations which speakers form
in response to the verbal inputs they receive” (Kamp 1981, p. 282). Subse-
quent syntactic forms are incorporated in the existing representation and
transformed in meaning representations by again applying construction
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rules. This shows an element of dynamics: syntactic forms are interpreted
inside representations formed by previously processed material and they
also set the stage for forms that follow.
DRSs are formal objects containing a set of variables or ‘(discourse)
referents’4 called the universe and a set of conditions. These structures
can be interpreted. Again, this notion of interpretation is not dynamic.5
Consider a modelM = 〈De, I〉 and a set of referent symbols VAR. A DRS is
a pair 〈V,C〉, where V ⊆ VAR and C is a set of conditions. Another way of
looking at these structures is by viewing them as a list of conditions paired
with (some of) the free variables that occur in them. In this light, a DRS
like the one in (2.14) is nothing more than the predicate logical formulae
P (x). Its interpretation (in (2.15)), however, tells us that it is true as soon
as we find a value for x which satisfies P in the model.
(2.14)
x
P(x)
(2.15) ∃f : {x} → De such that f(x) ∈ I(P)
A DRS is true in DRT if and only if there exists a function assigning values
to the free variables such that the conditions are satisfied in the model. As
a result, free variables are standardly existentially quantified. Indefinite
NPs, thus, need not be translated as existentially quantified expressions,
but simply as variables. This allows them to adopt the quantificational
force of whatever context they appear in. For instance, conditionals intro-
duce embedded DRSs with a more complex interpretation.
(2.16)
Υ
Γ
⇒ Υ
′
Γ′
(2.17) All functions f that verify 〈Υ,Γ〉 inM can be extended to a
function which verifies 〈Υ′,Γ′〉 inM .
A function g extends another function f if the domain of g includes that of
f and with respect to this joint domain, they agree on the values they pro-
vide. This is the source of many effects involving pronouns and indefinites.
The embedded boxes introduced by a conditional are interpreted in a local
4In this introduction, we do not distinguish the notion of variable from the notion of dis-
course referent as this is not relevant for the purpose of introducing DRT. However, the reader
should keep in mind that discourse referents are linguistically motivated objects, while vari-
ables can play many roles in natural language semantics, including some for purely deriva-
tional purposes. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1990), page 3, for example, point out that in the
lambda abstract λx.farmer(x) ∧ ∃y(donkey(y) ∧ own(x, y)), y, but not x can be considered a
discourse referent (i.e. with the properties they have in DRT).
5The interpretation of conditionals (see below), however, is dynamic, since the consequent
clause is interpreted with respect to an assignment function changed by the antecedent
clause.
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context. The consequent clause is iteratively interpreted with respect to
whatever the function f is changed into by the antecedent clause. Con-
sider for instance the DRS in (2.19) which represents the classic donkey
example and its interpretation in (2.20).
(2.18) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
(2.19)
x y
man(x)
donkey(y)
own(x,y)
⇒ beat(x,y)
(2.20) All functions f : {x,y} → De such that f(x) is a man and f(y) is a
donkey owned by f(x) in modelM extend to a function
f ′ : {x,y} → De such that f ′(x) beats f ′(y).
(2.21) All functions f : {x,y} → De such that f(x) is a man and f(y) is a
donkey owned by f(x) in modelM are such that f(x) beats f(y).
The simplification in (2.21) of (2.20) is due to the fact that, if two functions
have the same domain, one of them can only extend the other if they are,
in fact, the same function. The pronouns as well as the indefinites in (2.18)
are simply represented as variables. The e-type effect is explained by the
semantics of the conditional rather than by a reconstruction procedure.
A final important basic ingredient of DRT is its notion of accessibility.
As stated above, the only difference between a pronoun and an indefinite
is that the latter corresponds to a fresh variable while the former corre-
sponds to a referent which has already been introduced. The construction
rule for pronouns thus states that a pronoun should be replaced by an
accessible variable. The notion of accessibility is not stipulated, but is se-
mantically based: it follows from the truth-conditions for a DRS and is
therefore very similar to the syntactic requirements of variable binding in
predicate logic. For instance, from the interpretation in (2.17), it follows
that referents introduced in the antecedent DRS of a conditional are ac-
cessible in the consequent DRS. This is so because the functions used to
test verification of the right DRS are functions verifying the left DRS and,
therefore, these functions will have as their domain the universe of the
left DRS. In contrast, the referents in a conditional are not accessible from
outside the two embedded DRSs. That is, the referent ‘y’ in the predication
‘run-away(y)’ in (2.22) is free. It cannot originate from a pronoun, since the
referent ‘y’ introduced in the embedded DRS is inaccessible from within
the main DRS. This is supported by the infelicity of (2.23).
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(2.22)
x y
man(x)
donkey(y)
own(x,y)
⇒ beat(x,y)
run-away(y)
(2.23) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it. ??It runs away.
As I mentioned above in the introduction chapter, DRT was one of the
causes of the rise of a programme of dynamic semantics in which interpre-
tation is context-change potential. The specific representational architec-
ture of DRT, however, begged the question whether a more direct expres-
sion of this potential was not possible.
2.2.2 Dynamic predicate logic
In Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991, a dynamic predicate logic is presented
which fulfilled the goal of creating “a compositional, non-representational
theory of discourse semantics.” The dynamics of this system follows di-
rectly from the fact that predicate logical formulae are not interpreted in
terms of truth-conditions, but in terms of how they change the context,
or, to be precise, how they change assignment functions. Every formula
denotes a set of pairs of assignment functions, i.e., it denotes a relation
between assignments. Conceptually, these pairs should be seen as the in-
puts and corresponding outputs of the predicate logical ‘instructions.’ For
instance, 〈f, g〉 is in the interpretation of Γ if g is a possible output for
interpreting Γ with respect to f .
Crucial is the interpretation of conjunction as relation composition.
That is, in interpreting a formula p ∧ q the output of interpreting p is used
as an input for the interpretation of q. Let [[]] map formulae to relations
between assignment functions. We write f [[ϕ]] g to express that 〈f, g〉 is one
of the pairs of assignment functions in the dynamic intepretation of ϕ.
(2.24) f [[p ∧ q]] g :⇔ ∃h : f [[p]]h & h [[q]] g
Dynamic conjunction is thus internally dynamic: the change brought about
by p is passed on to the interpretation of q. Moreover, it is externally
dynamic: the change brought about by processing p and subsequently q
can be recovered from the output assignment. The prime source of such
‘changes’ is the dynamic existential quantifier. It uses the notion of ran-
dom assignment.
(2.25) f [[∃x(ϕ)]] g :⇔ ∃h : f and h differ at most in the value they
assign to x and h [[ϕ]] g
The existential quantifier replaces whatever value the input assignment
assigns to x with some value that satisfies its scope ϕ. Combining the
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definition of the existential quantifier with relation composition as the in-
terpretation for conjunction, we are able to derive the so-called donkey
equivalence in (2.26), which says that existentially introduced values have
unlimited scope to the right.
(2.26) f [[∃x(ϕ) ∧ ψ]] g ⇔ f [[∃x(ϕ ∧ ψ)]] g
In fact, this points out that it is unnecessary to define the existential quan-
tifier with a scopal formula. We could alternatively define just the bare
quantifier:
(2.27) f [[∃′x]] g :⇔ f and g differ at most in the value they
assign to x
Existential quantification changes the context in an important way. Other
atomic formulae have no such influence on the context and simply test
whether the context is to their satisfaction. Such expressions are accord-
ingly called tests. A predication P (x), for instance, returns an incoming
assignment whenever this assigns a value to x which is in the extension of
P .
(2.28) f [[P (x1, . . . , xn)]] g :⇔ f = g & 〈f(x1), . . . , f(xn)〉 ∈ I(P )
Dynamic implication is also a test, although a much more complex one.
Similar to DRT, conditionals are analysed as introducing universal quan-
tification over contexts. In DPL’s terms, this means that given an input
assignment f , we first interpret the antecedent clause and for each output
assignment this interpretation returns, we check whether we can use that
as an input for interpreting the consequent clause successfully (i.e., re-
turning some output assignment function). If this test succeeds, we return
the input assignment again.
(2.29) f [[p⇒ q]] g :⇔ f = g & ∀h : f [[p]]h→ ∃k : h [[q]] k
All this gives us the tools to analyse a number of ordinarily problematic
pronouns as simple (bound) variables. For instance, the semantics of inter-
sentential anaphora in (2.30), represented in (2.31), follows directly from
the donkey equivalence in (2.26). The classic donkey conditional in (2.32)
can be analysed parallel to the proposal in DRT, except that the indefinite
results in an existential quantification as opposed to a predication over a
free variable. The effect from (2.33) is the same.
(2.30) A man came in. He sighed.
(2.31) [[∃x(MAN(x) ∧ CAME_IN(x)) ∧ SIGH(x)]] =
[[∃x(MAN(x) ∧ CAME_IN(x) ∧ SIGH(x))]] =
[[∃′x ∧ MAN(x) ∧ CAME_IN(x) ∧ SIGH(x)]]
(2.32) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
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(2.33) [[(∃′x ∧ MAN(x) ∧ ∃′y ∧ DONKEY(y) ∧ OWN(x, y))⇒ (BEAT(x, y))]]
The accessibility of antecedents follows from the semantics. Consider for
instance (2.33). In (2.23), we saw that a conditional like (2.32) does not
allow subsequent anaphoric reference to indefinites introduced in one of
its clauses. The formula in (2.33) is interpreted as a test. Given an assign-
ment function f , it returns f if and only if all possible output functions for
the left-hand side of the dynamic implicator ‘⇒’ yield an output when used
as an input function for the interpretation of the right-hand side of the
implicator. But when these conditions are met the input assignment (f ) is
returned and consequently all random assignments considered during the
test are lost.
Negation is a test as well. It blocks access from outside its scope to vari-
ables introduced within its scope. The negation operation checks whether
there exists an assignment function which can serve as a proper output for
its scope given some input assignment. If so, the test fails. If not, the input
assignment is returned.
(2.34) f [[¬(ϕ)]] g :⇔ f = g & ¬∃h : f [[ϕ]]h
Changes brought about to f by ϕ can thus never surface outside the scope
of the negation. Therefore, a variable x occurring after ¬(∃x) can never ac-
cess the value assigned to x inside the negation. This explains why negated
indefinites are not proper antecedents.6
Something similar occurs with universal quantification.
(2.35) f [[∀x(ϕ)]] g :⇔ f = g & ∀k : f [[∃′x]] k ⇒ ∃j : k [[ϕ]] j
This says that any extension of f assigning some value to x can success-
fully interpret ϕ. The output assignments j of these successful interpreta-
tions, however, are not passed on.
This way, the semantics of DPL mirrors the anaphora facts of natural
language. While existential quantification is externally dynamic, univer-
sal quantification is externally static. Like the semantics of negation, the
semantics of universal quantification does not pass on any values intro-
duced in its scope. Both conjunction and predication are also externally
dynamic, the latter trivially so.
2.2.3 Information increase
The relations expressed by DPL formulae carry information about the con-
tent of the formulae. For instance, the set of assignments g paired with
some assignment f according to such a relation, inform us about the pos-
sible values for the variables. They inform us about which values are still
6It has often been pointed out that a definition as in (2.34) constrains the accessibility of
negated antecedents too strongly. See, e.g. Krahmer and Muskens 1995 and van Rooy 1997for
discussion.
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open to discussion. Accordingly, the predicate logical expressions in DPL
can be seen as actions on information states. Predication, being a test,
has the capability of reducing the number of possible values for variables.
For instance, after introducing ‘a man’ in the discourse using the action
‘∃x(MAN(x))’, the possible values we wish to entertain for ‘x’ are all the
objects satisfying the property of being a man. If, somewhere further on
in the discourse, an utterance instantiates the action ‘OLD(x)’, the possible
values for ‘x’ are reduced to objects which are old men. This way, predica-
tion reduces the number of options that are open and thus increases the
information stored in context.
Given a set of assignment functions F and a dynamic predicate logical
expression ϕ, we are able to express the update potential of this expression.
That is, given a set of possible value assignments that is consistent with
the foregoing discourse, we are able to express how a form like ϕ influences
this set.
Definition 2.1 Update potential
F [ϕ] := λg.∃f ∈ F : f [[ϕ]] g
2
Ideally, only three possibilities are open for formulae of a dynamic formal-
ism: (i) ϕ accepts the possibilities in F , i.e. F [ϕ] = F , (ii) ϕ adds informa-
tion, i.e. F [ϕ] ⊂ F or (iii) ϕ is inconsistent with respect to F , i.e. F [ϕ] = ∅.
In such a formalism, no action can cause a loss of information: for any for-
mula ϕ it holds that ∀F : F [ϕ] ⊆ F . For DPL, however, this does not hold.7
For example, say that some set of assignments F contains only functions
assigning some entity d to x. Clearly, however, F [∃′x] 6⊆ F , for the existen-
tial quantifier resets the variable x.
Intuitively, this is related to the fact that apart from reduction of the
set of possible assignment functions, there seems to be a second form of in-
formation increase associated with quite a different notion of information.
During the processing of a discourse, not only do we constantly reduce the
number of options open as a value for some variable, we moreover keep
track of which variables are under discussion. By introducing new topics
we expand the information we have about the discourse.
In DRT, this type of information is represented by the universe of a
DRS. Each NP that is encountered introduces a fresh referent in the uni-
verse. As the discourse unfolds, more and more referents will be intro-
duced, increasing the potential for anaphoric reference. The contexts of
7This is in contrast to the update semantics presented in Veltman 1991, which does have
this property. See Vermeulen 1994 (also 1993) for an elaborate discussion of this so-called
eliminativity property and an elegant variation on DPL’s variable management which guar-
antees eliminativity. Other proposals can be found in Fernando 1992; Dekker 1993; Dekker
1994 and van Eijck 2001.
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DPL, however, are assignment functions that assign values to all the vari-
ables in their domain and as such do not have a way of discerning between
active and inactive variables. Moreover, the notion of context of DPL is not
able to represent something like an initial state wherein an item has yet
to be introduced in the discourse.8
An intuitively attractive way of enriching DPL with information con-
cerning the introduced discourse topic is by using partial (instead of total)
assignment functions. This way, the active domain of a function expresses
which variables are under discussion, just like the universe of a DRS sup-
plies the domain of the verifying assignment function in DRT. The initial
state, in such a set-up, will be the function that is undefined for every
variable.
As we will see below, particularly in chapters 4 and 5, we will need to
model both kinds of information discussed here. There, we return to the
issue of defining DPL with partial functions.
2.3 DRT and plural e-type pronouns
The fourth chapter of Kamp and Reyle 1993 is doubtlessly the first analysis
of anaphoric aspects of plurality which is detailed enough to make serious
empirical claims about virtually all of the numerous phenomena involving
plural reference. Although the framework is DRT, the analysis of plural
e-type pronouns presented in this work very much resembles an e-type
strategy.
Kamp and Reyle distinguish between two types of NPs, namely quan-
tificational NPs and non-quantificational NPs. The latter group is treated
like ordinary indefinites. That is, they introduce a (possibly plural) refer-
ent in the local universe which is accessible in the local DRS as well as in
embedded DRSs. For instance, (2.36) is represented as (2.37).
(2.36) Two students wrote an article.
(2.37)
X y
|X|=2
student*(X)
article(y)
wrote(X,y)
Uppercase letters are used for referents which correspond to plural indi-
8This is not entirely true. For DPL one could take as an initial state the set of all possible
assignment functions. In such a state, each variable is associated with every possible value
in the domain of entities. The state, therefore, represents a tabula rasa, since all options
are still open. However, this is at the cost of representing all non-introduced topics as topics
about which nothing is known.
2.3 DRT AND PLURAL E-TYPE PRONOUNS 29
viduals, lower case letters have an atomicity required implicit in them9.
The conditions in the DRS say that the referent ‘X’ should refer to a plu-
rality containing two atoms which occurs in the plural closure of the set of
students. Furthermore, ‘y’ corresponds to an article written by these stu-
dents. Subsequent plural pronouns are able to pick up these two referents.
(2.38) Two students wrote an article. They sent it to L&P.
(2.39)
X y
|X|=2
student*(X)
article(y)
wrote(X,y)
senttoL&P(X,y)
There is no maximality involved in the case of anaphora in (2.38). There
might have been other students writing a paper, but they need not have
sent a paper to L&P to verify (2.38). This is indeed allowed by the DRS in
(2.39), since any function f assigning a set of two students to X that wrote
some article f(y) and sent it to L&P verifies this DRS.
The other class of NPs, quantificational NPs, does not introduce ref-
erents. They introduce a type of representation called duplex conditions.
These representations follow the common wisdom that (quantificational)
determiners create a tripartite structure. Duplex conditions take care of
the truth-conditions of the structures following the techniques of gener-
alised quantifier theory(Barwise and Cooper 1981) . At the same time,
they account for possible anaphoric links between the arguments of the
determiner. Let us briefly consider how this is done.
Ignoring some details, duplex conditions consist of two DRSs, one cor-
responding to the restrictor argument of the determiner and the other to
the nuclear scope. These boxes are connected by a symbol expressing the
quantificational relation corresponding to the determiner as well as the
referent(s) quantified over.
(2.40)
UR
CR @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Q
r
US
CS
The referents introduced by the restrictor ([UR|CR]) are accessible in the
scope ([US |CS]). The interpretation is not straightforward. I will ignore
several important issues here and aim at communicating the general intu-
ition behind the interpretation.10 Say that Q corresponds to some relation
9Actually, the system of plural and singular referents presented in Kamp and Reyle 1993
is much more refined, but we will ignore these subtle (though important) details.
10See especially subsection 4.3.2.1 of Kamp and Reyle 1993 for discussion of some details.
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between sets I(Q), then a model and an embedding function f verify (2.40)
if the following sets A and B are in the I(Q) relation:11
(2.41) A: The set of individuals d, such that there is an extension g of
f ∪ {〈r, d〉} which verifies CR.
(2.42) B: The set of individuals d, such that there is an extension g of
f ∪ {〈r, d〉} which verifies CR, for which in turn there exists an
extension h which verifies CS .
The accessibility facts follow from the interpretation. Referents in the
scope are interpreted relative to an extension of an embedding function
which verifies the restrictor. Referents in the restrictor are thus accessible
to the scope. Outside the duplex conditions no referents introduced in it
are accessible. This way, DRT needs to use an independent procedure to
account for non-bound pronouns with quantified antecedents.
2.3.1 Abstraction
In DRT, the so-called abstraction procedure makes it possible to recon-
struct a description using representation material of the antecedent. Plu-
ral e-type pronouns can be analysed as variables equated with such a de-
scription. This is made possible by a summation operator ‘Σ’, which creates
the plural individual maximally satisfying the description. For instance,
the abstraction in (2.43) corresponds to the maximal plurality of farmers
owning a donkey.
(2.43) Σx.
x y
farmer(x)
donkey(y)
own(x,y)
The operator can be used to abstract information from a duplex condition.
That is, following a duplex condition as in (2.44), we want the individual in
(2.43) to be a potential antecedent for subsequent (e-type) plural anaphors.
It stands for the farmers that own a donkey.
(2.44)
x
farmer(x) @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Most
x
y
donkey(y)
own(x,y)
A construction rule regulated when abstraction can be applied. It is a spe-
cial kind of construction rule since the “application conditions relate to the
DR-theoretical structure of the DRS, not to the syntactic form of particu-
lar reducible DRS-conditions” (Kamp and Reyle 1993, p. 344). That is, the
11To be slightly more precise, the following conditions hold for such duplex conditions: r ∈
UR and DOM(f) ∩ (UR ∪US) = ∅.
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occurrence of a duplex condition in a DRS is enough to trigger application
of the procedure. In fact, Kamp and Reyle suggest that Abstraction could
be seen as a kind of “inference principle on DRSs” Kamp and Reyle 1993,
p. 344). According to the construction rule, given a duplex condition as in
(2.45), we may perform the operations specified in (2.46).
(2.45)
R1
K1 @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Q
v
R2
K2
(2.46) Form the union K0=K1∪K2 of the two component
DRSs of this condition. Choose a discourse refer-
ent w from R1∪R2. Introduce into the universe
of the DRS in which the duplex condition occurs
a new discourse referent Y and add to its set of
conditions:
Y = Σw.K0
According to this rule, we can extend any DRS containing a duplex condi-
tion to one containing an abstraction over the restrictor and scope of the
quantification that introduced the duplex condition.
Notice that abstraction makes use of the representational nature of
DRT. It is triggered not by a linguistic quantificational structure, but rather
by the semantic representation of such a structure. This is necessary since
the abstraction procedure comes on top of the ordinary interpretation of
quantification, which needs to represent the constituents of the structure
piece by piece. Only after the whole quantification is represented can
the formation of antecedents start. The duplex condition specifies exactly
which referents can be abstracted over, namely those in R1∪R2 with re-
spect to K1∪K2.
The representational nature of abstraction becomes especially clear if
we try to incorporate abstraction in DPL. Of course, it is perfectly possible
to find a way in which a formula ‘X=Σx.ϕ’ is meaningful in an extended
version of DPL. It would have to express the identity relation 〈f, f〉 if and
only if f(X) equals the set of d’s such that if we interpret ϕ with respect to
f ∪ {〈x, d〉} we successfully find some output function.
The question, however, is where ϕ comes from. The conditions it con-
tains will, of course, not be retrievable from the input function. They will
have to be copies of conditions which occurred in a formula representing an
antecedent quantificational structure. For instance the example in (2.47)
could be successfully modelled in our neo-DPL as (2.48), but this would
be completely counter to the compositional ideology of DPL, since the ana-
phoric reference Y is retrieved not by context change, but through a copy
instruction on formulae.12
12Moreover, the fact that the abstraction procedure is in essence a copy instruction illus-
trates once more the strong resemblance with the e-type strategy tradition.
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(2.47) Every student wrote a paper. They worked very hard.
(2.48) ∀x[[STUDENT(x)]⇒ [∃y[PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y)]]]∧
∃X[X = Σx.[STUDENT(x) ∧ ∃y[PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y)]]] ∧
WORKED_VERY_HARD(X)
For now, it suffices to conclude that there is an interesting tension between
the dynamic semantic ideal and DRT’s treatment of maximal plural ana-
phora.
2.3.2 Domain information
Turning now to more complex kinds of anaphora that involve pluralities,
namely dependent interpretations of pronouns, it becomes clear that the
abstraction procedure is not enough. Consider (2.49).
(2.49) Three students wrote an article.
They sent it to L&P. Krifka 1996a (ex. 1)
The first sentence of this example can have a distributive reading, wherein
three students each wrote a (different) article. Given that reading, the sec-
ond sentence is to be interpreted as meaning that the students each sent
their own article to Linguistics and Philosophy. The puzzle this example
presents is how the singular pronoun accesses the individual papers when
the only procedure for antecedent formation involves the summation of
values for the referents in the first sentence. That is, given the represen-
tation of the first sentence in (2.49) in figure 2.1a, the second sentence will
result in a quantification over the abstracted referent ‘X′’ (the students
that wrote an article),13, as in figure 2.1b. However, the pronoun ‘it’ can
only access the abstracted referent ‘Y’ (the papers written by the three
students) which leads to the undesirable interpretation that the students
did not only send their own article but also those written by the other two
students. Kamp and Reyle conclude from a similar example that “[w]hen
a set is introduced via Abstraction over some duplex condition δ, then the
information contained in the constituent DRSs of δ is available as infor-
mation concerning the members of that set. This means that when we
distribute over such a set, the DRS occurring on the right-hand side of the
Abstraction equation may be “copied” into the left-hand DRS of the du-
plex condition which the distribution introduces” (Kamp and Reyle 1993,
p. 379).
In order to derive the intended interpretation of (2.49), we have to exe-
cute the “copy” instruction proposed by Kamp and Reyle. Next to the DRS
in (2.1b), which we can discard as an interpretation for (2.49) due to the
mismatch between the plurality of the group of papers (‘Y’) and the sin-
gular number feature of ‘it’, we come to a second DRS, one in which the
13Or, alternatively, it can access the referent ‘X’, which, in this case, describes the same
group of students.
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X
|X| = 3
student*(X)
x
x∈X @@
   @@
  
∀
x
y
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
X X′ Y
|X| = 3
student*(X)
x
x∈X @@
   @@
  
∀
x
y
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
X′=Σx.
x y
x∈X
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
Y=Σy.
x y
x∈X
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
z
z∈ X′ @@
   @@
  
∀
z sent_to_L&P(z,Y)
a. DRS for three students wrote an article b. potential DRS for (2.49) (ignoring
number agreement)
Figure 2.1: Abstraction applied to example (2.49)
individual papers are accessible. This DRS is given in figure 2.2. Quan-
tifying over ‘X′’ allowed the copying of the descriptive material (i.e. the set
of conditions) that was abstracted from the ‘antecedent’ duplex condition.
Krifka criticises this last move as being unmotivated: “[T]he anaphoric
phenomenon of box copying is treated in a quite different and strikingly
informal way. This stands in sharp contrast to the narrowly defined and
well-motivated constraints for the accessibility of discourse entities that
represent standard anaphora” Krifka 1996a (p. 561).
I agree with Krifka’s criticism and wish to add that DRT’s treatment
of dependent pronouns is completely dependent on the use of represen-
tations. The copy-instruction under discussion here accesses individuals
depending on the members of some group antecedent by accessing the rep-
resentation responsible for describing the group. From our point of view,
we prefer to have these individuals accessible in the form of semantic ob-
jects (as in the range of assignment functions). As we saw above with
our attempt to integrate an abstraction procedure in a dynamic predicate
logic, an extension of a semantic analysis using DPL with a treatment of
dependent pronouns in the style of Kamp and Reyle would not comply with
DPL’s compositional roots. The accessibility of individuals that are (indi-
rectly) involved in group formation when quantifying over such a group
would not be due to context change potential, but due to a copy-procedure
on formulae.
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X X′ Y
|X| = 3
student*(X)
x
x∈X @@
   @@
  
∀
x
y
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
X′=Σx.
x y
x∈X
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
Y=Σy.
x y
x∈X
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
x y
x∈X
article(y)
wrote(x,y)
@@
   @@
  
∀
x sent_to_L&P(z,y)
Figure 2.2: Quantification over an inferred domain
2.4 Discussion
The abstraction procedure makes it clear that after processing a quantifi-
cational sentence, not only a duplex condition taking care of the internal
dynamics as well as of the truth-conditions of the quantification is inserted
in the DRSs, but also an abstraction over the material in the conditions of
the duplex condition. Under normal circumstances (i.e. when the quantifi-
cational structure is not embedded in a negative context), this means that
the maximal individual satisfying restrictor and scope is accessible in the
subsequent discourse. One might wonder, however, why this individual is
introduced in such an indirect way. It is difficult to decide whether the
strategy employed by DRT is an e-type strategy or whether it belongs to
the more dynamic tradition. It is dynamic in the sense that plural e-type
pronouns are still simple variables (equated with an abstracted individ-
ual). However, the anaphoric effect these cases of anaphora display are
not due to the linguistic context they appear in, but rather due to a stipu-
lated inference principle on a specific representational form. Nevertheless,
it is hard to criticise the abstraction procedures on these grounds. The pre-
dictions it makes seem to be correct. We could possibly only accuse Kamp
and Reyle of a lack of elegance. Still, there are some cases which show
weaknesses in the abstraction procedure.
In this section, I discuss the merits of DRT, as well as some questions
about the nature of its anaphoric mechanisms.
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2.4.1 Merits of DRT’s analysis
The empirical coverage of the abstraction procedure (and the other infer-
ence principle of box-copying) goes beyond merely accounting for Evans’
remarks on e-type pronouns and maximality. First of all, quantificational
noun phrases are distributive, in contrast to non-quantificational noun
phrases.14
(2.50) Exactly four students wrote a paper. dist/*coll
(2.51) Four students wrote a paper. dist/coll
This is predicted by duplex conditions, which counts the possible atomic
extensions to an embedding function. In other words, only assignment
functions that are extended with an assignment to an atomic individual
are considered. The same goes for the abstraction procedure. In ‘X=Σ
x.K’, no groups that possibly satisfy K are considered, due to the atomicity
restriction implicit in the small letter ‘x’.
A second success of the DRT treatment of quantificational noun phrases
is the maximality of the abstraction procedure. By simply collecting the
successful values, what is recovered is not just any set of values which
would have verified the duplex condition, but a maximalised one. The dis-
tinction above between distributive quantificational noun phrases and the
potentially collective referential ones is relevant with respect to maximal-
ity as well. Indefinites and bare numerals, which do not introduce duplex
conditions and therefore do not depend on the abstraction procedure for
the introduction of antecedents, license non-maximal discourse anaphora.
We can assure ourself of this fact by applying a test taken from Szabolcsi
1997.
(2.52) A few students wrote a paper.
Perhaps there were other students who did the same.
(2.53) Two students wrote a paper.
Perhaps there were other students who did the same.
14Although the intuitions for examples as (2.50) are clear, it remains a simplification to call
quantificational noun phrases distributive. For instance, both (i) and (ii) below, can clearly be
said to be collective.
(i) Exactly four students wrote this paper.
(ii) Exactly forty students gathered in the square yesterday.
There are many complicating subtleties. For instance, (iii) shows that not all quantificational
noun phrases behave in the same way. (That is, the example cannot mean that a group of
students collaborated in writing the paper and that this group forms a majority.)
(iii) ??Most students wrote this paper.
Since –apart from the complications involving collective predication– the group of quantifi-
cational noun phrases behaves the same in many respects, I will ignore this problem and
assume that QNPs are, in essence at least, distributive.
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(2.54) More than two students wrote a paper.
# Perhaps there were other students who did the same.
(2.55) Most students wrote a paper.
# Perhaps there were other students who did the same.
Whenever anaphora is maximal, there is nothing ‘others’ can refer to.
Thus, (2.53) shows that anaphoric relations with ‘two students’ involve two
students no matter whether there were actually more than two students
that wrote a paper. With quantificational determiners, like ‘more than two’
and ‘most’, pronouns will have to pick up the abstracted referent, which is
exhaustive.
A third success of DRT’s treatment of quantification has to do with ac-
cessibility. Since the abstraction procedure can only be applied once its
trigger, a duplex condition, is formed, it is predicted that the type of max-
imal anaphora for which the abstraction forms an antecedent will always
occur after the quantificational structure is completed. That is, quantifica-
tional noun phrases do not display referential effects within the sentence
level. This is supported by the data in (2.56) and (2.57).
(2.56) Two lawyers (each) hired a secretary they interviewed.
(2.57) Most lawyers hired a secretary they interviewed.
The example in (2.56) is ambiguous between a reading in which each of the
two lawyers hired a secretary he or she interviewed and one in which they
each hired a secretary that was interviewed by them both. The ambiguity
involves the possibility of the plural pronoun ‘they’ to be construed as a
collective subject for ‘interview’. In other words, in the first reading, the
secretary is interviewed by the lawyer that hired him and in the second,
he is interviewed by the two lawyers. In contrast, (2.57) lacks this latter
reading, since no plural antecedent has been introduced yet by the subject.
For instance, (2.57) cannot mean that a majority of lawyers each hired a
(different) secretary they collectively interviewed.15
A fourth virtue of DRT is the fact that abstraction is free to abstract
over any referent in the universe of either sub-DRS of the duplex condition.
This way, indefinite noun phrases introduced somewhere in the quantifica-
tional structure trigger exhaustive reference in discourse. For instance, in
(2.58) a plural pronoun accesses the set of papers written by the students.
The DRT account is in (2.59).
(2.58) Most students wrote a paper. They weren’t very good.
15Note that, strikingly, the paraphrase given here does have this reading, since I replaced
the QNP ‘most lawyers’ with ‘a majority of lawyers.’
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In sum, we have discussed four successes of the duplex condition and ab-
straction approach to plural e-type pronouns. We now turn to two of the
less clearly advantageous sides of the proposal.
2.4.2 Some questions
2.4.2.1 Entailment, negativity and emptiness
Let us turn to a particular aspect of entailment patterns between examples
with downward-entailing quantifiers. These quantifiers license anaphora
just like upward-entailing quantifiers do, even though they do not assure
us of the existence of anything satisfying both restrictor and scope.
(2.60) Few students went to the party.
6⇒
Some student went to the party.
With the abstraction procedure, DRT seems to acknowledge that the possi-
bility for anaphora is not influenced by the choice of the determiner. How-
ever, by automatically constructing the antecedent as soon as a duplex
condition is inserted in a DRS, it is in danger of ignoring the lack of en-
tailment in (2.60). The reason is that a condition ‘X = Σx.K’ is interpreted
as the condition that there should exist a function which assigns to X a
value all the atoms satisfy the condition K. Following downward entailing
quantifiers, this could be the empty set. The functions we are considering
should therefore include functions assigning the empty set to a referent for
if we were to exclude such sets, we would not do justice to (2.60).
What are the effects of allowing empty sets as values for referents?16
Allowing for the empty set is not straightforwardly harmless. For instance,
16Actually, DRT does not talk about sets at all, but about the elements of a free complete
atomic upper semilattice with a zero element. Here, we confuse the elements in such struc-
tures with sets, which does not have any serious consequences for our purposes given the
isomorphism between the structures used by DRT and the set of subsets of the domain of
atomic entities together with the subset relation.
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a DRS like the one in (2.61) becomes a tautology, since we may assume the
empty set not to have any lexical property P .
(2.61)
X
¬ P(X)
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this causes problems for the in-
terpretation of natural language expressions. In general, it seems to me
that the restriction of a quantification will already exclude the empty set
as a value. That is, there is no natural language paraphrase for (2.61),
since there is nothing in the DRS that can play the role of a restrictor. For
instance, ‘something does not have property P’ or ‘nothing has property P’
both quantify over ‘things’ and since the empty set is not a thing it does
not verify these sentences. Moreover, quantifier domains are contextually
restricted and we may assume these restrictions to exclude empty sets.
There might be more danger in an example like: ‘Only women do not
like Kylie’, which would be analysed as ‘for all x such that x does not like
Kylie, it holds that x is a woman’ and thus seems to be immediately falsi-
fied by the empty set since it neither likes Kylie, nor is a woman. But here,
too, there is a restriction, namely the set of alternatives (e.g. men, women,
martians) brought about by focus on ‘women’, which again excludes the
empty set. The empty set, then, seems to be an element in the ontology
which never surfaces in linguistic meanings.
There is another assumption which is necessary and relevant to empty
sets. Downward entailing quantifiers are to be represented by duplex con-
ditions and not simply by the introduction (and existential closure) of a
referent. This is because if we were to represent them as ordinary exis-
tential constructions, the predications involved would exclude the empty
set as a possible value for the referent involved, thus strengthening the
truth-conditions. Here is an example. Say we represent ‘Less than three
players are holding a card’ as the following DRS:
(2.62)
X
player*(X)
|X|<3
card(y)
hold(X,y)
Since the empty set is not a player, this DRS is only verified by two players
or a single player holding a card. The DRS is falsified by a situation in
which no players is holding a card. As we will see in chapter 6, the se-
mantics I propose makes an assumption similar to the one described here:
downward entailing NP are to be interpreted as quantificational struc-
tures, not as predicational structures over some introduced (potentially
empty) group of individual.
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Let us focus some more on the burden of the pronoun. The pattern
in (2.63) suggests that with pronominal reference there comes some non-
emptiness condition on its referent. What the contrast between (2.60) and
(2.63) shows is that this condition is due to the pronoun rather than due
to the duplex condition or the subsequent abstractions. Pronouns, then,
trigger an extra condition on abstracted referents, namely that they are
non-empty.
(2.63) Few students went to the party. They had a good time.
⇒ Some students went to the party.
Thus, in order to do justice to both (2.63) and (2.60), two assumptions have
to be made. The first assumption is that abstraction is able to abstract
the empty set, that is, that empty sets are allowed in the range of assign-
ment functions. Second, it is necessary to have the pronoun trigger a non-
emptiness condition on its reference. Against this latter assumption, how-
ever, a more philosophical complication comes to mind. The non-emptiness
condition is semantic in nature, that is, it can only be a predication over
a referent. This means that there is no distinction between a false pred-
ication over an abstracted referent and an empty referent picked up by
a pronoun. From the point of view of accounting for (2.63), this is a good
thing, since what we see there is obviously a semantic fact. However, (2.64)
and its supposed representation (2.65) show that the condition triggered by
a pronoun is not a simple predicational condition.
(2.64) Few students went to the party. And it is not the case that they
misbehaved.
(2.65)
X
x
student∗(x) @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Few
x
x went to the party
X=Σ x.
x
student∗(x)
x went to the party
¬ |X| >0misbehave∗(X)
The representation in (2.65) is wrongly verified if no students went to the
party. Clearly, the condition that comes with a pronoun is presupposi-
tional. This is confirmed by an example like (2.66), where the condition
seems to bind into the antecedent clause, causing the paraphrase in (2.67).
(2.66) If less than ten students pass the test, the teacher will take them
out for dinner.
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(2.67) If less than ten but more than one student passes the test, the
teacher will take them out for dinner.
Similar issues play a role if we consider another alternative understanding
of DRT’s abstraction procedure, namely one where it is seen as a run-of-
the-mill e-type strategy by making the pronoun the crucial factor in the
triggering configuration, instead of the quantificational sentence. This
means that a plural pronoun introduces a variable equated with a descrip-
tion formed from material from an antecedent duplex condition. This de-
scription is taken to correspond to a non-empty set (i.e. the empty set is
not allowed in the range of assignment functions). Here, it is the site of
insertion of the abstraction equation which becomes crucial. Like the non-
emptiness condition in (2.65), the abstraction equation should end up in a
higher DRS.
It is clear that with respect to downward entailing quantification, many
more details concerning the application of the abstraction procedure have
to be clarified.
2.4.2.2 Accessibility of other sets
As we saw above, given a quantificational sentence Dx(A)(B), the abstrac-
tion procedure correctly predicts that the reference set, (λx.A) ∩ (λx.B),
is not the only set that is accessible after processing a quantificational
sentence. Sets depending on the reference set, such as (λy.A) ∩ (λy.B),
are also accessible using abstraction. DRT also makes the strong predic-
tion that the reference set is the only set related to the ranging variable
(here, x) of the antecedent quantifier that is accessible. That is, Kamp and
Reyle predict the unavailability of the maximal set, λx.A, and the comple-
ment set, (λx.A) − (λx.B). Recall from chapter one, however, that cases
of pronominal reference to the maximal set and to the complement set are
both reported.
There does exist a procedure in DRT which comes close to an analysis of
maxset reference, namely kind introduction. Kamp and Reyle’s motivation
for this procedure is closely related to the phenomenon of maximal set
reference. Consider the following example (Kamp and Reyle 1993, p. 391):
(2.68) Few women from this village came to the feminist rally.
No wonder.
They don’t like political rallies very much.
The plural pronoun here does not refer to the few women from the vil-
lage that came to the feminist rally. Instead, it seems to generalise over
all women from the village (or maybe even over all women in the world).
Kamp and Reyle choose to treat this phenomenon as a general option for
the plural pronominal reference and introduce the procedure of kind intro-
duction, which given some “noun establishes a discourse referent for the
genus within the universe of the main DRS” Kamp and Reyle 1993 (p.392).
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Kamp and Reyle correctly remark that a genus is not simply a set.
Rather than a case of reference to the maximal set, they would argue
that the anaphoric phenomenon in (2.68) is independent of reference to
the maximal set. However, most examples do not involve generic reference
at all. Consider, (2.69).
(2.69) Most marbles in this bag are red. But exactly three of them are
black.
The preferred interpretation for the second sentence of (2.69) is that three
of the marbles in the bag are black. The genus ‘marbles in the bag,’ what-
ever this may mean, does not seem to be involved. Should the treatment
of genera in DRT be worked out in more detail, however, so that is allows
for examples like (2.69), the question becomes how kind introduction is to
be restricted. As we will see in more detail in chapter 3, the maximal set
is not generally accessible in the case of weak quantifier. Since kind intro-
duction is a general principle working on representations, there does not
seem to be a way of restricting it to not operate on structures that are due
to those kind of noun phrases.
Turning now to reference to the complement set, Kamp and Reyle ex-
plicitly mention that such type of pronominal reference is predicted not to
exist. They explicitly argue that set-subtraction is not an operation that
could be involved in antecedent formation. Again, however, we have seen
that cases of pronominal reference to the complement set seem to exist. If
Kamp and Reyle are right about the set-subtraction not being one of the
tools involved in anaphora, then we should at least be able to explain the
existence of such cases (away). In the next chapter, we will turn to an
evaluation of the kinds of anaphora Kamp and Reyle do not consider.
2.4.3 Conclusion
Abstraction can account for many of the facts. Yet, as the case of down-
ward entailing quantifiers and reference to sets like the maximal set and
the complement set show, a several details of what exactly the relation be-
tween pronominal reference and abstraction is remain unclear. Moreover,
as Krifka (1996a)’s criticism shows, the procedures that control abstrac-
tion are in many ways unmotivated. The operation is ad hoc, since it does
not treat plural e-type anaphora as a phenomenon which is derivable from
accessibility facts in a straightforward way. This in contrast to singular
e-type anaphora. In general, since accessibility is not a purely semantic
notion, but dependent on representations, it follows that DRT’s analysis
of plurality is not compatible with a non-representational compositional
enterprise in a straightforward way.
Criticism of the abstraction procedure, however, will always have to
deal with the massive empirical coverage of chapter 4 of Kamp and Reyle
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1993. DRT’s success, however, is only due to the fact that the overgenerat-
ing tool of set-abstraction can only be operated by a small set of indepen-
dently motivated rules.
Chapter 3
Pronominal Reference
to Sets
Parts of this chapter appeared in the Journal of Semantics 20.1 (Nouwen 2003),
copyright of Oxford University Press.
3.1 Discourse and sets
Recall from the introduction that discourse pronouns have the ability to
refer to not just one but several sets associated with a quantificational
structure. Apart from the reference set, that is, the set of MPs attending
the meeting in (3.1), reference to the complement set (the MPs not attend-
ing the meeting) and the maximal set (the MPs) also present themselves
as potential antecedents for future plural pronouns.
(3.1) Few MPs attended the meeting. Few(A,B)
a. They decided not to discuss anything important. A ∩B
b. They stayed home instead. A−B
c. But they all attended the drinks afterwards. A
It seems that plural pronoun reference is very flexible. However, as we
will see in this chapter, pronominal reference set reference, exemplified
in (3.1a), is the only kind of pronominal anaphora with a quantificational
antecedent which is robust. For instance, it is difficult to interpret the
pronoun in (3.2) as referring to the maximal set. That is, it does not have
the reading that five students were at the beach (and not in the garden).1
1Nevertheless, quite some people disagree with this intuition. As we will see, pronominal
maximal set reference is licenced whenever the domain of quantification is presupposed to
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Similarly, the pronoun in (3.3) cannot be linked to the complement set. In
fact, the only reading available for (3.3) is a nonsensical one, in which the
MPs that attended the meeting ‘went to the beach instead’ as well.2
(3.2) There are four students in the garden.
Five of them are at the beach. *A
(3.3) Most MPs attended the meeting.
# They went to the beach instead. *(A-B)
The reference set is available for these examples.
(3.4) There are four students in the garden.
One of them was picking flowers. A ∩B
(3.5) Most MPs attended the meeting.
They made a lot of important decisions. A ∩B
The question central to this chapter is the following: does a sentence of the
form NP VP generally introduce discourse referents for the reference set,
the maximal set and the complement set? At the end of the chapter, we
will be able to conclude that a sentence never introduces a referent for the
complement set, sometimes introduces a referent for the maximal set and
always introduces a referent for the reference set.3
Here, I use the DRT terminology of referent-introduction as a conve-
nient way of phrasing the question of whether a certain set is contextually
salient. With this use of terminology come the following two assumptions:
(i) only accessible referents can be salient antecedents and (ii) pronouns
typically refer to salient antecedents. This means that when we want to
refer anaphorically to something not available via a discourse referent, we
will, in principle, have to do so by some linguistic form which bears more
semantic content than the pronoun. But as we will see, the existing cases
of pronominal reference to the complement set are examples of cases in
which a pronoun is used to refer to a set not available by an accessible
exist. This means that quantifiers that do not trigger a presupposition of their domain will
not always licence maxset reference. However, in cases like (3.2), it is easy to assume the
existence of some (salient) set of students anyway. See section 3.2 for some examples of a
different nature.
2Here and in the rest of the book, I use ‘#’ to indicate that an expression is pragmatically
anomalous. In the case of (3.3), the marking is due to the fact that a resolution for the plural
pronoun which would render the continuation consistent does not seem to be available. If
the pronoun has a set of MPs that did not go to the meeting as a potential antecedent, then
the continuation is not in contradiction with the first sentence. The ‘#’ judgement, therefore,
indicates that this antecedent is, in this case, not available.
3An obvious exception to the general availability of the refset as an antecedent is caused by
the determiner ‘no’. However, this follows from the fact that we have assumed that pronouns
carry some sort of non-emptiness presupposition (recall the discussion in section 2.4.2), since
the reference set for a quantifier ‘No N′ ’ is always the empty set. See section 2.4.2 for how
this is realised in the final proposal of this thesis.
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referent. I will come to this conclusion because the availability of the com-
plement set for pronominal reference is not only constrained by properties
of the antecedent sentence, but also constrained by properties of the ut-
terance the pronoun occurs in. Accessibility of the complement set, I will
conclude, is therefore not due to context-change, but due to a last resort
strategy on the part of the hearer. In contrast, the availability of the max-
imal set relies solely on the properties of its antecedent and, therefore, if
these relevant properties are met, a referent for the maximal set will be
introduced.
In order to compare the constraints on referents to sets in discourse,
we will need a way of modelling the restrictions on the different possibili-
ties. Hendriks and de Hoop (2001) developed a framework called optimal-
ity theoretic semantics which will enable us to do just that. In their theory,
different options for interpretation are resolved by resolving the conflict
these options present to the hearer. Among many other phenomena, they
discuss how domain interpretation can be formalised in such a way and,
what is relevant to the present discussion, they briefly apply their theory
to pronominal reference as well.
The interpretation of quantificational domains resembles the flexibility
of pronominal reference in discourse. Quantification is context-dependent.
A statement like the one in (3.6) does not necessarily commit its speaker
to believe that everybody in the whole wide world was smiling.
(3.6) Everybody smiled.
The domain in (3.6) is not interpreted as the set of all human beings, but
rather as some salient set in the discourse. This dependency may be on
many different sets set up by a quantificational antecedent. This becomes
especially clear when syntax does not overtly specify a domain. The exam-
ples in (3.7) shows a variation similar to those in (3.1).4
(3.7) Few MPs attended the meeting,
a. and several walked out. several attending MPs
4Hendriks and de Hoop (2001) even report a case where the domain is chosen to be the set
denoted by the nuclear scope of the previous quantificational sentence.
(i) Er
There
zijn
are
in
in
Nederland
the Netherlands
maar
only
weinig
few
vrouwen
women
hoogleraar.
professor.
‘There are only a few female full professors in the Netherlands’
(ii) De meesten
Most
zijn
are
nog
still
altijd
always
mannen
men
met
with
baarden
beards
of
or
brillen.
glasses.
‘Most of them are still men with beards or glasses.’
Hendriks and de Hoop 2001, p. 24, ex. 44
The interpretation here would normally prefer to have ‘de meesten’ (most) range over female
full professors or simply women in general, but these are blocked by the predication of being
‘men with beards’. Instead, the set denoted by the scope of the first sentence, namely the set
of full professors, is chosen as the domain of ‘most’.
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b. but all had an excuse. all non-attending MPs
c. most stayed at home. most MPs
The starting point for optimality theoretic semantics is a radical hypoth-
esis about interpretation. De Hoop and Hendriks’ so-called free interpre-
tation hypothesis states that “all possible elements of a certain semantic
type may serve as the elements between which a relation can be estab-
lished by a relational type in a complex expression” Hendriks and de Hoop
2001 (p. 13). For quantificational domains, this means that a determiner
may, in principle, choose any set as its domain. This in principle infinity
of choices is then evaluated by a number of soft constraints, which differ
in their importance. The interpretation of a quantificational structure is
now that choice which violates the least important constraints. Thus, it
represents an optimality theoretic approach to semantics.
Optimality theory (OT, Prince and Smolensky 1997) is really a theory of
grammar. Given an input, a number of candidate forms is generated, the
so-called candidate set. A hierarchy of violable constraints dictates which
candidate is optimal, and hence grammatical. In OT semantics, the input
is a syntactic string, which generates a set of possible interpretations. An
interpretation I is optimal for form F if all its competitors show more seri-
ous violations than those of I. A violation of a constraint C is more serious
than a violation of all or some of the constraints ranked below C. Opti-
mality is graphically represented using tableau notation, (cf. figure 3.1,
below) in which highly ranked constraints are left of lower constraints and
violations are marked with ‘*’. The optimal candidate is marked with the
symbol ‘+’.
Returning to the subject of domain selection, it is clear what the mer-
its of such a theory are. Since, as we have seen, domain restriction is
extremely flexible, all possibilities should in principle have the option of
resulting in the actual interpretation. Which set is chosen as a domain
depends on the interaction of a number of soft constraints.
One of the constraints adopted by de Hoop and Hendriks describes the
preference for choosing a reduced domain of a previous quantification as
the current domain of a quantification. To be precise, forward directional-
ity, as the constraint is called, states that the reference set of a previous
quantificational sentence is to be favoured as the domain of the current
quantificational sentence.
(3.8) Forward Directionality: The topic range induced by the domain of
quantification of a determiner is reduced to the topic range
induced by the intersection of the two argument sets of this
determiner.
This constraint is motivated by the fact that forward directional interpre-
tation seems to block other choices. For instance, in (3.9), ‘three’ is readily
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(3.9) AVOIDCONTRADICTION FORWARDDIRECTIONALITY
three students *
+three attending students
(3.10) AVOIDCONTRADICTION FORWARDDIRECTIONALITY
+three students *
three attending students *
Figure 3.1: Avoid Contradiction and Forward Directionality
interpreted as three students attending the meeting, rather than just any
three students.
(3.9) Ten students attended the meeting. Three spoke.
Forward directionality, however, cannot be a hard constraint. The example
in (3.10) is interpretable even though ‘three’ clearly cannot be interpreted
as ranging over attending students.
(3.10) Ten students attended the meeting. Three didn’t.
What happens in (3.10), according to the theory of de Hoop and Hendriks,
is that a non-forward directional interpretation is preferred over a contra-
dictive one. Therefore, the constraint ‘Avoid contradiction’ is postulated
and ranked above forward directionality. This predicts the interpretation
of both (3.9) and (3.10), as shown in figure 3.1.
Assuming that anaphoricity of pronouns is comparable to the anaphoric
behaviour of bare determiners, forward directionality is a likely candidate
for the modelling of a preference of pronouns for reference set reference. As
we saw above, however, other choices for interpreting pronouns sometimes
surface. We also saw that this possibility is not always an option. In fact,
with respect to complement set reference, (3.1b) and (3.3), repeated here
as (3.11) and (3.12), show a contrast in the availability of the complement
set.
(3.11) Few MPs attended the meeting.
They stayed home instead. complement set
(3.12) Most MPs attended the meeting.
#They went to the beach instead. *complement set
The intuitive difference between (3.11) and (3.12) is the monotonicity of
the antecedent quantifier.5 Since (3.12), contains the monotone increasing
5A quantifier D(A) is monotone increasing (or upward entailing) if and only if ∀B ⊆ B′ :
D(A)(B)→ D(A)(B′). A quantifier D(A) is monotone decreasing (or downward entailing) if
and only if ∀B ⊆ B′ : D(A)(B′)→ D(A)(B)
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(3.11) EMPTINESS FORWARDDIRECTIONALITY
reference set *
+complement set *
(3.12) EMPTINESS FORWARDDIRECTIONALITY
+reference set
complement set * *
Figure 3.2: Emptiness and Forward Directionality
‘most MPs’ it does not guarantee the existence of any MPs not attending
the meeting. It seems then that reference to the complement set is only
allowed once we know it exists. This moves de Hoop and Hendriks toward
proposing the following constraint:
(3.13) Emptiness: As the antecedent of an anaphoric expression, do not
choose a set which is or may be empty.
Emptiness is ranked higher than forward directionality. This means that
whenever the refset could be empty, we disregard forward directionality
and selecting to satisfy the emptiness condition by choosing an alterna-
tive reference (e.g. the complement set). This yields a reasonable account
of the distribution of complement anaphora. Monotone increasing quanti-
fiers have potentially empty complement sets, so complement set reference
would violate both emptiness and forward directionality. The correspond-
ing tableaux are in figure 3.2.
Generalising on this approach we may expand the candidate set with
the maximal set.6 The ranking of ‘emptiness’ above ‘forward directionality’
now predicts that maximal set reference is possible whenever it is guaran-
teed to be non-empty and reference set reference is excluded. Intuitively,
this seems to be on the right track. As I will discuss below, the class of
determiners not licencing pronominal maximal set reference does indeed
allow its domain to be empty. However, what the relation is with forward
directionality remains to be found out.
The analysis of de Hoop and Hendriks sets the stage for a more de-
tailed investigation into the availability of sets in discourse. What the data
clearly points out is the principled flexibility of both pronominal reference
and domain selection. This is captured by de Hoop and Hendriks’ free
generation of interpretations. Various preferences constrain the choices
between these interpretations. In the remainder of this chapter, I will fo-
cus in much more detail on pronominal reference to sets and show that
6The candidate set should really be something which is generated by the free interpreta-
tion hypothesis. The presentation here is a schematic account of the theory. It leaves implicit
many constraints which filter out the candidates that never surface.
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there is more to say than de Hoop and Hendriks’ initial successful analysis
of.
3.2 Reference to the maximal set
The example in (3.2) showed that maximal set reference is not a general
option. Similar to what we saw with the reference set and the complement
set, not all determiners guarantee the non-emptiness of their domain of
quantification.
(3.14) No unicorns have ever visited this forest.
6⇒ there are unicorns
(3.15) It is unlikely that most unicorns visited this forest.
⇒ there are unicorns
(3.16) It is unlikely that two unicorns visited this forest.
6⇒ there are unicorns
This is related to the intersectivity property. Formally, D is intersective
iff D(A)(B)⇔ D(A ∩B)(B) (see Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan 1987).
Intersective determiners do not give any information about their domain.
For instance, while in (3.16) the reported unlikelihood is challenged by
two unicorns visiting the forest, in (3.15) the majority of some given set of
unicorns should pay the forest a visit. That is, in order to falsify (3.16) it
suffices to find two visiting unicorns. The total set of unicorns is not at
issue.
The relevant distinction here is that between weak and strong deter-
miners (Milsark 1974). Weak determiners are intersective (Barwise and
Cooper 1981) and due to this property fail to present any information about
the domain. The classic test for weakness is occurrence in an existential
‘there’ sentence.
(3.17) There are four/a few/many/few/no/*most/*all/*the cats.
Quite some determiners that pass this test for weakness, however, can
also have strong, i.e. non-intersective readings, although not in existential
there sentences. Clearly, (3.18) has more than one reading. Its weak read-
ing tells us that the students that came to the party are many in number.
But it also has a strong reading in which the number of students that came
to the party is high when compared to the total number of students.7
(3.18) Many students came to the party.
7Westerståhl (1984) gives two more ways to interpret ‘many’, both of which violate the
conservativity property.
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It is possible to isolate strong readings from weak ones. For instance,
Milsark (1974) notes that only strong noun phrases can be the subject
of individual-level predicates (that is, predicates which express inherent
properties of individuals).
(3.19) Some students are intelligent.
(3.20) Some students came to my office.
The example in (3.19) cannot be uttered at the start of a conversation about
some group of students who happen to be intelligent, while (3.20) could be
uttered to introduce some group of students to the hearer. The only pos-
sible reading for (3.19) is that while some of the students are intelligent,
others are not. Stress plays an important role here. The stress pattern
within a noun phrase is another way of keeping weak and strong readings
apart. While in (3.19), ‘some students’ has to be pronounced with stress on
‘some’ in order to get the felicitous strong reading, the preferred pronun-
ciation in (3.20) is with stress on ‘students,’ yielding the weak reading. In
fact, if we stress the determiner in (3.20), we get the partitive reading that
some of the students came to my office, implying that other students did
not.
(3.21) SOME students came to my OFFICE.
Using these characteristics of weak and strong determiners, we can show
that only (occurrences of) strong determiners introduce a maximal set an-
tecedent into the discourse. One clue comes from the definite description
‘the others.’ It needs to be able pick up two sets: a domain and a subset of
that domain to which it forms a contrast. Following weak noun phrases,
there is no domain which may form an antecedent for ‘the others’. Conse-
quently, use of ‘the others’ is infelicitous following such noun phrases.8
(3.22) Some STUDENTS came to my office. # The others didn’t bother.
(3.23) SOME students came to my office. The others didn’t bother.
I take this to show that strong determiners presuppose their domain of
quantification. That is, their use signals the existence of a set satisfying
the restrictor clause in the context. (See also, Moltmann 1996)
Consequently, maximal set reference is only felicitous if the antecedent
noun phrase is strong, since only those cases are cases in which the do-
main of quantification is accessible. Strong determiners presuppose that
the context contains a referent corresponding to the domain of quantifi-
cation. Weak determiners do not tell us anything about such a referent.
The property of intersectivity allows them to simply count the individuals
satisfying the property expressed by both arguments.
As we will see, the case of pronominal reference to the complement set
is not quite as straightforward.
8Of course, there does exist an interpretation for (3.22) where ‘others’ refers to non-
students.
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3.3 Reference to the complement set
The phenomenon where an NP refers to the complement set of an an-
tecedent quantificational structure is called complement anaphora. Dur-
ing the end of the eighties and the early nineties of the previous century,
this type of reference was extensively studied by psycholinguists. In the
nineties, formal semanticists began to get interested in the subject, but
this interest resulted in just a few papers. The reason for this seemed to
be that, in general, semanticists reacted sceptically to the experimental
data. They questioned whether examples like (3.35) really involved refer-
ence to the complement set, or rather a more generic-style reference to the
set of MPs.
Thus, two questions became central to the study of complement ana-
phora: (i) do pronominal complement anaphora involve reference to the
complement set? and (ii) what constraints explain the distribution of com-
plement anaphora? I will address both questions. First, however, we will
consider the psycholinguistic data which sowed the seeds of interest in the
semantics of complement anaphora.
3.3.1 Moxey and Sanford’s experiments
Studies of complement anaphora have their origin in the psycholinguis-
tic research of Linda Moxey and Anthony Sanford. They found that when
subjects were asked to give intuitions about denotations of related deter-
miners like a few, few, very few, only a few, not many, etc., no reliable
differences were found. The goal of a new set of experiments thus became
to find out what the functional difference between these determiners is.
See Sanford and Moxey 1993 for an overview, but also Moxey and Sanford
1987 and Sanford, Moxey, and Paterson 1994.
In a sentence completion task, subjects were confronted with a single
quantified statement and asked to make up a sensible continuation begin-
ning with the plural pronoun ‘they’.
(3.24) Q of the MPs attended the meeting. They. . .
Subjects were also asked to indicate what the plural pronoun referred to in
their continuation. Here, they had a choice between five categories: MPs
in general, all MPs, MPs who went to the meeting, MPs who did not go
to the meeting and none of the above. Independent judges checked all the
utterances and reference indications. In 98% of these cases, the judges
agreed with the judgments of the subjects.
In an alternative experiment, intra-sentential complement anaphora
were tested, using a structure like (3.25).
(3.25) Q of the MPs attended the meeting, because they. . .
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The results showed that following a structure which had one of the deter-
miners hardly any, not many, very few and few substituted for Q, subjects
preferred to use the plural pronoun to refer to the complement set of the
quantification over MPs, that is, the set of MPs who did not go to the meet-
ing. With other determiners (like many and a few), the tendency was to
refer to the reference set (that is, the MPs who did go to the meeting). A
special case was only a few, which only showed compset reference in the
task involving a structure like (3.25).
In a different study, complement set reference was studied with pro-
portional numerical expressions. The continuation method and the use
of judges was as in the experiment above (cf. Sanford and Moxey 1993,
p. 77). Here, it was found that compset continuations were favoured fol-
lowing determiners less than n%. The other determiners (n%, only n% and
more than n%) showed hardly any continuations containing complement
set reference.
‘Preference’ for a continuation containing reference to the complement
set should be interpreted rather weakly as roughly indicating that more
than half of the subjects used a complement anaphor. That is, refset contin-
uations did occur following few, not many, etc. In fact, Moxey and Sanford
1987 conclude that though “few and not many licence compset anaphoric
mappings [t]hey do not however, require them” (Moxey and Sanford 1987,
p. 203). In contrast, they remark that it appears that determiners like a
few can never be followed by pronominal reference to the complement set.
Sanford and Moxey stress that the results show that determiners do
not just identify different proportions, but moreover place focus on differ-
ent parts of the domain. In fact, there is evidence for yet another role
played by determiner choice, namely that of steering the thematic con-
tent of a continuation. This is supported by experiments testing for a cor-
relation between determiners and rhetorical choices made. Independent
judges were asked to indicate to which types the produced continuations
belonged. The possible continuation categories for a sentence like ‘Q MPs
attended the meeting’ were: reason why there, reason why not there, con-
sequence of the number of MPs being there and other. It was found that
determiners that focus on their complement set displayed the ‘reason why
not there’ type as the most prevalent type of continuation. These deter-
miners thus seem to motivate the subject to indicate “the reason why the
predicate is not true of the refset” (see Sanford and Moxey 1993, p. 66).
In sum, taking few as the prototypical case of complement set focus, for
Moxey and Sanford, the utterance of an expression “Few X do Y” consists
of three actions: “(i) identify a small percentage of Xs of which “does Y” is
true; (2) put into focus the set of which Y is false, and (3) set the system to
expect a reason why the division is as small as it is” (Moxey and Sanford
1987, p. 203).
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3.3.2 Semantic data
The experimental data show a clear preference pattern associated with dif-
ferent types of determiners. From a semantic point of view, it is clear that
determiners differ greatly with respect to their potential to licence comple-
ment anaphora. Moxey and Sanford’s experiments showed that following
a determiner like many, there was no preference for using a complement
anaphor. It is now widely accepted that following such ‘positive’ quanti-
fiers, reference to the complement set is disallowed, as is illustrated in
(3.26).
(3.26) Many/Most/A few MPs went to the meeting.
# They were too busy.
The analysis by de Hoop and Hendriks, discussed above, makes a first at-
tempt at explaining the pattern. Their emptiness constraint supposes that
the data in (3.26) is explained by the fact that the quantifiers in (3.26) are
monotone increasing. A case of complement anaphora will therefore be
an attempt at reference to a potentially empty set. Given such an anal-
ysis, pronominal complement anaphora are licenced by a non-increasing
antecedent. Unfortunately, not all decreasing quantifiers licence comple-
ment anaphora. The data show a difference between (modified) cardinal
and proportional (decreasing) quantifiers. Cardinal quantifiers (like ‘thirty
N’) and modified cardinal quantifiers (like ‘less than thirty N’) are inter-
sective. As we saw in the discussion of the maximal set, in a quantifica-
tional sentence D(A)(B), if D is an intersective determiner only the A’s
that are B need to be considered. On the other hand, if D is a proportional
determiner the A’s which are not B also need to be taken into account.
Intersective decreasing quantifiers disallow pronominal reference to the
complement set, while proportional decreasing quantifiers allow it.
(3.27) Less than thirty MPs attended the meeting.
# They were too busy.
(3.28) Less than thirty percent/Less than half/Few of the MPs attended
the meeting.
They were too busy.
The example in (3.27) improves once the decreasing modified cardinal is in
a partitive construction.
(3.29) Less than thirty of the fifty MPs attended the meeting.
They were too busy.
These observations are in sharp contrast with data concerning reference
set reference. No matter what the antecedent determiner is, reference to
the refset is always allowed.
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(3.30) Most MPs attended the meeting.
They discussed a lot.
(3.31) Few of the/Less than thirty MPs attended the meeting.
Nevertheless, they managed to discuss a lot.
In contrast to Moxey and Stanford’s findings, which deal with focusing
and preference patterns, the data given here are strict facts about inter-
pretability. While Moxey and Sanford focus on why decreasing determin-
ers emphasise their complements set, I wish to focus on why increasing
determiners completely disallow subsequent pronominal complement set
reference, while all determiners allow for reference set reference. The data
show that De Hoop and Hendriks’ elegant explanation in terms of a conflict
of constraints needs to be amended in order to explain this asymmetry.
Like de Hoop and Hendriks, I have assumed up to now that the cases of
complement anaphora and cases of anaphoric reference to the complement
set are the same. However, as mentioned before, it is not immediately
clear that what is involved in complement anaphora really is reference to
the complement set. Quite a few researchers consider this to be a different
kind of phenomenon. Before turning to what explains the strict pattern of
complement anaphora licencing, it is important to first concentrate on the
question of what a complement anaphor actually is.
3.3.3 Complement anaphora and reference to compset
Corblin (1996b) argues that accepting the complement set as a potential
antecedent for plural reference is inconsistent with an important generali-
sation made by Kamp and Reyle. Based on Partee’s example (3.32), Kamp
and Reyle conclude that “apparently, subtracting one set from another is
not a permissible operation for the formation of pronominal antecedents”
(Kamp and Reyle 1993, p. 307).
(3.32) Eight of the ten balls are in the bag.
# They are under the sofa.
Corblin goes on to argue that complement anaphora is really a case of
reference to the maximal set. Following Corblin, we will call this pseudo
reference to the complement set.
Reference to the restrictor following a quantified structure is in princi-
ple always possible. Kamp and Reyle’s (3.33) is the standard example:
(3.33) Few women from this village came to the feminist rally. No
wonder. They don’t like political rallies very much.
Here, the plural pronoun in the final sentence refers to the restrictor of the
subject quantifier, the women from this village.9 Corblin argues that it is
9There is also a reading of (3.33) where the plural pronoun refers to women in general.
Corblin allows two maximal set references: the restrictor and the bare noun inside the re-
strictor. Like Corblin, I will ignore the latter type of reference.
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this type of reference that gets confused with complement set reference.
Corblin gives the following example to strengthen his proposal.
(3.34) Peu
Few
d’électeurs
of-voters
français
French
ont
have
voté
voted
pour
for
le
the
candidat
candidate
du
of-the
parti
party
communiste.
communist.
Ils
They
ont
have
voté
voted
pour
for
le
the
candidat
candidate
de
of
la
the
droite
right
à
with
40%
40%
environ.
average.
“Few French voters voted for the candidate of the communist
party. Approximately 40 percent of the voters voted for the
right-wing candidate.”
He argues that this example cannot possibly be an example of (genuine)
complement set reference, since the adverbial à 40% environ would render
the sentence with an explicit reference to this set false.
The example above doesn’t show that reference to the complement set
does not exist, it merely illustrates the fact that maximal set reference is
a potential alternative. I will discuss two proposals for a pseudo-reference
analysis of complement anaphora more concretely. One is Corblin’s own
analysis, the other an alternative suggested by Bart Geurts.
3.3.3.1 Two pseudo reference analyses
The general idea in Corblin 1996a and Corblin 1996b is that complement
set reference is really a case of reference to the maximal set under an
implicit restrictive modifier.
Corblin identifies the complement set licencing determiners as those
which demonstrate that the reference set is smaller than expected. Thus,
by referring to the maximal set, we know that its majority will consist
of elements not satisfying the nuclear scope. In a continuation, we can
therefore confuse a restricted reference to the maximal set with reference
to the complement set.
(3.35) Few of the MPs went to the meeting.
They stayed home instead.
In (3.35), the first sentence declares that the proportion of MPs that went
to the meeting is small. In the second sentence we can therefore gener-
alise over the MPs and explain their (general) absence. Technically, Cor-
blin adopts a DRT approach. Since the antecedent sentence expresses the
fact that the refset was smaller than some norm, a partial abstraction op-
eration is triggered creating the reference to the maxset. Restrictive mod-
ification then weakens this maxset reference, causing the resemblance to
complement set reference. The application of restrictive modification is
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natural since any sentence, Corblin argues, carries either explicitly or im-
plicitly some quantificational modification. Sometimes, this implicit mod-
ifier has to be universal (in a context where strictness is important, for
instance), but often the modifier expresses some kind of generalisation.
An alternative to Corblin’s analysis was proposed by Bart Geurts in his
book review of Moxey and Sanford’s book (Geurts 1997). The proposal is
based on the concept of collective reference.10 This phenomenon is quite
common with plural definite descriptions.
(3.36) The soldiers withstood the attack. (from Link 1991)
Reference in (3.36) can be sloppy in the sense that the sentence is consid-
ered suitable to describe even situations where not all the soldiers were
able to cope with the attack.
According to Geurts, a complement anaphor is an instance of this kind
of sloppy reference. The plural pronoun in compset continuations refers to
the maximal set, which is collectively held responsible for the negation of
the nuclear scope in the antecedent sentence.
3.3.3.2 Arguments against pseudo reference
Several authors have criticised the line of reasoning explained in the previ-
ous section, most notably Moxey and Sanford themselves, but Kibble 1997a
(p. 260-264), also gave a number of arguments against such accounts. In
this section, I will evaluate the arguments found in the literature. In the
end, I will come to the conclusion that complement anaphora really do
involve complement set reference. Still, many of the arguments against
pseudo-reference accounts that I discuss below remain rather weak. I will
explain why this is so, but I will also explain why one of these arguments
is strong enough to seriously consider complement anaphora as reference
to the complement set.
Personal judgments
An obvious problem with reducing complement anaphora to a confusion
of maxset with compset is that it is not clear why subjects would not be
aware of such a confusion. Remember that in Moxey and Sanford’s exper-
iments, subjects were asked to give their personal judgment on what they
had referred to. These were almost always compatible with judgments of
independent judges. Subjects were even given the explicit option of judging
their continuation to be a generalisation over the maximal set.
10It must be noted that Geurts’ proposal is simply an option he considers. In his book-
review he still seems to think of reference to the complement set as a realistic possibility.
Nevertheless, I will refer to the collective reference variant of pseudo-reference as “Geurts”s
proposal”.
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Moxey and Sanford report that some critics have weakened this argu-
ment by suggesting that people in general do not know what they refer to
and that their comment on the reference of they is simply a naive judg-
ment on language use. Moxey and Sanford themselves find it “hard to see
why there is a misunderstanding over the intended referent” (Sanford and
Moxey 1993, p. 64), but I tend to agree with the critics. How can naive lan-
guage users even understand what is meant by the question: where does
the word they refer to? It is clear that even if complement set reference did
not exist and complement anaphora were to reduce to a weakened form
of maximal set reference, the objects that matter to the continuation were
still just those in the complement set. It could well be that subjects answer
the question in that light.
The use of instead
A different argument against a pseudo reference account of complement
anaphora is that the frequent use of instead seems to indicate that a refer-
ence is made to a complementary situation. We are not able to use instead
when no contrast is made. One of the continuations from Moxey and San-
ford’s experiment is given in (3.37).
(3.37) Hardly any of the MPs went to the meeting.
They were out at the pub or with their secretaries instead.
If this were a case of maximal set reference, then there would be no con-
trast. Genuine compset reference would make the use of instead felicitous
since it implicitly denies the fact that more than a handful of MPs attended
the meeting.
This is my interpretation of the standard argument against pseudo-
reference based on the use of instead. It seem, however, that this line of
critique cannot be maintained. In fact, we can simulate Corblin’s approach
to a continuation including instead as follows.
(3.38) Few of the students went to the party.
Most of them went to the beach instead.
The plural pronoun ‘them’ refers to the maxset and there is no explicit neg-
ative property being contrasted, yet, the use of instead is unproblematic. It
seems to me that the semantic aspects of instead are not well known and
that rejecting pseudo reference on the basis of an occurrence of instead is
rather preliminary.
Notice that the use of instead in (3.39) is ambiguous.
(3.39) Tom went to the cinema, and Bill stayed at home instead.
(3.39) is ambiguous between Bill staying home instead of John and Bill
staying home instead of going to the cinema. This means that instead does
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not necessarily seek to contrast full sentences. We could thus easily think
of the use of instead as contrasting a VP and we are certainly not obliged
to think of instead as operating on full sentence meanings, including for
instance, implicit modifiers. The example in (3.37) could thus very well be
an instance of maximal set reference.
Explicit definites
Another common criticism of an approach to complement anaphora involv-
ing some sort of implicit modification of maxset-reference is that the re-
stricted reading is absent when the plural pronoun is replaced by a definite
description directly referring to the maximal set.
(3.40) Few of the students went to the party.
They were too busy.
(3.41) Few of the students went to the party.
# The students were too busy.
In (3.40) the plural pronoun corresponds to the full set of students. Since
we know that few of them went to the party we can apply a restrictor
to the maximal set and thus identify this weakened maximal set with the
complement set. The puzzle is why in (3.41) the implicit operator suddenly
cannot do its work.11
I am not convinced that this puzzle forms an argument against Cor-
blin’s approach. In fact, the oddness of (3.41) is part of a much larger
puzzle. Consider, for instance:
(3.42) All students came to the party.
They had a good time.
(3.43) All students came to the party.
# The students had a good time.
(3.44) All students came to the party.
# The students who came had a good time.
In (3.42), the plural pronoun refers to the maximal set, which is equal to
the reference set. However, if we explicitly refer to either maximal set or
reference set by a definite (as in (3.43) and (3.44) respectively), then the
continuation is out. The puzzle of (3.41) obviously has little to do with the
implicit restrictive modifier, which might or might not be present. More
insight is needed into the difference between the use of a pronoun and the
use of a definite description when used anaphorically in these contexts.
11Moreover, in (3.99), below, and example is given which shows that an epithet definite
description is allowed to refer to the complement set.
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Notice also that the argument cannot be turned against complement
set reference. Definite descriptions are possible as genuine complement
anaphora, witness the complement subsectional12 anaphor in (3.46).
(3.45) Most of the senators attended the meeting.
The democrats sat on the opposite side of the republicans.
(3.46) Few of the senators attended the meeting.
The republicans had a good excuse, the democrats didn’t.
(3.46) shows that definite descriptions (here, as so-called partial match
anaphors) do have the potential to refer to (parts of) the compset. Con-
sequently, there is neither an argument against nor in favour of pseudo
reference. Definite descriptions can have complement set reference, but
that doesn’t tell us anything about whether or not this is real reference to
compset or some kind of pseudo-reference.
The strength of the modifier
Corblin’s analysis assumes that complement set licencing determiners re-
port on the smallness of the reference set. Moxey and Sanford’s studies tell
us that there are a few determiners that do licence complement anaphora
but do not offer a smallness judgment.
(3.47) Not quite all of the MPs attended the meeting.
They stayed at home instead.
Note that it does not do to dismiss this on account of the vagueness of
a determiner like not quite all. “True” downward monotone proportional
determiners like less than 90% also licence complement anaphora.
(3.48) Less than 90% of the MPs attended the meeting.
They stayed at home instead.
Following Corblin’s analysis, the second sentences in (3.47) and (3.48) have
the plural pronoun referring to the maximal set. By the presence of a
restrictive modifier the sentences comment on a generalisation of this set.
The problem is, however, that They stayed at home reports on a minority
group of MPs.
Notice that Geurts seems immune to this line of critique (as he points
out himself). Even minorities can be responsible for collective reference.
In (3.49), there is an example where the actual subset of individuals satis-
fying the predication could, in fact, be a minority.
(3.49) The local residents organised a barbecue.
12Subsectional anaphora are anaphora that refer to subsets of their antecedent. An exam-
ple is an anaphoric relation between the definite description John’s pets and the subsectional
anaphor the dogs. See Krahmer and van Deemter 1998 and references therein.
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Imagine, for instance, a situation where there are a hundred residents
and an organising committee consisting of ten of them. In such a situation
(3.49) could be truthfully uttered.
3.3.3.3 Plural reference
So far, we have seen that there exist a whole range of arguments against
pseudo-reference, but that most of them are far from convincing and can
very easily be dismissed. Moreover, the most powerful argument, the
strength of the modifier involved, seems to hold only for one type of pseudo
reference, namely one wherein an implicit operator which is responsible
for the generalisation over maxset is assumed. Other analyses, where the
effect is seen as a side-effect of plural reference, cannot be subjected to this
criticism. In my view, this allows us to reject the analysis based on some
sort of implicit modification of maximal set reference. In this section, I will
investigate the potential of the other pseudo reference account, which is
based on inherent properties of plurality.
Geurts refers to the type of reference he suspects to be involved in com-
plement anaphora as collective reference. As already mentioned, in this
type of reference, subsets of the predicate’s argument can be responsible
for the complete satisfaction of the predication. I should start by acknowl-
edging the existence of such reference and by making it clear that such ref-
erence undoubtedly occurs in complement anaphoric continuations. What
is at stake here is whether complement anaphora are necessarily instances
of collective reference.
Plural reference, distributivity and all
Dowty (1987) illustrates in a clear way that non-total definite reference
displayed by plurals is not limited to predicates which are clearly collec-
tive. He shows that apparently plural reference in general is not commit-
ted to strict truth-conditions, witness the example in (3.50).
(3.50) At the end of the press conference, the reporters asked the
president questions. Dowty 1987 (ex. 23)
While one would want to classify to be asking a question as a distribu-
tive predicate, this example does not turn out false if, in fact, not every
one of the reporters asked the president a question. Dowty argues that
sentences like (3.50) are not true modulo some handwaving, but that they
are in fact literally true due to the semantics of the definite determiner.
In the lexicon, distributive sub-entailments are specified and these give
the conditions for individuals to satisfy the verbal predicate. The definite
determiner does not force its complement to fully satisfy the distributive
sub-entailment.
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The effect which might be responsible for complement anaphoric refer-
ence is thus not limited to collectivity. There is another property of the type
of reference under discussion which is relevant for our evaluation. This is
the observation that any kind of sloppy plural reference is strengthened by
the quantifier “all”.
Consider again an example of sloppy reference, given below in (3.51).
Plural definite reference allows a subgroup of the total group of soldiers
to be responsible for a collective hunger (notwithstanding the fact that the
involved VP is distributive). This means that in (3.51) some soldier might
actually be fine. Such a possibility typically disappears once the floating
quantifier “all” occurs in the sentence. In (3.52), there are no exceptions
allowed.
(3.51) The soldiers were hungry.
(3.52) The soldiers were all hungry.
In Dowty’s terms, “all” forces all the sub-individuals to fulfil the predi-
cate’s sub-entailments. With distributive predicates this means that each
individual should be an independent member of the interpretation of the
predicate. With collective predicates this means that each individual has
to have some (distributive) property.
How is this relevant for the current discussion on complement ana-
phora? If complement anaphora involves plural reference to the maximal
set, then the presence of a floating quantifier “all” undoes the weakening
to pseudo complement set reference. That is, the floating quantifier turns
the interpretation into a strict maximal set reference. In case complement
anaphora involve reference to the complement set, then floating quanti-
fiers have little effect, since they would totalise reference to the complete
complement set.
It so happens that there is an oddity with complement anaphoric con-
tinuations. Moxey and Sanford report that in quite a few continuations
judged to involve reference to compset, subjects used the floating quanti-
fier “all”. One example is given in (3.53).
(3.53) Few of the fans went to the football match. Sanford and Moxey
1993
They all watched the game on television instead. (p. 74)
One might suggest that what the floating quantifier does here is in fact
exaggerate the inferior size of the reference set further. By the bold state-
ment that every one of the fans saw the game on television, the refer-
ence set is claimed to be empty. Frankly, there is no way to tell and here
we stumble on a difficult point in our evaluation. It may well be that
the choice between real compset reference and pseudo reference cannot be
made. Since the pseudo reference analysis makes use of the vagueness of
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language, it is not possible to construct counterarguments based on sys-
tematic properties of natural language interpretation possible.
Similar considerations arise when we return to the argument against
pseudo-reference based on situations where considerable weakening of max-
set reference is needed. An analysis in terms of the potential sloppiness
of plural reference was thought to be immune to such an argument since
even minorities can take responsibility for a property of the mass they be-
long to. This, however, is only partly true. Consider again (3.47), repeated
below.
(3.47) Not quite all of the MPs attended the meeting.
They stayed at home instead.
In contrast to (3.49), it is hard to imagine how in the second sentence
in (3.47) a minority could take responsibility for the satisfaction of the
VP. How can a handful of MPs be responsible for a collective absentness?
The situation in (3.47) is quite different from that in (3.50), where truth-
conditions are almost indifferent to how many of the reporters actually
asked a question. But would we say that “the MPs stayed at home” is true
when in fact only a minority really did? Geurts is right in saying that
collective reference can sometimes allow any subset of an argument to sat-
isfy the predicate. But the degree to which this is possible depends on the
predicate involved. We do not say that “the soldiers were hungry”, when
only a few actually were. In the same way, the second sentence of (3.47)
will not be true if only a small part of the pronominal reference consists of
individuals that stayed at home.
Pseudo reference, entailment and implicature
Once again, one could counter the critique of the previous section by claim-
ing that complement anaphora are simply stylistic exaggerations. This
begs the question of how analyses of pseudo reference explain the set of
compset licencing determiners. An intuitive answer is the following: comp-
set licencing determiners do not allow the reference set to be equal to the
restrictor – i.e. following such a determiner, sloppy reference could never
be so sloppy as to refer to an empty set and is therefore allowed.13 No-
tice that such a proposal would be based on a rather vague relationship
between the logical properties of the determiner (emptiness potential) and
the speaker’s/hearer’s intention of producing/interpreting a pronoun with
a weakened reference. The speaker is apparently allowed to use the max-
set as a sloppy compset since she knows about some fundamental formal
properties of the preceding quantification. This particular way of referring
is thus a pragmatic choice of the speaker.
13Basing the criterion for compset reference on the largeness of the mistake made by sloppy
reference makes this account actually a near notational variant to a real compset analysis
based on some notion of emptiness. Compare with section 3.3.6.
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Nevertheless, notice that a language user will not base her choice of
reference/ resolution on non-logical facts. Consider (3.54).
(3.54) More than 10% of the students went to the party.
# They went to the beach instead.
The determiner “more than 10%” is not a complement set reference licen-
sor. This is logically quite clear, because this determiner is right monotone
increasing and therefore allows the quantification to be true even if all
students went to the party; this would make pseudo-reference too sloppy,
so complement anaphora are disallowed. In addition to the monotonicity
entailments, however, (3.54) also evokes implicatures. One of these impli-
catures is that not all students went to the party. In fact, the first sentence
provides the implicature that the real proportion of students that went
to the party is not far from ten percent. A potential problem for pseudo-
reference is now that if the relation between determiner-type and action of
the language user is one of pragmatic considerations, why then doesn’t the
language user react on the implicatures evoked by the structures.
The distribution of complement set reference seems to be very much
governed by logical properties of determiners. This means that a theory
of complement anaphora should focus on these formal properties and find
the precise causal link between those properties and subsequent anaphoric
potential. In my view, pseudo-reference analyses could therefore only be
valuable if they adopt some formal mechanism describing what pseudo-
reference is all about. Such theories of plural reference do exist (cf.Link
1983; Brisson 1997),14 but they typically also adopt a strict semantics for
floating “all”. Such analyses will then additionally have to explain the
(flexible) use of “all”, as well as account for the normal unacceptability of
extreme sloppiness in complement anaphora cases like (3.47).
3.3.3.4 Reference to the complement set
We saw that analysing complement anaphora in terms of pseudo-reference
to the maximal set begs the question of how a formal relation can be re-
alised between the set of right decreasing determiners and the possibil-
ity of pseudo-reference, especially since these analyses make use of the
vagueness of plural reference, while complement anaphora seem to be so
closely related to very formal properties of language. In what follows, I
therefore assume that complement anaphora involve reference to the com-
plement set. But accepting complement set reference as an unproblematic
alternative might be too hasty. Corblin argues that accepting complement
set reference would oppose Kamp and Reyle’s generalisation. However, it
needs to be stressed that acknowledging the existence of complement set
14Although Dowty gives a programmatic overview of how to deal with plural reference, he
does not give a formal account, he himself admits. He notes that there might be several
compositional difficulties involved. See Dowty 1987, p. 111.
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reference does not mean that a subtraction operator is freely applicable.
In fact in the coming sections, I will argue that complement set reference
is marked and is subject to some strict conditions.
3.3.4 Dynamic Quantification
If we accept complement anaphora as anaphora that refer to the comple-
ment set, the main question becomes how this type of reference comes
about and why it is constrained to such specific contexts. Related to this
question is the question of how e-type pronouns refer in the first place.
Why are maxset and refset generally available sets for anaphoric reference
and why is reference to the extension of the scope, for instance, impossible?
A possible analysis of the anaphoric potential of quantificational sen-
tences is to treat this type of sentence as dynamic and subsequent ana-
phora as cases of dynamic binding. As we saw in chapter 2, a formalism
like DPL displays the so-called donkey equivalence: ∃x(ϕ)∧ψ = ∃x(ϕ∧ψ).
Such a formalism can be exploited to derive a dynamic approach to gener-
alised quantification. Conservativity tells us that only two sets are needed
to derive the truth-conditions of a sentence D(A)(B), viz. A and A ∩ B.
These sets are also two likely candidates for future anaphoric reference.
Thus, if we existentially introduce these sets and check whether they re-
late in the way D desires, then these two sets will be accessible for sub-
sequent anaphoric reference. This observation is the central driving force
behind some dynamic quantifier accounts of e-type anaphora (e.g. van den
Berg 1996b, but especially chapter 4 for a detailed consideration of such
approaches). Moreover, Rodger Kibble (1997b, 1997a) claims that such an
analysis can even account for the distribution of complement anaphora.
He bases his claims on van den Berg’s dynamic quantifier logic. In that
formalism a quantificational sentence Dx(A)(B) is represented as follows:
(3.55) x′(maxx′(A[x/x′]) ∧ x(maxx(x ≤ x′ ∧B) ∧QD(x′)(x)))
Postponing the interpretation details of such a representation to chapter
4, the formula in (3.55) is read as follows. The  operator is a dynamic
existential quantifier ranging over plural individuals and the maximality
operator ‘max’ ensures that only maximal collections are exported. The
term x ≤ x′ expresses that the value for x is a part (or subset or sub-
individual, depending on ones favourite ontology for plurality) of the value
of x′.
The representation in (3.55) introduces a referent x′ for the maximal
value satisfying the restrictor (i.e. maxset) and a referent x for the maxi-
mal subset of x′ that satisfies the scope (i.e. refset). The final condition
on these two referents is membership of the quantificational relation QD
associated with the determiner D.
Any new occurrences of x′ and x will now be dynamically bound and
thus the maximal set and the reference set are available for anaphoric
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reference.
A well-know problem with representations like the one in (3.55) is that
they are truth-conditionally flawed whenever QD(x′) is monotone decreas-
ing and B involves collective predication. For example, the sentence in
(3.56) is true according to (3.55) if there exists a maximal set of students
gathering in the square yesterday, which are “few” relative to the maximal
set of students.
(3.56) Few students gathered in the square yesterday.
But consider a situation in which there was more than one gathering yes-
terday in the square. One of them could involve only a handful of students
(thus satisfying (3.55)) while another could be a massive meeting of stu-
dents. This second maximum should not be overlooked by the representa-
tion of the quantificational sentence. It is not sufficient that there exists
some local maximal set satisfying scope and restrictor and counting as few.
In fact, all such maximal sets should satisfy the quantificational relation.
A well-known solution to this problem is to represent right monotone
decreasing quantificational structures as the negation of their increasing
counterpart. That is, (3.56) is treated as (3.57).
(3.57) It is not the case that ‘many’ students gathered in the square
yesterday.
Van den Berg proposes that the same metamorphosis for decreasing quan-
tifiers could also apply in the dynamic case (with a dynamic notion of nega-
tion) and thus account for the whole range of e-type anaphora. Kibble no-
tices, based on work by Zwarts (1996), that there are basically two ways of
giving a truth-conditionally sound representation for examples like (3.57).
These two alternatives are due to the fact that a quantifier has two com-
plements. One gives us a representation based on (3.57) and the other is
based on (3.58), with different logical realisations of the complement of few
(here twice loosely represented as many).
(3.58) ‘Many’ students did not gather in the square.
Truth-conditionally, there is no difference between (3.57) and (3.58), but if
we translate the two into dynamic quantificational representations, then,
dynamically, they will be different. The referent for the conservative scope
(x in (3.55)) will correspond to the set of all the students who were in a
gathering in the square yesterday, in the case of (3.57), but in (3.58) this
referent will correspond to the complement set, the set of students that did
not participate in gathering in the square yesterday.
It appears then that the need for an alternative representation for de-
creasing quantifiers leads to an ambiguity between either A∩B or A∩−B
for the reference set referent. Moreover, Kibble argues that when the
quantificational relation involved is cardinal, the value for A ∩ −B cannot
be established since no information concerning the (relative) cardinality of
A is known. This accounts for the distribution of complement anaphora.
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3.3.5 The interpretation perspective
We have seen that dynamic quantifiers create an independent need for an
ambiguity between compset introducing and refset introducing represen-
tations of decreasing proportional quantifiers. In this section, I want to
point out that however striking Kibble’s findings are, it is unwise to treat
compset and refset on a par. That is, the complement set and the reference
set have quite a different status as antecedents. I will argue that in inter-
pretation there is a natural preference for refset resolution over resolution
to the complement set.
We have already seen that Moxey and Sanford found a thematic effect
in compset continuations, namely that they usually specify the reason why
a relatively large proportion of the domain did not satisfy the scopal pred-
ication. From an interpretation perspective it is interesting to see what
happens if we use complement anaphora in continuations other than the
thematic preference found by Moxey and Sanford. Consider the following
examples.
(3.59) Few of the students went to the party. I know who they are.
(3.60) Few of the 20th century presidents of the USA were elected for
two consecutive terms. My history teacher made me learn their
names by heart.
(3.61) Few of these balls are blue.
Can you point them out for me?
In all these examples the predications in the first and second sentence are
neutral with respect to one another. That is, there is no relation between
the predication in the antecedent sentence and the predication over the
plural pronoun, which would lead the interpreter to resolve the pronoun to
either refset or compset. In (3.61) for example, the speaker could ask the
hearer to point at any set of balls. Resolving the plural pronoun, however,
shows a clear preference for refset reference. It is unlikely that anyone
would point at the non-blue balls, if asked the question in (3.61). It appears
then that the default interpretation for plural pronouns is the intersection
of restrictor and scope no matter the formal properties of the determiner.
The point made here is that refset is (if possible) the preferred resolu-
tion of a plural pronoun. The complement set has no such status. Dur-
ing resolution it is overruled by the reference set in neutral situations. It
seems to me that compset interpretation is the result of a last resort strat-
egy. Notice that a side effect of the type of continuation that was most
common in the cases of complement anaphora found by Moxey and San-
ford, reason-why-not continuations, is that resolving the plural pronoun to
refer to the refset results in a contradiction. The only non-contradictory
resolution is, of course, the compset. Only in these situations will compset
interpretation occur.
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In Moxey and Sanford 1987, we find an example showing that reason-
why-not continuations are not obligatory. In (3.62), there is a clear case
of complement set reference, but the fact that the members of compset
send their apologies does not really indicate why so few MPs were at the
meeting.
(3.62) Few MPs attended the meeting.
They sent apologies for being absent.
Still, once again we see that resolving the plural pronoun to refset refer-
ence would result in a contradiction.
Notice that Kibble’s account given in the previous section is not able
to cope with the general preference for refset reference. On Kibble’s story,
compset is a reference set: the distinction between the two sets is no longer
made.
More support for the view that the interpretation of anaphora shows a
preference for refset comes from explicit reference to the complement set.
Notice the following contrast.
(3.63) Few of the students went to the party.
The others stayed at home instead.
(3.64) Few of the students went to the party.
The others had a good time. non-party goers/??party goers
In (3.63), we see that we can replace the complement anaphor with an ex-
plicit reference to the complement set: the others. This definite description
takes the complement of the refset relative to some domain of quantifica-
tion (the maxset).
If we now take Kibble’s analysis serious, there is really no difference be-
tween compset and refset other than that they are the reference set of dif-
ferent but logically equivalent representations of a quantificational struc-
ture. In other words, there is no apparent reason why the others should not
accept the compset as an antecedent reference set. This, however, gives us
the odd (3.64). Even though the choice of the predicate supports comple-
ment set reference, (3.64) is still odd.
Given these observations, the complement anaphora paradigm becomes
a bit more complex than the association with monotone-decreasing propor-
tional quantifiers. First of all, we see a general preference for reference
to refset. Second, we see that this preference can be overruled by contra-
dictive predication. Finally, we see that the possible cancellation of the
preference only occurs with downward proportional antecedents.
3.3.6 Forward directionality and emptiness again
The difference between the complement set and the reference set discussed
above is reminiscent of the soft constraint forward directionality from de
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Hoop and Hendriks’ account of quantificational domains. A choice between
complement set reference and reference set reference will always turn out
in favour of the latter option. As we saw, de Hoop and Hendriks’ analysis
is too strong, since it predicts that refset reference and compset reference
are in complementary distribution. This was because their soft constraint
emptiness blocks reference to any potentially empty set, including refer-
ence sets of decreasing quantifiers. Now, we find a second complication,
namely that in the cases where both types of reference are possible, refset
reference actually blocks complement anaphora.
It is useful to restate the complement anaphora paradigm in terms of
emptiness potential. Below, (A) corresponds to monotone increasing con-
texts, (B) to intersective downward monotone ones and (C) represents the
cases with true compset licensors (other monotone decreasing determin-
ers).
(A) compset possibly empty, refset non-empty: *compset/refset
(B) compset and refset both possibly empty: * compset/refset
(C) refset possibly empty, compset non-empty: refset>compset
Although forward directionality expresses a preference for reference set
reference, this preference can never surface in case (C). Even if the refer-
ence set is potentially empty, reference to it is still felicitous. Let us there-
fore, for the sake of the OT analysis, stipulate a variant of the emptiness
constraint:
(3.65) Emptiness’: As the antecedent of an expression do not choose a set
which is potentially empty, except when this set is the reference
set of a sentence.
Ranking the alternative emptiness’ constraint over forward directionality
now accounts for the fact that, in the downward proportional cases, ref-
erence to both complement set and reference set is (in principle, at least)
possible, but that there is a preference for the latter. The fact that this
constraint has a conditional character, suggests that it is not a soft con-
straint at all, but part of the generator, the set of hard constraints that
dictates which interpretations are in the candidate set. If emptiness’ were
part of the set of soft constraints, the exception it models would have to
follow from an interaction between constraints.
Although the principle in (3.65) is clearly in need of justification, I
briefly explore the potential of the optimality theoretic analysis further,
since it is an ideal way of modelling the interaction of constraints on refer-
ence and will thus enable us to clarify the paradigm.
3.3.6.1 Avoid Contradiction
An unresolved issue concerning the presented paradigm is how to derive
the potential cancelling of the preference for refset. One way to account for
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EMPTI’ AVOIDC FORWD
Most(A)(B). They ¬B +refset *
Most(A)(B). They ¬B compset * *
Most(A)(B). They Cneutral +refset
Most(A)(B). They Cneutral compset * *
Less than half the (A)(B). They ¬B refset *
Less than half the (A)(B). They ¬B +compset *
Less than half the (A)(B). They Cneutral +refset
Less than half the (A)(B). They Cneutral compset *
Less than ten (A)(B). They ¬B +refset *
Less than ten (A)(B). They ¬B compset * *
Less than ten (A)(B). They Cneutral +refset
Less than ten (A)(B). They Cneutral compset * *
Figure 3.3: Tableau for the paradigm
this is to add the high-ranked constraint avoid contradiction.
Avoid Contradiction seems appropriate for accounting for the last-resort
strategy necessary for resolving pronoun reference to compset. That is,
in cases of complement anaphora, the refset interpretation violates avoid
contradiction, while complement set reference does not. But what about
cases like (3.26), repeated here as (3.66)?
(3.66) Most students went to the party.
# They went to the beach instead.
We have to account for the fact that avoid contradiction does not force us
to choose the unproblematic complement set interpretation of the plural
pronoun. This is where we need emptiness’. I already hinted at the fact,
that this constraint is part of the generator and thus ranks over all other
constraints. It thus dictates when compset is available as an antecedent.
In cases like (3.66), the fact that a complement set interpretation of the
pronoun violates emptiness’ leaves no choices left for avoid contradiction.
In fact, we are forced to interpret (3.66) in its contradictory reading, which
explains the infelicity of the continuation. (See de Hoop 2001 for more on
optimality theory and unintelligibility.)
The effects of this ranking are illustrated in the tableau in 3.3. The
subscripts neutral indicate that predicates C and B do not get a disjoint
interpretation in sensible models. Contradictory continuations are indi-
cated by predication ¬B. Emptiness’ rules out all references to compset
where compset is possibly empty. This only leaves the proportional down-
ward entailing quantifiers. In general, refset reference is preferred, but
this can be overruled in the non-neutral cases, where the predication in
the continuation contradicts the predication in the antecedent sentence.
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This optimality theoretic account will be the blue-print for the analysis
to follow. It gives us the opportunity to separate some important issues.
First of all, it illustrates that semantic considerations overrule a powerful
pragmatic preference for anaphoric relations involving reference sets. Sec-
ond, anaphoric reference following increasing or non-proportional quanti-
fiers can only be resolved to the reference set or the maximal set even if
this results in an inconsistent interpretation. The analysis should there-
fore not only account for the distribution of compset and refset reference;
it should especially account for their different status in discourse.
3.3.7 Analysis
So far, we saw that there is a preference for interpreting pronouns as re-
ferring to the refset over interpreting them as referring to the compset.
Semantics can force us to override this principle, but only if the comple-
ment set is available for reference in the first place. That is, while the ref-
erence set is always generated as one of the possible resolutions of plural
pronouns, the complement set has to obey the non-emptiness requirement.
In this section, we will focus on this contrast and propose that complement
anaphora is a case of pronominal anaphora with a non-salient antecedent,
subject to specific semantic and pragmatic constraints.
3.3.7.1 Pronouns and entailment
Since in cases of reference to quantificational NPs there is no coreference
involved, it is difficult to predict the accessibility or the cognitive status
(e.g. what Moxey and Sanford have called ‘focus’) of refset and compset.
There is widespread consensus that subjects have a higher attentional sta-
tus than direct objects and that direct objects in turn are more prominent
than indirect objects, etc. However, neither compset nor refset was explic-
itly mentioned or predicated over, so no syntactic strengthening of salience
applies. There is, however, an important semantic difference between ac-
cessing refset and compset using a pronoun. Reference to the reference set
allows entailments which prior to the pronominal reference were not valid.
(3.67) Few of the students went to the party.
6⇒
Some students went to the party.
(3.68) Few of the students went to the party.
They had a wonderful time.
⇒
Some students went to the party.
Support for (3.67) comes from the felicity of continuations expressing that
there were no students at the party as in (3.69), this in contrast to compa-
rable increasing examples like (3.70).
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(3.69) Few of the students went to the party. In fact, none did.
(3.70) A few students went to the party. # In fact, none did.
A situation of no students attending the party is no longer a possibility af-
ter pronominal reference to the reference set, leading to the entailment in
(3.68). Similar entailments fail when the pronoun attempts to refer to the
complement set. Still, similar to the possibility of no students attending
the party in the decreasing case, a sentence like Most students went to the
party does not exclude the possibility of every student attending the party.
A continuation like In fact, all did is felicitous, hence (3.71). But since
pronominal reference to the complement set is out in increasing contexts,
there is no case of pronominal reference to enforce the entailment that is
impossible in (3.71). This is illustrated (once again) by (3.66).
(3.71) Most students went to the party.
6⇒
Not all students went to the party.
(3.66) Most students went to the party.
# They stayed at home instead.
In contrast to pronominal reference to the complement set, the definite
description the others does enforce the entailment pattern missing from
(3.71).
(3.72) Most students went to the party.
The others went to the beach instead.
⇒
Not all students went to the party.
3.3.7.2 Pronominal complement anaphora and inference
It is often claimed that pronouns are anaphorically weak. For instance,
Ariel (1990) claims they are relatively high accessibility markers, meaning
that pronouns signal to the addressee that their antecedent is easily acces-
sible. In work on the givenness hierarchy (Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski
1993) pronouns are thought to need antecedents in focus, which according
to the hierarchy is the highest attentional state a referent of a referring
expression can be in. In general then, there is thought to be a one-to-one
correspondence between a hierarchy of linguistic anaphoric forms and a
scale of salience of the antecedent. Pronouns map to an antecedent with
relatively high salience. In other words, the referent set of a quantifi-
cational structure is a salient antecedent. Pronouns referring to the ref-
erence set are ordinary pronouns whose antecedent has a high degree of
salience. Pronominal complement anaphora are extra-ordinary pronouns.
Their antecedent is not salient and the acceptability of the anaphoric link
they contribute is both semantically and pragmatically constrained.
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I will argue that complement anaphora link to their antecedents by in-
ference. This explains why they are semantically constrained: only from
quantificational structures that guarantee the non-emptiness of their com-
plement set can we infer the existence of individuals satisfying the restric-
tor but not the scope. Furthermore, there is a striking similarity between
pronominal complement anaphora and other pronouns with non-salient
reference. I will justify the inference account of compset reference by draw-
ing a parallel with these other uses of pronouns.
Let us consider some cases of non-salient reference, i.e. anaphoric re-
lations which do not involve some linguistically available prominent an-
tecedent, but which involve some kind of inference in order to derive an an-
tecedent from the linguistic context. I first concentrate on examples where
the anaphoric link obeys the correspondence between linguistic form and
salience of the antecedent, meaning that the anaphor is a definite descrip-
tion. I will then show that it is possible to break with the correspondence
and use pronouns instead of definite descriptions under some specific con-
ditions.
The most straightforward example is subsectional anaphora.
(3.73) The children were having a lot of fun in the park. The boys played
hide and seek and the girls were picking flowers.
(3.74) Tom, Susan and Mary went to a party. The girls went home early.
In (3.73), the definite descriptions the boys and the girls both refer to a sub-
set of their (syntactic) antecedent the children. In (3.74), the girls refers to
the two female conjuncts of the coordinated antecedent. These are fairly
straightforward inferences, based on inclusion relations. A more compli-
cated form of inference plays a role in the well-known bridging examples
(Clark 1977).
(3.75) John’s car doesn’t run. He blew the engine.
(3.76) John walked into the room. The chandelier sparkled brightly.
In (3.75), the engine is associated with John’s car. This anaphoric relation
can be explained by making use of the world-knowledge (cars have en-
gines). In (3.76), a more sophisticated inference is needed, since not every
room has a chandelier, so the inference needs to be supported by the fact
that chandeliers are typically associated with rooms.
Another example of anaphoric reference without explicit antecedents is
reference to implicit arguments.
(3.77) John got a haircut.
The barber used a razor-blade. (ter Meulen 1999)
Although there is no explicit agent in the first sentence of (3.77), it sup-
ports an inference of the fact that someone cut John’s hair. The definite
description the barber can link to this inferred antecedent.
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All these examples have in common that the antecedent involved in the
anaphoric relation was not explicitly mentioned. This means that the use
of definite descriptions in these examples was predicted by the hypothesis
that non-pronominal anaphora are able to pick up antecedents with a low
degree of salience. In general, the examples are unacceptable if we use
pronouns instead of definite descriptions.
(3.78) Peteri and Haroldj met in Utrecht. He#i/#j loves that town.
(3.79) Peteri met Haroldj in Utrecht. Hei/j loves that town.
(3.80) The children had a lot of fun in the park. They picked flowers.
(3.81) We cannot use John’s car. # All four of them are flat.
(3.82) # After John entered the room, it came crashing down on him.
(3.83) # John got a hair-cut. He used a razor-blade.
The pronoun in (3.78) is infelicitous, while the pronoun in (3.79), with Pe-
ter and Harold both available as singular arguments is ambiguous. The
plural pronoun in (3.80) cannot refer to the subset of girls in the set of chil-
dren having fun in the park. Although there is an impressive amount of
semantic support, the second sentence in (3.81) is out. The same applies to
(3.82). Finally, pronominal reference to implicit arguments is also impos-
sible. The continuation in (3.83) is incoherent, for the pronoun can only be
resolved to John.
Interestingly though, there are special cases where pronominal refer-
ence to inferred antecedents is felicitous. Consider the following exam-
ples.15
(3.84) Peter and Susan met in Utrecht. He loves the town, but she
thinks it’s too small.
(3.85) My right-door neighbours make a lot of noise. He plays the drums
and she keeps on shouting at him.
(3.86) John kept on staring at the newly-wed couple. She resembled a
childhood sweetheart of his.
(3.87) The priest was tortured for days. They wanted him to reveal
where the insurgents were hiding out. (Mauner 1996)
15Hendriks and Dekker (1995) argue that the stress which is obligatory on the pronouns in
(3.84) and (3.85) is the result of the fact these are cases of non-monotone anaphora: “Link-
hood (marked by L+H* accent in English) serves to signal non-monotone anaphora. If an
expression is a link, then its discourse referent Y is anaphoric to an antecedent discourse ref-
erent X such that X6⊆Y” (Hendriks and Dekker 1995, p. 353.) In this respect, it is interesting
to note that the pronoun in (3.86) does not get stressed at all.
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In (3.84), both conjuncts are pronominally accessible. The example in
(3.85), based on an example from Hendriks and Dekker (1995), contains
two singular pronominal subsectional anaphora. In (3.86), there is a bridge
to the bride and in (3.87), the implicit argument the torturers is realised by
the pronoun they.
There are a number of conditions which need to be satisfied in order
for these extraordinary uses of pronouns to be licenced. The first and most
straightforward necessary condition is that the antecedent has to be in-
ferable. This is of course a general condition which also applies to the ex-
amples with anaphoric relations involving definite descriptions. In (3.88),
although there is an implicit argument, the fact that the negation operator
scopes over it makes the inference someone cut a student’s hair impossible.
The definite description in the second sentence of (3.88) has to be accom-
modated globally.
(3.88) No student got his hair cut.
The barber was on vacation. (ter Meulen 1999)
Another necessary condition is uniqueness: there should be no other sim-
ilarly inferable entities with the same semantic features. For singular
pronouns this means uniqueness of gender for the inferred object. In the
plural case, this translates to maximality. Since English does not specify
gender on plural pronouns, the prediction is that plural subsectional ana-
phora in English will never be pronominalised. There would be no unique
way of identifying which part of the antecedent is referred to.16 The same
goes for reference to parts of conjunctions (which is a special case of subsec-
tional anaphora) and bridging to parts (like (3.86)). Pronominal reference
to implicit arguments always obeys the uniqueness condition.
Apart from the uniqueness of the inference, there is a condition on the
effort involved. In fact, it seems that only inferences using semantic in-
formation are allowed. The examples in (3.84)–(3.87), I claim, have in
common that they allow the inference necessary for the pronominal refer-
ence to occur on the basis of the semantic representation of the antecedent
sentence only. In (3.84), both Peter and Susan are part of the semantic rep-
resentation, even though the infelicity of pronominal reference to either of
the conjuncts in (3.78) implies that they are not realised as discourse refer-
ents. The example (3.84), therefore, seems to suggest that semantic repre-
sentation of an entity as a part of a plurality makes this entity inferable.
This begs the question, however, why (3.86) is felicitous, since it does
not semantically represent a plurality: the definite the newly-wed couple is
singular. It is clear, however, that at some semantic level this NP is repre-
sented as a plurality, witness the plural agreement it sometimes triggers
on coreferring pronouns. Consider the following examples.
16It also predicts that languages that do specify gender on plural pronouns allow for
pronominal plural subsectional anaphora. An informal inquiry into the status of such ex-
amples in French and Spanish suggests this is indeed the case.
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(3.89) The newly-weds were both nervous about the wedding night.
(3.90) *The newly-wed couple were/was both nervous about the wedding
night.
(3.91) Grain is a symbol of both fertility and prosperity. Symbolically,
throwing rice (or other grains) at the newly wed couple is a means
of wishing them a lifetime of those blessings.17
The implicit semantic encoding of plurality in bunch-denoting singulars
is well-known. While ordinary plurality tests like distributivity fail (see
(3.89)/(3.90)), there are some traces of plurality on other levels, as is illus-
trated in (3.91); see Schwarzschild 1996, chapter nine, for discussion.
Whenever the inference involved is slightly more complicated and in
need of information which is not semantically present, pronominal refer-
ence is no longer an option. For instance in the bridging examples, al-
though there is a unique jockey associated with the race horse in (3.92),
this needs to be inferred using more than the information semantically
available from the first sentence.
(3.92) The race horse suffered a lot. During the race the jockey/# he
whipped it constantly.
Alternatively, one could argue that the inference in (3.92) is not unique,
since the jockey is not the unique masculine individual to be associated
with the race horse (there is e.g. its trainer, its owner, its veterinarian.)
Descriptions, then, narrow all the associations down to a single possible
one. This suggests that since the application of world-knowledge is in prin-
ciple unbounded, the semantic specification that comes with a pronoun is
necessarily too weak to satisfy the uniqueness requirement. The condition
asking for minimal effort thus follows from uniqueness.
Another condition for pronominal inferable reference is that the ana-
phoric link supports discourse coherence.18 The examples above all have a
natural coherence relation, improving the link between the first and sec-
ond sentence. But now consider:
(3.93) # My right-door neighbours make a lot of noise and I met her
yesterday.
(3.94) # John kept on staring at the newly-weds. She was thinking about
the flowers.
(3.95) # The priest was tortured for days. They went for beers everyday.
17This is a naturally occurring example from the world-wide-web.
18See Asher and Lascarides 1999 for an explicit claim that bridging is directly linked to
rhetorical relations.
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In (3.93), the link between the pronoun her and one of the right-door neigh-
bours is not an option, since there is no support for discourse coherence.
The same applies to (3.94) and (3.95). Notice that there is an intuitive
difference between an example like (3.93) and (3.96), below. Both are inco-
herent, but in contrast to (3.93), in (3.96) the plural pronoun is resolved to
refer to the right-door neighbours.
(3.96) My right-door neighbours make a lot of noise and I met them
yesterday.
Summarising, there are four important conditions on inferred pronominal
anaphoric reference: (i) inferability, (ii) uniqueness, (iii) use of semanti-
cally available information only and (iv) support of discourse coherence by
the anaphoric link.
The parallel with complement anaphora is straightforward. Pronom-
inal reference to the complement set is, in general, infelicitous. The ex-
ceptional cases are semantically constrained by inferability (condition (i)).
The emptiness’ constraint from the optimality theory approach translates
to checking whether or not the following inference holds: D(A)(B) →
∃X(A(X)∧¬B(X)). Such an inference is impossible in examples like (3.54),
repeated here.
(3.54) More than 10% of the students went to the party.
# They went to the beach instead.
Furthermore, complement anaphora are only semantically inferred. That
is, the effort involved in the inference is minimal (condition (iii)). The
pronoun in (3.54) cannot refer to the complement set as a consequence of
the implicature that not all students went to the party invoked by the first
sentence (as was noted in section 3.3.3) and/or the fact that this set would
be a plausible candidate for the predication in the second sentence.
Uniqueness (condition (ii)) is ensured with pronominal complement set
reference by the fact that, just like pronouns referring to refset, they are
maximal.19 The continuation in (3.97) cannot mean that some of the MPs
who did not attend the meeting were too busy, and some other non-attending
MPs had other excuses.
(3.97) Few of the MPs attended the meeting. They were too busy.
The final condition which parallels (other) antecedentless anaphora is sup-
port for discourse coherence. Moxey and Sanford already reported a link to
rhetorical structure. Moreover, we concluded in section 3.3.5 that semantic
support is a necessary condition for pronominal complement anaphora. In
19Note that uniqueness should not be interpreted here as uniqueness of antecedent, since
both the reference set and the maximal set remain alternative referents for the pronoun to
pick up. Rather, once an anaphoric link is made, this link should point to a unique individual
or, in the case of plurals, to a maximal one.
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fact, we could interpret the avoid contradictionconstraint of section 3.3.6
as modelling the fact that the complement set (once inferable) is only used
as a resolution for pronominal reference once there is a semantic reason
to do so. If there is no such reason, the resolution process will pick the
reference set which is the default reference for plural pronouns linked to
quantificational structures, as modelled by forward directionality in the
optimality theoretic analysis and the triggered abstraction rule presented
above.
In sum, I conclude that pronominal complement anaphora should not
be viewed as alternative e-type pronouns, but as extra-ordinary pronouns
whose antecedent is to be inferred. Inferability accounts for the strict se-
mantic nature of the distribution of complement anaphora, while pronomi-
nal reference to the reference set is furthermore constrained by conditions
that apply to other anaphora with inferred antecedents as well.
3.3.7.3 A note on ‘The others’
In this section, I discuss non-pronominal complement anaphora. Note that
the possibility of explicit reference to the compset using a definite descrip-
tion in all contexts, does not involve a referent for compset. In fact, a closer
look at the semantics of the others shows us that it contains two anaphoric
parts, a domain (the usual context variable which gives definite descrip-
tions their anaphoricity) and an anaphoric description others. In (3.72),
repeated here as (3.98), the others is anaphoric to the maximal set, while
its description complements the reference set.
(3.98) [[Mostj [students]i] went to the party].
The othersi,j went to the beach instead.
⇒
Not all students went to the party.
This explains why a definite description making explicit reference to the
complement set can and a pronoun cannot accommodate the existence of a
set of individuals satisfying restrictor but not scope. Use of the others as in
(3.98) thus results in a DRS as in figure 3.4. The referent Z is introduced
by abstraction which was triggered by the others being coindexed with the
reference set.20 The description others collects the maximal difference be-
tween Z and Y, the referents corresponding to the two indices of the others.
Since the referent X is existentially closed, the complement set is accom-
modated (accounting for the entailment in (3.72)). The same story applies
to a description as the students who did not go to the party which is also
anaphoric to the maximal set, but here the description itself is not anapho-
ric. For other definite descriptions there is no option for complement set
20Alternatively, the referent Y could be derived in the same way, if one does not choose to
have this referent introduced by the quantification itself.
78 PRONOMINAL REFERENCE TO SETS 3.3
Y Z X
Y = Σx.
x
student x
x
x ∈ Y @
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
Most
x
x went to the party
Z = Σx.
x
x∈ Y
x went to the party
X = Σx.
x
x∈ Y
x 6∈ Z
X went to the beach
Figure 3.4: DRS for (3.98)
reference if the antecedent is not right monotone decreasing and propor-
tional. This is due to the general condition of inferability on complement
anaphora. This is illustrated below. The use of an epithet is felicitous in
the downward entailing case (3.99), but not in (3.100).
(3.99) Less than half of the students went to the party.
The bastards went to the beach instead.
(3.100) More than half of the students went to the party.
# The bastards went to the beach instead.
3.3.8 Taking stock
I have shown that plural pronominal reference, although extremely flexi-
ble, ordinarily refers to the reference set of quantification, since this set is
made most salient by a determiner, independent of what set is focused on
by the determiner.
I have argued that from the interpretation perspective several princi-
ples govern the distribution of complement anaphora. Pragmatically, there
is a preference for reference set reference over complement set reference.
This preference can be overruled by semantic considerations. Crucial, how-
ever, is the fact that the possibility of complement set reference follows
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from inferability. Once the existence of individuals satisfying restrictor
but not scope cannot be inferred from the antecedent quantificational sen-
tence, pronominal reference to compset is not an option, regardless of the
semantic or pragmatic context. In contrast to pronouns referring to the ref-
erence set, pronominal complement anaphora belong to the class of cases
in which pronouns select an antecedent which is not salient, but has to
be inferred. As such, they are subject to the strict constraints that govern
such marked usages of pronouns.
Finally, let me suggest that the present approach to complement ana-
phora seems to explain why so many people have been hesitant to accept
Moxey and Sanford’s experimental results. Many have thought comple-
ment anaphora to be not quite felicitous. The account presented here,
where complement anaphora are considered to be an extra-ordinary case
of anaphora, might (at least partly) explain where this discomfort with
pronominal reference to the complement set comes from.
3.4 Context and pronominal reference to sets
In sum, in this chapter I showed the following. First, every determiner
imposes high salience on its referent set. Second, the complement set is,
in principle inaccessible for pronouns, but may form the antecedent of a
pronoun when it serves some salient communicative purpose and no other
antecedents for the pronoun result in a consistent discourse. Third, the
maximal set is presupposed to be contextually given in the case of strong,
i.e. non-intersective determiners. Weak noun phrases do not carry such
a presupposition and, since the intersectivity property makes the truth-
conditions independent of the full quantificational domain this set will not
be accessible in discourse.
I take the salience of the reference set to mean that every determiner
introduces a referent for this set. Similarly, the general inaccessibility
of the complement set suggests that no referent exists for this set. This
means that the marked case of pronominal complement anaphora is mod-
eled by a marked operation on context, inferring the existence of a comple-
ment set and introducing a referent for it. In the cases the complement set
is available as an antecedent this is due to an inference and a last resort
choice of the hearer and not due to the interpretation of the antecedent
quantification structure. In what follows, I therefore assume that the ex-
istence of complement anaphora has to be accommodated locally: it should
not follow from a semantics which expresses how context is built up in dis-
course. As for the maximal set, the presupposition that comes with strong
quantifiers is interpreted as a presupposition of the existence of a referent
for this set in context. Weak quantifiers have no such presupposition, nor
do they introduce a referent for their domain by themselves.

Chapter 4
Dynamic Semantics
for Plurals
In the previous chapter, we saw that following a sentence (D(A))(B), the
reference set, i.e. the set of individuals satisfying both restrictor and scope,
is made salient enough to guarantee unconditional pronominal anaphora.
We focus now on what is desired of a semantic formalism in order for it to
deal with quantification and anaphora with quantificational antecedents,
keeping in mind that the e-type pronoun is a regular pronoun, picking up
a salient antecedent.
As we have seen, the reference set is sometimes involved in dependen-
cies with other sets that were created during quantification. The standard
example is repeated here as (4.1), where the reference of the singular pro-
noun co-varies with the quantification over the three students.
(4.1) Three students (each) wrote a paper. They (each) sent it to L&P.
In DRT, such examples lead to the proposal of a copy-mechanism that gives
the singular pronoun access to the paper written by each student. One of
the advantages that dynamic semantic theories have over DRT with re-
spect to plural anaphora is that, given a sufficiently rich notion of context,
they are able to account for the intuition that quantificational sentences do
not only change the context by adding maximal plural individuals but also
by recording dependencies between such individuals. That is, apart from
keeping track of subjects that were introduced in discourse, context can
contain other kinds of anaphoric resources like, for instance, a functional
dependence that exists between two subjects.
In this chapter, I discuss three proposals which have in common that
they use a more fine-grained notion of context than do dynamic seman-
tic analyses of singular anaphora. I concentrate on just these three, since
they all focus on accounting for maximal reference anaphora as well as the
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dependencies they are involved in. The proposals are: van den Berg’s dy-
namic plural logic which uses information states for plurals (see e.g. van
den Berg 1990, 1993, 1996b, 1996a); Krifka’s semantics for plural ana-
phora based on parametrised sum individuals (see Krifka 1996a); and El-
worthy’s theory of anaphoric information which uses discourse sets (see El-
worthy 1992, 1995). After an introduction to these frameworks, I compare
them with respect to the specific notion of context they use. I discuss how
the data-structures involved in these proposals interact with the semantics
and how they compare. The result of the discussion will be that the infor-
mation states for plurals in van den Berg’s dynamic plural logic appear to
be the most expressive way of representing dependencies in context. More-
over, apart from sharing some common successes all three proposals leave
part of the data unaccounted for.
4.1 Dynamic Plural Logic
As far as I know, van den Berg (1990) was the first paper to propose a
dynamic semantics with an alternative notion of context for the purpose
of dealing with plural anaphora. Van den Berg refines and extends his
semantics in a number of papers (e.g. van den Berg 1993), but I take it
that the detailed presentation of a dynamic plural logic in his dissertation
(1996b) and in the paper van den Berg 1996a is his final proposal. I will
abbreviate dynamic plural logic as ‘DPlL’.
The most important features of van den Berg’s work are, in my opinion,
the following.
(4.2) a. The interpretation of a formula in dynamic plural logic yields
a relation between information states.
b. Information states are sets of assignment functions.
c. Assignment functions are partial.
d. Assignment functions only have atomic individuals in their
range.
e. Dependencies encoded in information states are due to
distributivity.
Dynamic plural logic was inspired by Groenendijk and Stokhof ’s DPL, but
instead of having the interpretation function ‘ [[ ]] ’ expressing a function
from formulae to relations between assignments, van den Berg lets it map
formulae to relations between sets of partial assignment functions. These
sets are called information states for plurals. For instance, a possible in-
formation state in dynamic plural logic is the following:
(4.3) {{〈x, j〉, 〈y, t〉}, {〈x, s〉, 〈y, d〉}, {〈y, h〉}}
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I will represent such structures as matrices, where each row corresponds
to an assignment function and each column to a variable. The information
state made up by the three functions in (4.3) is depicted in (4.4).
(4.4)
x y
f1 j t
f2 s d
f3 h
In this information state, x is ‘distributively’ assigned the plurality {j, s}
(say, John and Susan) and y the plurality {t, d, h} (say, Tom, Dick and
Harry). At the same time, it expresses that there is some sort of rela-
tion between John and Tom (as expressed by f1), and between Susan and
Dick (as expressed by f2). The third assignment function, f3, is not defined
for x. Following Van den Berg, we will henceforth represent undefinedness
using the value ‘?’. Each variable for which a partial assignment is unde-
fined will be assigned the undefinedness value, as in (4.5). This way, we
can treat partial assignments as if they were total.1
(4.5)
x y
f1 j t
f2 s d
f3 ? h
Van den Berg has several reasons for choosing partial assignments for
DPlL. The most important is that it allows for a more intuitive notion of
information increase. The initial state is undefined for all variables. Once
noun phrases are encountered, more and more variables are assigned val-
ues. In other words, as the discourse proceeds, the domain of the infor-
mation state increases. Another reason for choosing partial assignments,
more relevant to plurality, is that it allows a notion of subset which is sen-
sitive to dependencies in the state. This is best explained by an example.
Consider a state in which x and y functionally depend on one another.
(4.6)
x y
f1 j t
f2 s d
f3 m h
Say now that we are interested in a subset of the values assigned to x, for
instance, {j, s} and we want the variable z to range over this subset. Two
possible ways to go would be the states in (4.7) and (4.8).
(4.7)
x y z
f1 j t j
f2 s d s
f3 m h s
1Notice that consequently our method of graphically depicting information states is par-
tial, since it only reveals the relevant (i.e. defined) snapshot of a state.
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(4.8)
x y z
f1 j t j
f2 s d s
f3 m h s
f4 m h j
Although both these state assigns the set {j, s} to z they also create depen-
dencies which were not in the original state. For instance, (4.7) registers
a dependence between Susan and Harry and Susan and Mary, which was
not in the original state. The state in (4.8) has an additional dependence
between John and Harry and Mary. A much more realistic option is to use
a dummy value (in this case, the undefinedness value ‘?’) to express the
lacking individual:
(4.9)
x y z
f1 j t j
f2 s d s
f3 m h ?
The range of partial assignment functions inside an information state con-
tains singulars only. The pros and cons of this design choice will be dis-
cussed below. For now, it suffices to illustrate how pluralities are built up
from the atoms and how this kind of information state is capable of stor-
ing (functional) dependencies between variables. In all the example states
above, x and y are said to be dependent. This is a formal notion and it
expresses that the way collections are spread over the assignments in the
state is not arbitrary.
Definition 4.2
Dependence
In information state G, y is dependent on x if:
∃d, e ∈ G(x) : G|x=d(y) 6= G|x=e(y)
2
Definition 4.3
Projection
G(x) := {g(x)|g ∈ G & g(x) 6= ?}
2
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Definition 4.4
Sub-states
G|x=d := {g ∈ G|g(x) = d}
2
The definition of dependence makes use of special operations on informa-
tion states: G(x) collects the values assigned to x in the assignment func-
tions in G and G|x=d is the sub-state of G wherein all assignment functions
assign d to x. Dependence expresses that there exists a pair of sub-states
assigning different values to x which also differ at y.
Let us now turn to how interpretation interacts with dependence. In
van den Berg’s work, the logic itself is also partial, that is, it is three-
valued. The interpretation function relates to a pair of information states
either by truth, falsity or undefinedness (‘?’). This is necessary, since the
assignment functions are partial: they might not always provide a value
for all the relevant variables for the interpretation of a formula. A state
like the one in (4.9) is irrelevant for some formulae containing ‘v’, since it
provides no value for v. In those cases, interpretation is undefined.
The notation G [[ϕ]] dH means that the relation corresponding to ϕ is
defined with respect to input G and output H. We use G [[ϕ]]+H to ex-
press that the relation is true for G and H. Finally, falsehood is written as
G [[ϕ]]−H.
The notion of dependence given above is interesting with respect to
the existential quantifier van den Berg defines. The conditions for the
existential quantifier are:2
(4.10) G [[x]] dH iff G(x) = ∅ & ∃X : H = {g[x/d]|g ∈ G & d ∈ X}
G [[x]]+H iff G [[x]] dH
G [[x]]−H iff ⊥
This definition is similar to the random assignment relation in DPL. It
introduces all values in X as values for x without introducing any depen-
dencies on other variables that may occur in G. In fact, this defines x
as randomly assigning pluralities to x. In a domain with three individu-
als (say, t, d and h) and a language with just one variable (namely x), the
following seven relations are covered by the interpretation. (Here and in
forthcoming representations, we do not give names to the individual func-
tions for notational convenience.)
2The clause ‘G(x) = ∅’ ensures that x always increases information. The interpretation
can only be true once, in the input set G, there is no assignment function which provides a
proper value for x. Thus, existent values for x can never be overwritten. See chapter 5 for
more on such considerations.
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(4.11)
x
? [[x]]+
x
t
x
? [[x]]+
x
d
x
? [[x]]+
x
h
x
? [[x]]+
x
t
d
x
? [[x]]+
x
t
h
x
? [[x]]+
x
d
h
x
? [[x]]+
x
t
d
h
In other words, following x the possible values for x are the elements in
the powerset of the domain of entities, excluding the empty value. Ar-
guably, ‘X ’ could be the empty set in which case, an additional pair is in
the relation namely where x leaves x undefined.
The introduction of variables in dynamic plural logic does by itself
never introduce functional dependencies. This can be understood by study-
ing the way the -operator builds on the input state. Each assignment in
the input state branches into a set of new assignment functions that col-
lectively assign the introduced entity X. For instance, interpreting x in
a language with two variables, namely x and y, one pair in the relation is
one in which x is assigned the plurality {t, h}.
(4.12)
y
d
h
[[x]]
y x
d t
d h
h t
h h
It is easy to see that in the output state in (4.12), x is not dependent on y.
For both d and h are paired with both t and h.
The default mode of interpretation is collective. That is, predication is
evaluated with respect to the collection of values assigned to variables in
the assignment functions collected in a state. Just as in DPL, predicates
are tests. Note the definedness condition. A predication over xi is defined
even if xi is undefined in the incoming state. The reason is that the plural
projection of this variable G(xi) is not undefined. It is simply the empty
set.
(4.13) G [[Px1, . . . , xn]] dH ⇔ G = H
G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]+H ⇔ G = H & 〈G(x1), . . . , G(xn)〉 ∈ I(P )
G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]−H ⇔ G [[Px1, . . . , xn]] dH & ¬G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]+H
Since the existential quantifier in van den Berg’s formalism is by itself not
capable of introducing dependence relations, collective interpretation will
not cause any dependencies at all. Distributivity, however, is a source of
dependencies. Van den Berg uses an operator on formulae to break with
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the default collective interpretation. Dependencies arise since whatever is
in the scope of a distributivity operator is evaluated with respect to subsets
of the original input state.
(4.14) G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH ⇔ ∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]] dH|x=d& G|x=? = H|x=?
G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH &
∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]]+H|x=d
G [[δx(ϕ)]]−H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH & ¬G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H
Recall that the sub-state G|x=d is the set of assignments in G that assign
d to x. For each (atomic) individual in the collective assignment of G to x,
the scope of the distributivity operator (ϕ) is evaluated. This means that if
in ϕ new values are assigned to variables, these may differ from sub-state
to sub-state. In other words, variables introduced in the scope of δx may be
dependent on x.
A sentence like ‘Every man loves a woman’ produces an information
state wherein each assignment f is such that f(x) is a man loving woman
f(y). Once such a context is created, pronouns can profit from this by re-
entering the structure using distributivity again.
For instance, the formula in (4.15) can only be true if the pairs of atoms
that satisfy R also satisfy S. In other words, R and S have to contain the
same pairs (with respect to the values for x and y) in order to verify (4.15).
This is in contrast to (4.16) which merely expresses they involve the same
sets.
(4.15) x ∧ δx(y ∧R(x, y)) ∧ δx(S(x, y))
(4.16) x ∧ y ∧R(x, y) ∧ S(x, y)
A critical note is in order if we want to seriously consider using van den
Berg’s system. There is a peculiarity concerning the distribution opera-
tor. What do the conditions in (4.14) for two sets of assignment G and H
to truthfully stand in the relation [[δx(ϕ)]]+ tell us about H? Well, with
respect to the respective values d ∈ G(x), subsetsH|x=d are outputs of pro-
cessing ϕ with respect to G|x=d. Moreover, we know that H|x=? = G|x=?.
No other constraints are given and thus the above definition does not ex-
clude H to contain values for x which are not in G(x). For instance, dis-
tributing over three boys assigned to x in G could result in an output state
H, wherein H(x) contains the three boys as a proper subset.
In order to constrain the output state H, we thus need to state that the
values for x in G are exactly the values in H(x) (given that the undefined-
ness value is not included in projection). So, I redefine distributivity as
follows:
(4.17) G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH ⇔ G(x) = H(x) & G|x=? = H|x=? &
∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]] dH|x=d
G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH & ∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]]+H|x=d
G [[δx(ϕ)]]−H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH & ¬G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H
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Let me illustrate the merits of dynamic plural logic using our running
example in (4.18). The DPlL translation is in (4.19)3.
(4.18) Three students each wrote a paper. They each sent it to L&P.
(4.19) x ∧ STUDENT(x) ∧ 3(x) ∧ δx(y ∧ 1(y) ∧ PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y))
∧δx(SENT_TO_LP(x, y))
Say now that given an initial state, an update with x ∧ STUDENT(x)∧ 3(x)
will result in a state like in (4.20)4.
(4.20)
x
s1
s2
s3
The distributivity operator will now consider sub-states of this state for
the interpretation of its scope. The VP translation ‘y ∧ 1(y) ∧ PAPER(y) ∧
WROTE(x, y)’ will be interpreted three times. This results in three output
states that form the sub-states of the output for the distribution. Say that
s1 wrote paper p1, that s2 wrote p2 and s3 wrote p3, then:
(4.21)
x
s1 [[y ∧ 1(y) ∧ PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y)]]+
x y
s1 p1
x
s2 [[y ∧ 1(y) ∧ PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y)]]+
x y
s2 p2
x
s3 [[y ∧ 1(y) ∧ PAPER(y) ∧ WROTE(x, y)]]+
x y
s3 p3
and the output state after processing the first sentence is then:
(4.22)
x y
s1 p1
s2 p2
s3 p3
The second sentence in (4.18) now forces a new distribution over x (if we
recognise that the plural pronoun is co-indexed with ‘three students’). The
sub-states that are considered now, however, contain not only the atomic
values for x, but also those for y. So, in case each of the students indeed
sent his or her paper to Linguistics and Philosophy:
3Here, I assume that ‘three’ is analysed as a simple predicate ‘3’ which counts the atoms
in a set.
4Actually, such a formula results in a collection of states containing three students, given
the indefiniteness of ‘three students’. For simplicity, we will consider only one of these poten-
tial output states.
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(4.23)
x y
s1 p1 [[SENT_TO_LP(x, y)]]+
x y
s1 p1
x y
s2 p2 [[SENT_TO_LP(x, y)]]+
x y
s2 p2
x y
s3 p3 [[SENT_TO_LP(x, y)]]+
x y
s3 p3
The output state for distribution is again (4.22).
Independent existential quantification, standard collective predication
and a distributivity operator creating and accessing dependencies form the
backbone of dynamic plural logic’s treatment of plural anaphora and are
my main focus in this chapter. Let me briefly discuss van den Berg’s ap-
proach to quantificational noun phrases, however.
Van den Berg defines some more operators needed to come to an anal-
ysis of quantificational mechanisms. Since Van den Berg assumes that
quantification is externally dynamic, he needs to make sure that quanti-
fiers introduce only the sets suitable for subsequent anaphoric reference.
Most of the work is done by a maximality operator ‘M’. It has often been
observed that maximality plays an important role in quantification, not
least because of the ‘maximal’ interpretation of e-type pronouns. In dy-
namic plural logic the interpretation of a formula is maximised relative to
a variable x by finding an output state H such that no alternative output
state exists which assigns a superset of H(x) to x. I will not discuss the
complex truth and falsity conditions for such a relation, here. (See van den
Berg 1996b, p. 141 for details).
In a quantificational structure, both the referent for the maxset and for
the reference set are introduced using the maximalisation operator. The
maxset is moreover presupposed. Van den Berg defines an operator ‘+’
to express this presupposition. That is, ‘+(ϕ)’ is only defined for an input
state and an output state if ϕ is true relative to these states. The blue-print
for quantification is then:
(4.24) x′ ∧ x ∧ +M(ϕ) ∧M(x ≤ x′ ∧ ψ) ∧Q(x′, x)
Here, ϕ represents the restrictor clause and ψ the nuclear scope of quan-
tification, while x′ is the maximal set and x is the reference set. ‘Q’ is
the quantificational relation expressed by the determiner. The condition
x ≤ x′ expresses that the value for x′ is a subset of the value of x. This
way, conservativity is explicit in the representation.
The final ingredient for quantification is a notion of domain restriction.
I remarked earlier that an important reason for van den Berg’s choice for
partial assignment functions is because of the need of a ‘safe’ notion of
subset. The dependency preserving nature of this notion is important for
quantification. Van den Berg follows Westerståhl (1984) in assuming that
quantification always occurs relative to some context set which establishes
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the global domain of quantification. That is, if Q(A)(B) is interpreted with
respect to context set C, it is interpreted as Q(A ∩ C,B). Also, definite
descriptions can take such sets as domains. After introducing a set of chil-
dren with an NP like ‘six children’, a definite description like ‘the boys’ can
access the boys among the children. Moreover, it also accesses the depen-
dencies the children partake in. For instance, in (4.25), the NP ‘the boys’
takes the maximal set of boys among the children and claims that each of
them took the dollar he found home.
(4.25) Six children each found a dollar in the park. The boys took it
home.
To deal with these observations, Van den Berg relativises his -operator
and his maximality operator to a referent (thought to express the context
set). For instance, x⊆y is the state which assigns identical values to x and
y on just a subset of the incoming set of assignment that provide a value
for y. A similar transformation is available for the maximality operator5.
Given these tools, a standard quantificational structure looks like this:
(4.26) Qyx(ϕ,ψ) := x′⊆y ∧ x⊆x′ ∧+Mx′⊆y(ϕ[x/x′]) ∧Mx⊆x′(ψ) ∧Q(x′, x)
This concludes, for now, my discussion of van den Berg’s dynamic plural
logic. I now turn to an alternative proposed by Manfred Krifka.
4.2 Parametrised sum individuals
Like dynamic plural logic, Krifka’s proposal involving parametrised sum
individuals is set in the ‘tradition’ of dynamic predicate logic6. Krifka
follows the line of DPL and other dynamic approaches by interpreting a
sentence as a relation between assignment functions. It is the way in
which these functions assign pluralities which distinguish Krifka 1996a
from standard proposals. Here are the important aspects of his proposal.
(4.27) a. The meaning of a sentence is a relation between assignment
functions
b. Assignment functions are functions from variables to
parametrised sum individuals
c. Parametrised sum individuals are plural individuals paired
with an assignment function
d. Parametrisations are due to distributivity.
5For discussion and formalisation see van den Berg 1996b, p. 137-142.
6In what follows I changed a lot of Krifka’s notation in order to compare it to van den Berg’s
work more easily. For instance, Krifka does not make use of variables, but instead uses index-
like discourse entities. Ignoring such choices is harmless with respect to our current purpose,
namely that of comparison of the basic quantificational and anaphoric mechanisms.
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The notion of a parametrised individual was introduced in Barwise 1987.
Since parametrised individuals are individuals which have a variable as-
signment associated with them, they are an ideal medium for modeling
dependencies. The basic idea is that if y is dependent on x, then each atom
in the group assigned to x comes with its own assignment for y.
Krifka builds up his ontology carefully. Let VAR be a set of variables.
Let E be the domain of atomic entities. The domain of plural individuals is
taken to be ℘+(E), where ℘+ expresses the powerset operation excluding
the empty set. Parametrised sum individuals or P-individuals are now
defined recursively in tandem with the definition of the assignments.
(4.28) P0 := ℘+(℘+(De)× {∅})
This is the base set of P-individuals: the set of plural individuals paired
with empty assignments. We will write a P-individual made up from a
(sum-)individual d and a function f as d : f . So, for instance, the individual
{j,m} is represented as {j : ∅,m : ∅}. The base set for assignments is
based on P0: it is the set of partial functions from variables to base case
P-individuals.
(4.29) G0 := VAR ↪→ P0
Next, a first induction step defines P1 as the set of non-empty sets of pairs
of plural individuals and base case assignments. G1 is defined as is to be
expected:
(4.30) P1 := ℘
+(℘+(De)×G0)
G1 := VAR ↪→ P1
An example of an assignment in G1 is the following:
(4.31) g = {〈x, {j : {〈y, t : ∅〉}, s : {〈y, d : ∅〉},m : {〈y, h : ∅〉}}〉}
This is roughly the same assignment as van den Berg’s (4.6), except that
the variable y is subordinated to x. It is only accessible through x. So, if the
above assignment is called g, then g(x) corresponds to the plural individual
{j, s,m} parametrised for y. That is, g(x)(j)(y) yields t, g(x)(s)(y) yields d
etc.
The definition in (4.30) can be generalised to parametrised individuals
and assignment functions which have assignments to complex P-individuals
inside a P-individual itself.
(4.32) Gn := VAR ↪→ PnPn := ℘+(℘+(De)× ∪{Gi|0 ≤ i < n})
Finally, the full set of parametrised sum individuals and assignments to
them is derived by:
(4.33) P := ∪{Pi | 0 ≤ i}G := ∪{Gi | 0 ≤ i}
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To make the inhabitants of P and G somewhat readable, I propose the
following notation. An assignment 〈x, {a1, . . . , an}〉 is represented as
x
a1
...
an
I’ll abbreviate the inhabitants of P0, d : ∅ as simply d. The example in
(4.31) is written as:
(4.34)
x
j :
y
t
s :
y
d
m :
y
h
Given an assignment g in G, its value with respect to v is simply g(v). Em-
bedded assignments are not visible for ordinary application, so if the figure
above depicts g, then g(y) is undefined. In order to allow for parametrised
individuals in the extension of a predicate as well as ordinary individuals,
Krifka stipulates a lexical rule.
(4.35) P ({〈a, g〉})⇔ P ({a})
There is a notion of extending an assignment which is closely related to the
random assignment of DPL.
(4.36) g is extended to h by x or g <x h iff
x 6∈ RDOM(g) & ∃d ∈ P0 : h = g ∪ {〈x, d〉}.
This is a relation which expresses a random assignment of a non-parame-
trised sum individual. It adds to g a fresh index x, which is assigned an
individual in P0. The freshness is ensured by x 6∈ RDOM(g)which expresses
that x is not part of the so-called recursive domain of g, the ordinary do-
main plus all the indices in the domains of arbitrarily deeply embedded
assignments.
Krifka’s formalism is typed. Sentences correspond to relations between
G-assignments. One-place predicates correspond to ternary relations be-
tween two assignments and a variable. Krifka assumes that determiners
are responsible for adding individuals to the context. For instance, he anal-
yses “two students” as “∃x(two(student)),” where ‘∃x’ is a morphologically
empty determiner, interpreted as the existential quantifier introducing in-
dex x. Here are some details:
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(4.37)
two(student) = λv.{〈g, g〉|2(student)(v)}
∃x = λP.{〈g, h〉|∃k : g <x k ∧ 〈k, h〉 ∈ P (k(x))}
∃x(two(student)) = {〈g, h〉|∃k : g <x k ∧ 〈k, h〉 ∈ 2(student)(k(x))}
= {〈g, h〉|g <x h ∧ 2(student)(h(x))}
The final line shows that “[two students]x” is interpreted as introducing a
sum individual containing 2 students for x in the context. This relation
is combined with an operator indexed with the relevant variable (x in this
case) which dictates how it combines with a verbal predicate. For instance,
the subject operator takes a relation and a one-place predicate and feeds
the value for this index to the predicate. Object operators behave similarly,
but take two-place instead of one-place predicates.
Let us now focus on Krifka’s treatment of dependence. The default
mode of interpreting predicates is collective, just as in dynamic plural logic.
And just as in that formalism, while there are no dependencies created or
accessed with collective predication, distributivity acts as a major source
of dependency. The definition of distribution is not straightforward:
(4.38) |= g [[Mx (pi)]]h⇔ h is like g, except that every parame-
trised individual d : f in g(x) is replaced
by d : (f + i) such that:
〈g + f, g + f + i〉 ∈ pi(〈d, f〉).
where, f + g = f ∪ g provided that RDOM(f) ∩ RDOM(g) = ∅
Here, pi is a (possibly complex) one-place predicate, such as, for instance:
λd.{〈g, h〉 | g <y h ∧ article(h(y)) ∧wrote(d, h(y))},
which corresponds to ‘wrote any article.’ Distributing over this property
with respect to x results in adding parametrisation to the individuals as-
signed to x in the incoming assignment. This parametrisation is such that
it enables satisfaction of pi.7
Using our representation of assignments in G, a more schematic ver-
sion of the definition can be given.
(4.39)
. . . ,
x
d1 : f1
...
dn : fn
, . . .
 [[Mx (pi)]]
. . . ,
x
d1 : f1 + i1
...
dn : fn + in
, . . .

⇔
∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : g + fj [[pi(d : fj)]] g + fj + ij
7Unfortunately, this seems to be an oversimplification. The assignment g+ f can never be
defined, since the domain of f occurs in the recursive domain of g.
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Notice the resemblance to van den Berg’s distribution operator. For each
atomic individual dj in g(x), the scope of the distribution operator (the one-
place predicate pi) is interpreted with respect to its own parametrisation
fj and the input assignment g. Any extension of these assignments ij
due to the interpretation of pi with d : fj as its argument end up in the
parametrisation of dj as well.
Here is an example. Say we have an assignment which assigns to x the
parametrised sum individual ‘thex students who each read az book’ and,
say, this looks like (4.40).
(4.40)
x
s1 :
z
b1
s2 :
z
b2
s3 :
z
b3
If we now interpret Mx (λd.{〈g, h〉 | g <y h ∧ article(h(y)) ∧wrote(d, h(y))})
relative to the input assignment in (4.40) (call it g), in a model in which s1
wrote article a1 etc., we first check whether each individual d : f in g(x)
satisfies the predicate. This means the following three conditions hold.
(4.41) 〈g + {〈z, b1〉}, g + {〈z, b1〉}+ {〈y, a1〉}〉 ∈
{〈g, h〉 | g <y h ∧ article(h(y)) ∧wrote(s1, h(y))}
(4.42) 〈g + {〈z, b2〉}, g + {〈z, b2〉}+ {〈y, a2〉}〉 ∈
{〈g, h〉 | g <y h ∧ article(h(y)) ∧wrote(s2, h(y))}
(4.43) 〈g + {〈z, b3〉}, g + {〈z, b3〉}+ {〈y, a3〉}〉 ∈
{〈g, h〉 | g <y h ∧ article(h(y)) ∧wrote(s3, h(y))}
The output state corresponds to (4.44).
(4.44)
x
s1 :
z y
b1 a1
s2 :
z y
b2 a2
s3 :
z y
b3 a3
Just like in dynamic plural logic, distributivity here not only adds a depen-
dency relation, it also accesses one. For each sub-individual of the entity
assigned to x in the incoming assignment function, the predicate is evalu-
ated with respect to the parametrisation of that sub-individual only. This
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means that if the predicate distributed over makes reference to a variable
for which the individual assigned to x is parametrised, this variable is in-
terpreted distributively as well. For instance, the sentence in (4.45) can be
represented using distribution over the one-place predicate in (4.46).
(4.45) Thex students who each read az book each liked itz.
(4.46) λd.{〈g, g〉 | like(d, g(z))}
This way, each student in (4.40) will have to like the book it read in order
for (4.45) to be true.
I have only discussed Krifka’s treatment of numeral NPs. Here is a
glance at Krifka’s treatment of quantificational noun phrases. These use
a maximality operator on dynamic propositions, like dynamic plural logic
does. Quantificational determiners introduce two maximal values for its
indices, which correspond to the restrictor and the intersection of the re-
strictor and scope. For instance, here is, for illustration only, the entry of
(the subject quantifier) ‘most.’
(4.47) mostx,y : λP ′.λP.{〈g, h〉 | ∃k, f :
〈g, k〉 ∈ MAX({〈g, k〉|∃i : g <x i & 〈i, k〉 ∈ P ′(i(x))}) &
k <y f & f(x) ⊆ k(x) &
〈f, h〉 ∈ MAX({〈f, h〉|〈f, h〉 ∈ P (f(y))}) &
|h(x)|/|h(y)| > 1/2}
In many respects, Krifka’s proposal resembles that of van den Berg, espe-
cially with respect to the notion of extension/existential introduction and
that of distributivity. The key difference seems to be that parametrised
sum individuals come with a notion of subordination. For instance, in
(4.44), y and z are subordinated to x. In an information state for plurals
representing the same context there would be no hierarchy of variables: x,
y and z would simply be dependent on one another.
In the appendix to this chapter, we will focus in more detail on the
relationship between the data structures involved in the formalisms. Let
us now turn to another related framework.
4.3 A theory of anaphoric information
The key features of Elworthy’s theory of anaphoric information (Elworthy
1995) are:
(4.48) a. There are two interpretation functions, one constraining the
model-theoretic interpretation, one constraining anaphoric
interpretation.
b. Interpretation is relative to a discourse set (and a model).
c. Discourse sets are sets of tuples of possibly plural entities.
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d. Dependent (discourse) pronouns differ from independent ones
in the way they constrain the discourse set.
Interpretation in Elworthy’s theory of anaphoric information (or TAI) pro-
ceeds with respect to a model and a discourse set “to give the truth condi-
tions and the conditions on the anaphoric information.” The interpretation
function in TAI is split into two separate functions for constraints on the
model and constraints on the discourse set. This means that there are two
interacting semantics on formulae. The anaphora/discourse component ex-
presses which discourse sets are allowed, while the truth-conditional com-
ponent is a classical static semantics.
Although Elworthy’s discourse sets look a lot like van den Berg’s infor-
mation states, there are important differences between Elworthy’s work
and that of van den Berg. To start with, discourse sets (or DSs), arguably
the notion of information state used in TAI, is a set of tuples of sum-
individuals. This means DSs are subsets of {⊕X|X ⊆ De}n. The zero
individual (⊕∅, written ‘⊥’) is included. If we recognise the fact that such
objects can be seen as partial functions from indices to sum individuals
–i.e. a tuple 〈x0, x1, x2〉 corresponds to the function {〈0, x0〉, 〈1, x1〉, 〈2, x2〉}–
and if we furthermore confuse ‘⊥’ with ‘?’, then it is obvious that the crucial
difference between DSs and information states for dynamic plural logic is
the fact that the former, but not the latter, allows pluralities in its states.
As we did in the discussion of van den Berg’s work, we will postpone the
evaluation of the effects of such a decision to section 4.4.
I will for now also refrain from giving a detailed account of how the
interpretation functions in TAI operate and interact. Let us jump straight
to how quantificational sentences are interpreted, since that will enable us
to understand how dependencies in TAI are accounted for. The following
example is from Elworthy 1995.
(4.49) Mosti donkeys bray. = Elworthy 1995 (ex. 16)
(4.50) (most donkeys)(i)brays = Elworthy 1995 (ex. 16a)
(4.51) most’(donkey∗,bray∗) = Elworthy 1995 (ex. 16.T)
(4.52) (W ⇓ i) ∈MaxDe(donkey∗ ∩ bray∗) = Elworthy 1995 (ex. 16.A)
The example in (4.49) is enriched with information about indices. That
is, the set introduced by the determiner most is positioned in slot i of the
discourse set. In (4.50) we find the logical representation of (4.49), using
the language L(GQA) (based on the language ‘logic with generalised quan-
tifiers’ from L(GQ) in Barwise and Cooper 1981). This formula receives
two interpretations: the truth-conditional one is in (4.51) and the anapho-
ric one is in (4.52). The latter expresses that the set of entities located at
slot i in discourse set W (that is, ‘W ⇓ i’) should be a member of the set of
maximal sets of braying donkeys.
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As the discourse continues more and more conditions on the model and
the discourse set W can be collected. Anaphora can make use of the con-
straints onW by relating to a certain slot. That is, the slot i in a discourse
set W obeying the condition in (4.52) corresponds to the maximal set of
braying donkeys. This is e-type information to be used in the subsequent
discourse.
Elworthy has a single mechanism which derives all readings for quan-
tificational sentences. Since predicate extensions are lifted by closure un-
der the summation operator, all readings are allowed. For instance, Elwor-
thy gives the truth-conditions in (4.54) for (4.53), where P ∗ is the closure
under summation of P ’s extension.
(4.53) Twoi boys buy threej roses.
(4.54) 2(boy∗,⊕{X ∈ ⊕E|3(rose∗, buy∗(X))}
The numeral quantifier symbols 2 and 3 are ambiguous between ‘exactly
n’, ‘at least n’ and an existential interpretation (see Elworthy 1995, p. 326,
for details). The condition in (4.53) is not sensitive to how the ‘buy’-relation
is actually structured. It only uses the sum of individuals involved.
The anaphoric condition, however, does make use of, what Elworthy
calls, the essential extension of a predicate. Part of it establishes the de-
pendence relation by requiring that each value in the i slot (the (groups of)
boys) buys the roses in the corresponding j slot (see Elworthy 1995, p. 307,
for details). Discourse sets always mirror the model.
Anaphora introduce their own slots in discourse sets, but establish a
relation with the slot of their antecedent. A plural pronoun ‘Theyki ’ takes
the sum of individuals to be found in slot i and puts these individuals on
slot k in whatever configuration that satisfies the predicate. A special case
are pronouns that have two identical indices. A pronoun ‘Theyii’ has to
satisfy its predicate in exactly the way its antecedent did. This way it is
possible to force the dependencies of which the antecedent is part of upon
the anaphor.
For instance, consider (4.55) in a cumulative rendering resulting in the
discourse set in (4.56).
(4.55) Four boys bought five roses.
(4.56)
i j
〈 b1 ⊕ b2 , r1 〉
〈 b2 ⊕ b3 , r2 ⊕ r3 〉
〈 b4 , r4 ⊕ r5 〉
According to Elworthy, a subsequent continuation like ‘They sniff them’ is
ambiguous between a dependent reading and an independent one. If we
allow the two pronouns to introduce their own slot in the discourse set,
then we interpret the continuation as meaning that the four boys sniff the
five roses in whatever configuration. For instance:
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(4.57)
Theyki sniff them
l
j
i j k l
〈 b1 ⊕ b2 , r1 , b1 , r5 〉
〈 b2 ⊕ b3 , r2 ⊕ r3 , b2 , r4 〉
〈 b4 , r4 ⊕ r5 , b3 , r3 〉
〈 ⊥ , ⊥ , b4 , r2 ⊕ r1 〉
The more readily available reading, however, is one in which the boys sniff
the roses they bought. This reading is enforced whenever the pronouns do
not introduce a slot of their own, but simply add more conditions to the slot
of their antecedent. This means that ‘Theyii sniff them
j
j ’ is true whenever
the boys collected at i sniff the roses collected in j in exactly the way i and
j are structured within the discourse set, (4.56).
4.4 Comparison of data structures
The previous sections showed how the three proposals under discussion
each give a semantics defined on contexts containing functional informa-
tion concerning dependence relations. In this section, I want to focus more
on the nature of such relations. What relations are predicted to occur in
discourse by the proposals and which of these do we encounter empirically?
Van den Berg 1996b gives the following examples to support his choice for
having a distributive notion of assignment.
(4.58) Every1 man loves a2 woman. van den Berg 1996b (p. 126)
a. They1 bring them2 [..] flowers to prove this.
b. He1 brings her2 flowers to prove this.
c. Every1 old man brings her2 a present to prove this.
d. The1 old men bring them2 presents to prove this.
e. And they2 love them1 right back.
f. And she2 loves him1 right back.
g. Yesterday, several dogs dug holes in my garden.
Van den Berg distills four desiderata from this example. First, there is
the trivial demand that information states should somehow assign plural-
ities to discourse referents (from (a)). Second, specific relations between
the atoms of pluralities should be encoded (from (b), (c), (d), (f)).8 Third,
these relations should remain intact when subsets of the pluralities are
8I disagree with van den Berg that example (4.58b) and (4.58f) are prototypical cases of
inter-sentential anaphora. They are cases of what is called telescoping in Roberts 1987. The
fact that such examples is not generally acceptable indicates that one should be careful to
use it to distill general properties of anaphora. (See also Poesio and Zucchi 1992; Carminati,
Frazier, and Rayner 2002.)
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addressed (from (c), (d)). Fourth, only explicitly expressed relationships
should be encoded (from (g)).
Surely, these are basic desiderata both Elworthy and Krifka would
agree with. Recall that Krifka’s choice for parametrised sum individu-
als originated from very similar examples with a distributive antecedent
sentence. So, it is interesting to look at more involved cases of dependency
covering the whole spectrum of readings for quantificational sentences. In
order to evaluate the three proposals under discussion, we will have to de-
cide which interpretations are generated and what anaphoric effects these
cause in discourse.
4.4.1 Distributivity, cumulativity and correspondence
Let us start with distributive readings and study in more detail how they
behave in discourse and how this relates to the three formalisms discussed
above.
Krifka and van den Berg have similar distributivity operators which
evaluate its scope with respect to respective sub-states. They therefore
have no problem with deriving just the single interpretation for (4.59).
(4.59) Three students each wrote an article. They each sent it to L&P.
The second sentence in this example cannot mean that each student sent
any other article than the one she wrote to L&P. This is explained by
Krifka and van den Berg by interpreting the pronoun ‘it’ relative to a sub-
state or a subordinate assignment. We might wonder, however, how a pro-
noun inside the scope of a distributivity operator escapes the dependent
reading. This is necessary to get the proper reading of (4.60).
(4.60) Three students each wrote an article. They each sent them to L&P.
The second sentence (4.60) tells us that each student sent all articles writ-
ten by the three students to L&P. That is, the (same) three articles reached
the L&P editor three times.
In dynamic plural logic, if a variable y is dependent on the ranging
variable x of a distribution δx and y occurs in the scope of δx, then y is
bound by the distributor. That is, it never returns the full collection that
was assigned to it earlier, but rather a dependent value. In Krifka’s pro-
posal, once a variable is subordinated relative to another variable, its val-
ues can only be accessed through the latter variable. Distributivity enters
the parametrisations value per value and is never able to retrieve a single
collective value from the original input information state. Both Krifka and
van den Berg are unable to derive the reading we described for (4.60).
Elworthy provides a solution to this problem by making pronouns am-
biguous between structure sensitive and structure insensitive ones. The
former class of pronouns are those which do not introduce a new slot in the
discourse set, but simply add conditions to the slot of its antecedent.
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Elworthy’s analysis of the first sentence in (4.59) does not differ from
van den Berg’s very much. An example of a possible discourse set which is
in accordance with this example is:
(4.61)
i j
〈 s1, a1 〉
〈 s2, a2 〉
〈 s3, a3 〉
The two ways the plural pronoun in (4.59) can be represented in Elworthy’s
system is either as ‘Theyki ’, or as a pronoun which creates extra conditions
on slot i: ‘Theyii’. For Elworthy there are two renderings of (4.59):
(4.62) Threei students each wrote anj article. Theyki each sent itlj to L&P.
(4.63) Threei students each wrote anj article. Theyii each sent it
j
j to L&P.
The interpretation for (4.63) roughly says that the contents on slot i and
the contents of slot j both satisfy the ‘write’ and the ‘sent to L&P’ relation
and are represented in a discourse set which respects these relations. In
other words, the extension of ‘writing’ and ‘sending to L&P’ should be iden-
tical with respect to the three students and the articles. In contrast to this,
(4.62) only relates the summed content of i to that of k. Its truth-conditions
are that whatever is collected in i sent, in one way or another, the content
of j to L&P. One of those readings is any doubly distributed reading we
can think of, for instance, one in which all the articles end up at L&P and
all the students sent one, but none sent her own article, as illustrated in
(4.64). Thus, (4.62) seems to wrongly predict that a non-dependent reading
is available for the distributive case.
(4.64)
i j k
〈 s1, a1, a2 〉
〈 s2, a2, a1 〉
〈 s3, a3, a3 〉
This shows a serious defect in Elworthy’s system. The flexible way pro-
nouns can be indexed leads to a multitude of readings for (4.59), while
only one seems to exist.
Something similar happens with the example in (4.60). The reading
described above is derived by Elworthy by indexing the object plural pro-
noun as ‘themlj ’. But nothing stops us from deriving another reading by
indexing it as ‘themjj ’, rendering it the same as the dependency in (4.59).
In contrast to Elworthy’s analysis of (4.59), this might actually be a wel-
come prediction, since quite some native speakers seem to allow a reading
for (4.60) in which each student sent her (and only her) paper to L&P.9
9This illustrates the vague principles for number agreement in discourse. Elworthy com-
ments: “[A] fully adequate account of antecedent-anaphor agreement must draw on more
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In sum, although all three proposals acknowledge the importance of
the example in (4.59), their empirical coverage is otherwise limited. Dy-
namic plural logic and Krifka’s semantics with parametrised sum individ-
uals make too strong predictions, since their distributivity operation en-
forces dependency. Elworthy’s ambiguity approach derives dependent and
independent readings all of the time.
More issues arise when the antecedent sentence involves a more com-
plicated quantificationalmode, for instance cumulativity. Dependent read-
ings are naturally available if we do not force distributivity on the continu-
ation as well. One of the situations verifying the second sentence in (4.65)
is one in which the student-article pairs that were involved in the writing
relation according to the first sentence are also involved in the sending
relation.
(4.65) Three students wrote four articles. They sent them to L&P.
Krifka follows Elworthy in calling the interpretation of the second sen-
tence in (4.65) which parallels the dependencies in the verifying situation
for the first sentence a correspondence interpretation. According to this
reading, the students that cooperated in writing one or more articles also
cooperated in sending these (and no other) article(s). The status of this
interpretation is very much unclear. How do we know this is not simply
a possible model for the cumulative interpretation of the second sentence?
Krifka claims that “the correspondence interpretation can be marked by
each [,] which shows that it is nothing else but the distributive interpreta-
tion” (Krifka 1996a, p. 577). Krifka acknowledges the difficulty of getting
clear intuitions on the possibility of marking these interpretations with a
distributive floating quantifier, which is why he turns to sentences where
the number of the subject and the object are the same. These sentences, if
interpreted cumulatively, are most likely understood as corresponding to a
one-to-one situation. The continuation, then, follows this mapping.
(4.66) Three students wrote three articles. They each sent them to L&P.
This shows that the first sentence in (4.66) recorded a dependency between
students and articles, since the distributivity operator is capable of access-
ing this relation, at least, if we acknowledge that the plural inflection on
the object pronoun is due to the plurality of its antecedent10.
This is not to say that correspondence readings can be marked with
overt distributivity operators in general. Whenever pluralities are in-
volved in the dependencies created by cumulativity, ‘each’ can no longer
than one kind of information, and [..] –given the variability in intuitions– it is not possible to
specify one source of information as being the definitive one.” However, some hard principles
seem to exist. While (4.60) shows that plural pronouns can refer to both semantically and
syntactically singular antecedents, a singular pronoun as the one in (4.59) can never be used
with a semantically plural antecedent.
10Some people actually prefer a singular object pronoun in (4.66).
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access them. Although it is unclear how Krifka stops his distributivity op-
erator from ranging over pluralities, I’ll assume that overt ‘each’ quantifies
over atomic individuals. This is supported by examples like (4.67).
(4.67) During Live Aid, sixty bands performed on two locations.
They each wrote a song for the occasion.
Were ‘each’ capable of accessing the dependency between groups of bands
and locations in (4.67), then we expect a reading for (4.67) in which there
were two songs written, one by each of the two groups of bands. Instead,
however, we only get a reading in which each band wrote a song.
Krifka’s example (4.66) shows that cumulativity, like distributivity, in-
volves some quantificational mechanism which stores dependencies. Still,
in contrast to dependent readings under a distributivity operator, corre-
spondence readings do not seem to be enforced by a cumulative interpre-
tation. Consider (4.68) and (4.69).
(4.68) Tom, Dick and Harry each wrote an article. They (each) sent it to
L&P. # To be precise, Tom sent the article Dick wrote, Dick sent
the article Harry wrote and Harry sent the article Tom wrote.
(4.69) Tom, Dick and Harry wrote three articles. They sent them to L&P.
To be precise, Tom sent the article Dick wrote, Dick sent the
article Harry wrote and Harry sent the article Tom wrote.
While in (4.68) one has to interpret the continuation as being dependent on
its antecedent, this is not the case in (4.69). The correspondence ‘interpre-
tation’ is the most salient reading for (4.69), but the continuation shows
that other readings are just as acceptable. If cumulativity involves the
storage and subsequent accessing of dependencies, the question becomes
how a cumulative interpretation can be verified by a model in accordance
with the dependency as well as with an arbitrary model that is not.
Krifka’s cumulativity operation potentially explains this. It involves
making a cover of the group denoted by the subject. For instance, in a
cumulative interpretation a cover is formed from the set of three students.
Each of the cells in this cover is expected to write something. That what
is written is expected to amount to three articles. The quantification over
cells in the cover takes care of storing the dependencies.
The cover of the group expressed by the subject is associated with a dif-
ferent variable than the original group is. So if the example is indexed as
‘Threex students wrote fivey articles’ than a successful interpretation leads
to an assignment to parametrised sum individuals g in which some vari-
able x′ has a cover of g(x) assigned to it. The articles are assigned in the
parametrisations of the cells at x′. Consequently, the original group (at x)
can be involved in subsequent cumulative predications without addressing
the cells at x′. Alternatively, however, the cover stored in x′ can be used to
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access the dependencies. This explains the dependency observed in (4.66)
and the potential independence observed in (4.69).
A detailed analysis of cumulativity and its relation to anaphora are
beyond the scope of this dissertation. If Krifka’s example (4.66) indeed
shows that cumulativity involved the storing of dependencies in discourse,
then we will be able to accommodate this in an analysis by assuming that
cumulativity involves a dependency-creating operation very much like dis-
tribution. As we mentioned above, however, it is difficult to keep apart
dependent readings from possible verifying models of a cumulative inter-
pretation. In fact, it seems to me that we only have evidence of the possi-
bility of accessing of a dependency under the scope of distributivity. (This
intuition is certainly supported by (4.66) and (4.69)). Studying distributive
sentences will therefore give a much clearer picture of the constraints on
dependent reference.
One question is left open for now. Namely, how all these structures can
be set to work in such a way as to at the same time have access to both the
dependent values and the original group denoted by the antecedent. The
second sentence in (4.70) is ambiguous between Tom, Dick and Harry each
sending the two papers they wrote to L&P, or each of them sending copies
of the six papers they wrote altogether to L&P.
(4.70) Tom, Dick and Harry each wrote exactly two articles. They each
sent them to L&P.
As we saw, both Krifka and van den Berg cannot predict these possibilities.
For now, I will leave this an open problem, but it will play a central role in
chapter 5.
4.4.2 Subordination
Finally, a few words on Krifka’s notion of subordination. Krifka sees a
problem for theories which do not assume some sort of subordination rela-
tion between indices dependent of one another. If two respective sentences
introduce two dependency relations, then how are these combined? With
respect to Elworthy’s discourse sets, Krifka gives the following example.
(4.71) Every1 student wrote an2 article.
(4.72) {〈s, a〉, 〈s′, a′〉}
(4.73) Every3 professor read a4 book.
(4.74) {〈. . . , . . . , p, b〉, 〈. . . , . . . , p′, b′〉, 〈. . . , . . . , p′′, b′′〉}
In case (4.71) results into the discourse set (4.72) and (4.73) into (4.74),
then what discourse set represents the complex text which combines (4.71)
and (4.73)? Krifka considers making use of Elworthy’s ‘⊥’-element and
deriving a discourse set as in (4.75).
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(4.75) {〈s, a, p, b〉, 〈s′, a′, p′, b′〉, 〈⊥,⊥, p′′, b′′〉}
He rejects such an approach since “it introduces unwarranted dependen-
cies between individuals, like between s and p, as they happen to be in-
stantiated in the same tuple” (Krifka 1996a, p. 596). He concludes: “A
framework [..] with subordination of discourse referents [..] does not run
into such problems” (Krifka 1996a, p. 596).
The problem is a very interesting one, since it addresses a fundamen-
tal issue in dynamic semantics. If meaning is to be interpreted as con-
text change potential, then it should not matter what context is being
changed: formulae should be uniformally interpreted and these interpre-
tations should be uniformally combined. Krifka’s complaint is that Elwor-
thy is not specific about how his interpretation of sentences combines with
interpretations of other sentences without leading to new dependencies.
In the appendix11 of Elworthy 1995, we find some definitions for inter-
pretation of sequences. First, a formula F is interpreted relative to a set of
discourse sets V as in (4.76).
(4.76) I(F, V ) = {W ∈ V | [[F ]]Wt ∧ [[F ]]Wa }
The set V is a set of discourse sets which have not been discarded yet. The
interpretation of a closed formula F takes the largest subset of V which is
truth-conditionally and anaphorically consistent with F . Elworthy gives a
number of options for the interpretation of a sequence of formulae ‘F1;F2’.
(4.77) I(F1;F2, V ) = I(F1, V ) ∩ I(F2, V )
(4.78) I(F1;F2, V ) = I(F2, I(F1, V ))
Returning now to Krifka’s example, given a model in which s wrote a and
s′ wrote a′, (4.71) results in a subset X of V such that (say) slot 1 and slot
2 form either the pair (s, a) or the pair (s′, a′). Similarly, (4.73) results in
a subset Y of V such that (say) slot 3 and slot 4 form either the pairs (p, b)
or (p′, b′) or (p′′, b′′). Sequencing (4.71) and (4.73) either results in X ∩ Y
or in an interpretation of (4.73) not relative to V but rather to X. These
are equivalent in this case and result in the set of those tuples in V , which
have a student in slot 1 who wrote the article in slot 2 and which have at
the same time a professor in slot 3 reading the book in slot 4.
It seems that Krifka’s worry about unwarranted dependencies are jus-
tified. A third sentence F3 in the sequence will be interpreted relative to
the intersection of X and Y . That is, the sequence is interpreted as the
set of tuples such that they each contain the aforementioned relations be-
tween slot 1 and 2 and slot 3 and 4 plus obey the truth-conditional and
anaphoric constraints expressed by F3.
Consider now a model in which the students happened to have read all
the books which were read by the professors. This means that for each
11See also Elworthy 1995, p. 310, and Elworthy 1992, section 4.3.5.
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tuple in Γ∩ Γ′ it is accidentally the case that the student in slot 1 read the
book in slot 4. Yet in order to describe such a situation, a sentence like
(4.79) seems highly inappropriate after (4.71) and (4.73), since it refers to
a dependence relation which was never expressed. (Notice that the plural
variant ‘they each read them as well’ is appropriate.)
(4.79) They1 each read it4 as well.
Still, interpreting (4.79) relative to Γ ∩ Γ′ would succeed (it would return
Γ∩Γ′ again). The reason is that inside Γ∩Γ′ the relation between slot 1 and
2 is represented in exactly the same way as is the independence between
slots 1 and 4.
This does not mean, however, that subordination is a necessary ingre-
dient to cure the unwarranted dependencies. Krifka does not discuss van
den Berg’s work relative to this issue, but his approach differs from El-
worthy’s. For instance, remember that the existential quantifier never in-
troduced dependencies. In fact, just like Krifka’s work, the only source of
dependency in dynamic plural logic is distributivity.
It is unclear, whether Krifka has reasons for assuming a subordination
structure other than the avoidance of unwarranted dependencies. Natural
language does not seem to indicate the need for subordination. Surely, in
(4.80), the set of papers is available as an antecedent without first access-
ing the students.
(4.80) Every student turned in a paper. They were all identical.
This strongly suggests that the element of variable subordination in the
parametrised sum individual framework is redundant.
4.5 Conclusions
Let us focus on the common achievements of the three proposals discussed
here.
All three authors acknowledged that the accessibility of dependent an-
tecedents was the most basic fact they had to account for. This is mainly
why I focused on these authors, since I know of no other analyses which do
so in this much detail. As discussed above, all three successfully deal with
the crucial example (4.59). Unfortunately, none of the proposals is able to
express the relation between distributivity and dependence in much de-
tail and all of them make wrong predictions somewhere along the line.
In the end, I have a strong preference for van den Berg’s data structures
which in the deepest level involve nothing but atoms. Moreover, because of
their fine-grainedness and flexibility, information states for plurals are the
most general proposal. The appendix to this chapter stresses this formally.
There, it is shown that there exists a mapping from P-sum structures to
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information states for plurals which preserves the representation of de-
pendence and independence from one formalism to the other.
In the remaining chapters of this thesis, I therefore use van den Berg’s
proposal as a basis for mine. In the next chapter, I will focus on a problem
we encountered in the discussion above, namely how a sentence containing
a pronoun can be ambiguous between a dependent and an independent
reading.
4.A Formal comparison of data structures
In this appendix, we set out to obtain a better understanding of how the
different data structures we encountered in this chapter relate formally.
In order to achieve this we will translate the structures in Krifka’s formal-
ism into discourse sets, which in turn we will map to information states
for plurals. Then, we will show that given these mappings two key fea-
tures of Krifka’s and van den Berg’s formalisms, namely dependency and
independent existential introduction, correspond.
I will not attempt to give a translation the other way around, from
information states for plurals to assignments to parametrised individuals.
This is because of the subordination of variables in Krifka’s framework.
A single information state from van den Berg’s work would correspond to
a multitude of assignments to P-individuals. Also, since in the coming
chapters we take dynamic plural logic as our starting point, it suffices to
show that information states for plural are a more general medium for
storing dependencies and that Krifka’s results can be transferred to DPlL.
Let us agree on some set of variables V. Let us also simplify Elworthy’s
discourse sets as sets of functions of the same domain, namely some subset
of V.
Definition 4.5
From sum-parametrisations to discourse sets
Let g ∈ G (an assignment to P-individuals)
Let f : V → ℘(De) for some V ⊆ V (a function in a discourse set)
f ∼ g :⇔ rdom(g) = dom(f) &
∀x ∈ rdom(g) : ∃W ⊆ V : ∃h :W → ℘(De) :
∃x′1 . . . x′n : n ≥ 0 & g(x′1)(f(x′1)) . . . (x′n)(f(x′n))(x)(f(x)) = h
2
This says that f is a function in a discourse set corresponding to an assign-
ment to P-individuals g if and only if for each variable x in the recursive
domain of g: g(x) and f(x) agree on the individual they assign. This can
happen in two ways: either ∃h : g(x)(d) = h and f(x) = d, that is the value
that f assigns to x is (one of the) the parametrised sum(s) assigned to x in
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g or f(x) is a parametrised sum assigned to x somewhere deeply embedded
in g. In this latter case such an assignment to x is reached through a series
of other variables and variable-assignments. Crucial is that reaching this
value happens through values assigned to this series of variables in f .
Here is an example. Consider the P-individual assignment in (4.34),
repeated here, and call it g.
(4.81) g =
x
j :
y
t
s :
y
d
m :
y
h
Call f the function {〈x, j〉, 〈y, t〉}. According to the definition above it holds
that f ∼ g, since g(x)(f(x)) = {〈y, t : ∅〉} and g(x)(f(x))(y)(f(y)) = ∅.
We transform an arbitrary P-individual assignment function g into a
discourse set g∼ as follows: g∼ = {f |f ∼ g}.
For (4.81) g∼ results into the following discourse set.
(4.82) g∼ =
{{〈x, j〉, 〈y, t〉},
{〈x, s〉, 〈y, d〉},
{〈x,m〉, 〈y, h〉}}
Themapping ‘∼’ takes away the element of subordination central to Krifka’s
proposal and missing in Elworthy’s framework. Whereas in g dependen-
cies are stored in parametrisations of individuals, in g∼ they come about
in the form of functions. The relation between discourse sets and informa-
tion states for plurals is more straightforward. In contrast to Elworthy’s
system, dynamic plural logic does not have any means to assign pluralities
within single functions.
Definition 4.6
From discourse sets to information states for plurals
Let V ⊆ V (a set of variables)
Let S ⊆ {f |f : V → ℘(De)} (a discourse set)
S• := {g|dom(g) = V & ∃f ∈ S : ∀x ∈ V : g(x) ∈ f(x)}
2
S• collects those functions that share their domain with the functions in S
and that assign atomic individuals that are part of the plural values given
in one of the functions in S to the variables. Here, I assume pluralities to
be sets, so I use the membership relation ‘∈’, but nothing hinges on this
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and a similar definition could be given using i-sums and the corresponding
atomic part relation ‘·Π’ (Link 1983).12
In order to demonstrate that these mappings are meaningful, I show
that both independence (existential introduction) and dependence in van
den Berg’s proposal correspond to similar notions in Krifka’s framework,
according to the translations defined here. That is, from f ≤x g it follows
that (f∼)• [[x]] (g∼)• and x and y are dependent in (f∼)• if they are also in
f .
Notice, first of all, the following:
(I) : f ≤x g ⇔ x 6∈ rdom(f) & ∃d ∈ P0 : g = f ∪ {〈x, d〉} (4.36)
f ≤x g ⇒ ¬∃h ∈ f∼ : x ∈ dom(h) &
∃d ⊆ ℘(De) : g∼ = {h ∪ {〈x, d〉}|h ∈ f∼}
If g extends f by x, then the discourse set corresponding to g simply
adds the assignment of some plurality d to x to each function in the set f∼.
There exists such a plurality, since we can take d such that g(x) = d : ∅.
Since, if f ≤x g, it holds that g = f ∪{〈x, d : ∅〉}, it is easy to see that g∼ can
be derived by taking the functions in f∼ and adding 〈x, d〉 to each of them.
With respect to the mapping from discourse sets to information states
for plurals, the following holds for each discourse set S:
(II) : ¬∃h′ ∈ S : x ∈ dom(h′) & ∃d ∈ ℘(De) : S′ = {h ∪ {〈x, d〉}|h ∈ S}
⇒
S•(x) = ∅ & ∃d′ ∈ ℘(De) : S′• = {h ∪ {〈x, e〉}|e ∈ d′ & h ∈ S•}
Of course, we take d′ = d. (II) follows straightforwardly from how we
defined ‘•’. From the conclusion of (II) it follows that S• [[x]]S′•. Conse-
quently, from (I) and (II) it follows that:
f ≤x g ⇒ (f∼)• [[x]] (g∼)•
Interestingly, it does not hold that if (f∼)• [[x]] (g∼)• it follows that f ≤x g.
Firstly, the reverse of (II), given here as (II)′, is not valid.
(II)′ (invalid)
¬∃h′ ∈ S : x ∈ dom(h′) & ∃d ∈ ℘(De) : S′ = {h ∪ {〈x, d〉}|h ∈ S}
⇐
S•(x) = ∅ & ∃d′ ∈ ℘(De) : S′• = {h ∪ {〈x, e〉}|e ∈ d′ & h ∈ S•}
The culprit is the empty set. Since any plural individual, including the
empty set may occupy a position in a discourse set, an information state
for plurals which does not assign a value to some variable x could either
be derived from a discourse set which does not have a slot x, or from a
discourse set which assigns ∅ at x. For instance, the two discourse sets
below, S and S′, map to the same state. That is S• = S′•.
12This also means that in a notation as in (4.82) I take atoms like j to correspond to the
singleton set {j}. Schwarzschild (1992) refers to such an assumption as Quine’s innovation.
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(4.83) S = {{〈x, ∅〉, 〈y, d〉}} S′ = {{〈y, d〉}}
Notice that if we ignore the empty set or assume that assigning the empty
set to a variable leaves the assignment undefined for that variable that
(II ′) is valid. In the coming two chapters, we will elaborate on how unde-
finedness relates to empty sets.
The reverse of (I) is not valid either. It does hold that if f∼ does not con-
tain a function defined on x, then the original assignment to p-individuals
cannot have x in its recursive domain. However, if g∼ is derived from f∼
by adding the assignment 〈x, d〉 to all of f∼’s functions, then this can mean
two things. Either 〈x, d : ∅〉 was not embedded in g (which is the case de-
scribed by f ≤x g) or the same p-individual d : ∅ occurred in the parametri-
sation of all the parts of some other individual. Here is an example.
(4.84) g =
x y
d {e1, e2, e3} g
′ =
y
e1 :
x
d
e2 :
x
d
e3 :
x
d
Both assignment functions to P-individuals in (4.84) map to the same dis-
course set via ‘∼’. That is, g∼ = g′∼. This means that we cannot prove
that f ≤x g ⇐ (f∼)• [[x]] (g∼)•. Nevertheless, notice that the problem-
atic cases here, are cases in which the same individual occurs in all the
parametrisation of an individual assigned to some other value. That is,
with respect to the values that are assigned, x, is independent from y in g′
in (4.84). This indicates where the subtle differences between the propos-
als lie. Nevertheless, we have seen that, given the mappings ∼ and •, the
notion of extension in Krifka’s formalism corresponds to the independent
existential introduction of van den Berg’s framework. Now for the notion
of dependency.
First of all, we have to agree what it means for two variables to be in a
dependency relation in Krifka’s formalism.
Definition 4.7
Dependency in assignments to P-individuals
y is dependent on x in g
iff
∃d, e ∈ g[x] : g[x](d)[y] 6= g[x](e)[y]
2
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Here, g[x] is the cumulative value of x in g: the set of parametrised sum
individuals assigned to x at an arbitrary deep level in g.
In order to show that the notion of dependency is not only defined to
serve our goal of demonstrating the close relation between the parame-
trised sum individual framework and dynamic plural logic, we first focus
on how the above definition of dependency interacts with distributivity.
Notice that the above definition does not reduce to subordination. Al-
though in g′ in (4.84) x is subordinate to y, x is not dependent on y. In
fact, with respect to distribution the two representations in (4.84) do not
differ. With respect to both g and g′, an interpretation of ‘Theyy each V itx’
as ‘My (V (x))’ leads to the same result. (That is, ∃h : g [[My (V (x))]]h if and
only if ∃h′ : g′ [[My (V (x))]]h′.)
We would like to show that if x is introduced while distributing over y,
then x is dependent on y. This, however, does not hold. Cases like (4.84),
where x is assigned a constant value, form the exception. But as we saw
above, structures like g′ in (4.84) are best seen as objects in which x and y
are independent.
If a new variable x is introduced using extension within the scope of
distribution over y, then x is always subordinated to y. This follows from
the fact that the extension is performed with respect to the parametrisa-
tions of values assigned to y. If x is subordinated to y, then (trivially so)
either y’s value is constant in each P-individual assigned to x or there are
two values assigned to y with a different parametrisation with respect to x.
Consequently, distributivity over a scope containing an extension always
leads to subordination but only leads to dependency in case the different
parametrisations are distinguishable.
Define for a discourse set S, S(x) as the set of assignment to x made by
some function f ∈ S: S(x) = {f(x)|f ∈ s}. Also, S|x=d is that subset of S
containing only functions f ∈ S that assign d to x: S|x=d = {f ∈ S|f(x) =
d}. These definitions are parallel to van den Berg’s definitions (see page 4.1
of this chapter), with the key difference that S(x) is a set of sets (instead
of a set) and the d in S|x=d is a set (instead of an atom). We now have to
show:
(III) ∃d, e ∈ g[x] : g[x](d)[y] 6= g[x](e)[y]
⇒
∃d′, e′ ∈ g∼(x) : g∼|x=d′(y) 6= g∼|x=e′(y)
If there is a P-individual d′ : h′ such that for some P-individual d : h,
g[x](d)[y](d′) = h, then there will be a function f in g∼ such that f(x) = d
and f(y) = d′. According to the premise there is also a f ′ ∈ g∼ for which
there is a e : i and a e′ : i′ such that f ′(x) = e, f ′(y) = e′ and e′ 6= d′.
Consequently, the two subsets of the discourse set, g∼|x=d and g∼|x=e give
different projections for y. This proves (III). Now, toward independence
in information state for plurals:
4.1 FORMAL COMPARISON OF DATA STRUCTURES 111
(IV ) ∃d′, e′ ∈ S(x) : S|x=d′(y) 6= S|x=e′(y)
⇒
∃d′′, e′′ ∈ S•(x) : S•|x=d′′(y) 6= S•|x=e′′(y)
Say S, contains at least two functions: f and f ′. According to the premise
two different assignments to x in S lead to different projections to y. Schemat-
ically:
S : f =
x y
{. . . , a, . . .} {. . . , b, . . .}
f ′ =
x y
{. . . , c, . . .} {. . . , d, . . .}
The d′ and e′ witnessing independence in discourse set (and the d and e
in P-sum structures) are non-identical (since, otherwise, S|x=d′ and S|x=e′
would be the same set of functions). So, in the schema, above, a 6= c (or,
rather, the sets assigned there should contain an atom a and c respectively
such that a 6= c.) Since the projections to y with respect to the function(s)
assigning d′ to x and those assigning e′ to x differ, there should be two
atoms b and d, as above, which are non-identical as well. Consequently, to
verify the consequent-clause of (IV ), we take d′′ = a and e′′ = c. According
to the definition of • there should be at least one function f ∈ S• such that
f(x) = a and f(y) = b and a f ′ ∈ S• such that f(x) = c and f(y) = d.
Although the possibility of representing a subordination relation be-
tween variables in an assignment to parametrised sum individuals makes
Krifka’s data structures more expressive than discourse sets or informa-
tion states for plurals, the formal discussion above shows that the ele-
mentary representation of (in)dependence in the three data structures are
closely related.

Chapter 5
Plurality and Indices
Following our discussion about what type of information state is needed to
come to a model of the anaphoric possibilities of plural discourse pronouns,
we now turn to the question of how exactly the anaphoric relations them-
selves are represented. In (5.1), the antecedent quantifier few senators will
have to introduce new information in the sufficiently structured context.
This information will have to be stored under some sort of label, a referent
or a variable name, a file card, an index, etc. The plural pronoun will have
to retrieve that information using the label in question. To express such a
relation, we often decorate examples with indices.
(5.1) Fewi senators admire Kennedyj ; and theyi are very junior.
What (5.1) represents is a possible understanding of the utterance ‘few
senators admire Kennedy and they are very junior.’ Other readings, where
‘they’ does not refer to the senators that admire Kennedy are also possible
albeit rather unlikely.
In (5.1), the choice of the indices is arbitrary and with respect to the
clarification method of example decoration this is harmless. Instead of giv-
ing ‘few’ and ‘they’ index i we could just have used k without changing the
reading we wanted to express. On the logical representation level, how-
ever, it is of much more importance which label we choose. This is because
the utterance in question could occur in a context in which the label in
question is already in use and consequently we could unwantedly access
and update information which is independent from the current utterance.
A related problem occurs with the anaphoric dependencies we discussed
in the previous chapter. Dependent uses of pronouns and ordinary uses
of pronouns can have the same antecedent, so mere co-indexation will not
be a sufficient way of representing these cases of anaphora. The current
chapter focuses on a solution to index-related problems. It is structured as
follows. First, I will discuss the two problematic issues related to index or
variable choice that occur in a dynamic semantics of plurality. In a more
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general formulation they involve: (i) the potential of standard dynamic se-
mantics to overwrite information present in context and (ii) the existence
of (discourse) anaphoric relations not expressible in terms of simple co-
indexation at some level of syntactic representation. After sketching a so-
lution for the first of these problems, I will introduce a dynamic framework
called incremental dynamics (van Eijck 2001) in section 5.2. The particular
variable-free way of dynamic binding proposed in this system ensures that
the choice for a label is made in context and it thus circumvents the first
problem. In section 5.3, I will present a reformulation of van den Berg’s
dynamic plural logic in the framework of incremental dynamics. Finally,
in section 5.4, its merits will be demonstrated by defining an alternative to
van den Berg’s distributivity operator which shows much more anaphoric
flexibility. Finally, in section 5.5, I will discuss how pronouns receive an
underspecified interpretation, which allows us to account for the problem-
atic cases of anaphora in (ii).
5.1 Indices and the syntax-semantic interface
5.1.1 Variable choice
Let us start with asking a question which at first sight might seem simple
to answer: where do the variables we use to model pronouns in the se-
mantic representations come from? I think there are at least two possible
answers to this question. First, we could think of the relation between pro-
noun and antecedent as something independent from semantics: coindex-
ation relations are already given in the input to the interpretation mech-
anism. That is, together with a syntactic structure (say, a ‘logical form’)
comes information of how elements in that structure relate anaphorically,
for instance by expressing indexation patterns on the structure (as e.g. in
(5.1)). During interpretation, the variable corresponding to the pronoun
will be whatever variable we choose to associate with the antecedent. The
ambiguity in reference of the pronoun is expressed on the level of the struc-
ture which is the input to the interpretation procedure. For instance, the
same syntactic structure could come with different possible indexations.
This is the standard approach of, for instance, DynamicMontague Gram-
mar (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1990): “[W]e do not translate sentences as
such, but indexed structures, i.e., sentences in which determiners, pro-
nouns and proper names, are marked with indices” Groenendijk and Stok-
hof 1990 (p. 22).
A second option, however, is to wait with pronominal interpretation un-
til the utterance it occurs in is (partially) interpreted itself. Whereas in the
first strategy antecedents were syntactic objects, in the second strategy the
semantic level provides the antecedents for pronouns, namely a variable or
a referent, i.e. a semantic entity.
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An example of the second strategy is DRT. Kamp and Reyle remark:
“We will analyse anaphora not as a relation between pronouns and other
NPs, but as one between pronouns and discourse referents that are al-
ready present in the semantic representation under construction” Kamp
and Reyle 1993 (p. 67). The way this works in DRT is that in the construc-
tion of a DRS pronouns introduce their own referent whose value is then
equated with that of some accessible other referent.
But even in a more compositional setup a semantic approach to an-
tecedent choice is possible. One could for instance have expressions con-
taining pronouns derive underspecified interpretations, in which a dummy
object corresponds to the pronoun. In order to come to a specific interpre-
tation of such a representation the dummy object has to be replaced by an
(accessible) variable. For instance, an example like ‘if a dog sees a cat, it
runs away’ could compositionally be mapped to the formula:
(5.2) (∃xi(DOG(xi) ∧ ∃xj(CAT(xj) ∧ SEE(xi, xj)))⇒ RUN-AWAY(x?))
Here, x? is a place-holder for the pronoun. Once it is replaced by one of
the ‘accessible’ variables xi or xj (depending on the outcome of pronoun
resolution) the formula in (5.2) becomes interpretable.
The question where the variables corresponding to pronouns come from
is thus a question about whether the resolution mechanism makes its
choice with respect to a set of syntactic antecedents or if it operates on
semantic representations. Some problems pointed out in Heim, Lasnik,
and May 1991a and Heim, Lasnik, and May 1991b are relevant to the first
strategy, where indexation is thought to be part of the input to the seman-
tic module. In these problems the syntactic nature of such indexations gets
in the way. Heim, Lasnik and May extensively discuss a set of problems
which show up in the analysis of reciprocity and plural pronouns, some of
which appear to be due to the fact that the traditional logical forms asso-
ciated with the examples in question are not fine-grained enough to repre-
sent all referential options. In (5.3), for instance, there are three possible
resolutions for the plural pronoun. Still, only two (suitable) antecedents
are represented at LF. Even worse, ideally, these two expressions are coin-
dexed.
(5.3) John and Mary told each other that they should leave.
a. John and Mary both said: ‘I should leave.’
b. John and Mary both said: ‘You should leave.’
c. John and Mary both said: ‘We should leave.’
The solution to this problem is to decompose the reciprocal into a distribu-
tor ‘each’ and a reciprocator ‘other’, which both carry an index. The three
readings of (5.3) can then be expressed as:
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(5.4) [John and Mary]i eachj told [the other]k that theyi/j/k should
leave.
Choosing i as the index for ‘they’ results in the ‘we’-reading, choosing j
results in the ‘I’-reading and k corresponds to the ‘you’-reading.
The problem is independent of reciprocity. The distributor ‘each’ al-
ways needs to carry an index, whether it is explicit or implicitly given. For
instance, (5.5), which contains the distributive floating quantifier ‘each,’
has a reading in which the first, but not the second, plural pronoun is in-
terpreted dependent on the distributivity over John and Mary. That is, in
this reading John claims that only he loves the son he has with Mary and
Mary claims that only she loves this child. The second pronoun in that
reading is interpreted as coreferring with the group John and Mary.1,2
(5.5) John and Mary each claim that only they love their son.
If only the noun phrase ‘John and Mary’ were allowed to carry an index,
we would not be able to represent the co-indexation patterns of this exam-
ple. Assuming that distributivity operators (no matter whether they are
overt of covert) carry their own index, as in (5.6), enables us to express the
anaphoric relations.
(5.6) [John and Mary]i eachj claim that only theyj love theiri son.
Such problems do not occur if one assumes that indexation is not part of
the input to interpretation. For instance, specifying the interpretation of
(5.3) necessarily involves having three variables.
1Such readings are, of course, independent of an overt occurrence of ‘each’. In what follows,
when discussing distributive readings, I’ll often explicitly enforce them using the floating
quantifier ‘each’.
2The example in (5.5) is reminiscent of the example in (i). (See Heim 1993 and Reinhart
2000.) However, the purpose of the example in (5.5) is different.
(i) Every wife thinks only she respects her husband.
Apart from a deictic reading for ‘her’, there are two other readings that should be noticed.
First of all, (i) could be interpreted as meaning that every wife x thinks that apart from x, no
other wife y has the property ‘respect(y,y’s husband)’. In other words, every wife thinks she
is the only good wife. In a second reading, however, every wife thinks that her husband is
not respected: for every wife x, x thinks that x’s husband is not respected by anyone except
x. The example in (5.5) also shows these readings, but they are irrelevant to my present
purpose. What is at stake here is the possibility of the two pronouns to refer either to the
group ‘John and Mary’ or to the parts. That is, given the plurality involved in this example,
even more readings than those available for (i) surface. The operator ‘only’ is useful to get
better intuitions about such examples, but the phenomenon is independent from the presence
of such an operator. For instance, (ii) also has a reading wherein the first pronoun covaries
with John and Mary, while the second refers to the group John and Mary. The example in (iii)
provides yet another example.
(ii) John and Mary each claim that they love their son.
(iii) John and Mary each claim that their mother spoiled their son.
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(5.7) ∃xk(xk = {j,m} ∧ ∀xl ∈ xk : ∀xm ∈ xk :
xm 6= xl ⇒ TOLD(xl, xm, SHOULD-LEAVE(x?)))
A resolution step completes this representation by substituting a suitable
variable (one leading to an interpretable representation) for ‘x?’. The po-
tential ‘antecedents’ in (5.7) are the variables ‘xk ’, ‘xm’ and ‘xl’ and, con-
sequently, the three possible resolutions for (5.7) correspond to the three
reported readings.
In sum, assuming that indexation is part of the input to semantic inter-
pretations makes it necessary to express all referentially relevant entities
in a syntactic form. In discourse, however, it is unclear how such a syn-
tactic form can be made sufficiently fine-grained. In the previous chapter,
I pointed out a problem which in many respects resembles the problem of
fine-grainedness of LF of Heim, Lasnik and May. In the scope of a dis-
tributivity operator, both global values and local dependent values need to
be accessible. For instance, in (5.8), the pronoun ‘them’ should (at least)
have two possible indexations, one which results in the reading in which
each student sends all the written papers to L&P and one which results in
a reading in which the students just send their own papers to L&P.
(5.8) Three students each wrote exactly two papers. They each sent
them to L&P.
The two readings for the second sentence in (5.8) we are focusing on would
have to involve different co-indexation patterns, but clearly in both cases
the object plural pronoun them has the same linguistic antecedent, namely
exactly two papers.
A solution like Heim et.al.’s seems the right way to go for intra-sentential
cases of anaphora like (5.6). But as we can conclude from examples like
(5.8), in discourse the facts are more complicated. Distributivity operators
allow for access to not only the respective atoms in the group distributed
over, but also to values dependent on them, while at the same time leav-
ing intact the accessibility of the groups these dependent values are taken
from. Distributivity thus opens up all sorts of referential possibilities and,
as examples like (5.8) show, each of these possibilities should come with a
unique index. Clearly, representing the ambiguity in (5.8) in syntax is not
going to be easy.
An obvious solution would be to claim that the plural pronoun is am-
biguous: it either takes the currently active functional value of some index
or it takes the collective value of that same index. However, given that we
are looking for a uniform interpretation for pronouns, we have no room for
ambiguity and we will discard this option.
I conclude that in order to cover the full range of pronominal plural
discourse anaphora, we will have to assume a strategy to reference reso-
lution which is based on a semantic level. The input to the interpretation
mechanism comes without indexation information. Notice, for instance,
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that DRT does not have the problems discussed here. After processing the
first sentence of (5.8), two antecedents are formed, namely the set of three
students and the set of six papers written by these students. In the second
sentence, quantification over the three students takes place, triggering the
accessibility of yet another set, namely the set of papers written by each
of the students. The dependent and the independent value for ‘the papers’
are thus both represented in the semantics. This way, the pronoun has a
choice between the local value and the global value for ‘the papers’.
5.1.2 Indices and Assignments
We can conclude from the previous section that discourse semantics should
assume that discourse pronouns choose their antecedent on the semantic
level. However, dynamic formats like dynamic predicate logic and dynamic
plural logic force any semantic theory based on them to make a strik-
ing assumption, namely that the input-form for interpretation is enriched
with information on (co-)indexation. This is necessary because of the so-
called destructive assignment problem. In DPL, ‘∃x’ randomly assigns a
value to x. That is, if, in the incoming information state, there is already
some knowledge about x available, ‘∃x’ randomly overwrites this informa-
tion.Indefinites should therefore always quantify over ‘fresh’ variables. In
a lexical approach to meaning derivation this is especially worrisome. The
entry for the determiner ‘a’, for instance, could naively be expressed as
λP.λQ.∃x(Px ∧ Qx). However, due to the problem just described, we will
have to assume that ‘a’ comes with an index which is used in the interpre-
tation. So, ‘ai’ translates as λP.λQ.∃xi(Pxi ∧Qxi).3
In DPlL, part of the destructive assignment problem is solved by as-
suming that an existential quantification action is undefined once the in-
coming information state already provides a (defined) value for the vari-
able in question. That is, destructive assignment never really occurs, but
is replaced by undefinedness. With respect to, for instance, the indefinite
determiner ‘a’, whenever a non-fresh variable is chosen to be the ranging
variable of the existential quantification, the derivation results in unde-
finedness. This means that in DPlL we still need a specification of the
index of the determiner, this time not to protect us against loss of informa-
tion, but rather to make sure the interpretation is defined.
In sum, frameworks like DPL will have to turn to decorated lexical
entries once they are used for bottom-up meaning derivation. Moreover,
one will have to assume that the input is properly indexed, such that, on
the logical level, destructive assignment will not appear. This clearly goes
3Notice that DRT does not have the problems described here. The construction rule for
indefinites, for instance, specifies that a referent should be chosen which is distinct from any
referent in the universe of the DRS in which the indefinite is interpreted. This option is
available due to the top down architecture of DRT. Linguistic forms are interpreted inside
the current DRS, so information about the current context is always available.
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against what we remarked in the previous subsection where we argued
that antecedent choice should be a semantic process.
The problem is also clear in van den Berg’s approach to dependent pro-
nouns. Recall that in DPlL, the distributivity operator interprets its scope
in reduced information states: only dependent values are accessible in the
scope. That this is problematic follows already from example (5.5) where
the global value of the group (John and Mary) and the local value of the
group (first John, then Mary) are both accessed by a pronoun. Van den
Berg’s distributor cannot handle such examples, since there is only one in-
dex available, namely the index of the distributivity operator. The atoms
ranged over in the scope of ‘each’ (namely the individual John and the in-
dividual Mary) have the same variable associated with them as the group
referent which acts as the domain of the distributivity (namely the group
John and Mary). In the scope of distributivity only the first of these is
activated, outside its scope the variable takes on its global guise.
In a bottom-up approach, we will have to worry about where the multi-
tude of indices needed for dependencies comes from. We need an operator
which freely introduces new indices, as do the principles of DRT.4 Unfor-
tunately, unlike DRT, dynamic plural logic has to deal with the destructive
assignment problem at the same time. The destructive assignment prob-
lem is thus directly relevant for a dynamic semantics of plurality.
In sum, what I have aimed to show is that the well-known (technical)
problem of destructive assignment bears an interesting relationship with
plural co-reference patterns in discourse. Some of these patterns are not
expressible using (co-)indexation. So whereas destructive assignments call
for index patterns to be defined on the input to the interpretation process,
there are empirical clues that interpretation should not take indexation
for granted.
4It is possible though, to come up with an operator within DPlL which would generate a
sufficient amount of indices. What is needed for such an operator is a specific way of extending
the context. Say that F is a set of assignments, defined for x. Distributivity with respect to x
now creates a range of temporary extensions of F relating to specific values d for x in F . These
extensions, F •x=d, have new variables in them pointing to the local values of {f ∈ F |fx = d}.
F •x=d := {{〈v•, a〉|〈v, a〉 ∈ f & fx = d}|f ∈ F}
Here v• acts as the variable name for the zoomed-in value of global variable v. Of course, we
do not have any information on whether v• is already defined or not.
F [[δ′x(Γ)]]G :⇔ ∀d ∈ {fx|f ∈ F} : F ∪ F •x=d [[Γ[x/x•]]]F ∪G•x=d
See section 5.4, for a development of this idea in a setting which does not display the destruc-
tive assignment problem.
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5.2 Eliminating destructive assignment
5.2.1 Index and Context
Van den Berg does not attempt a system for a bottom up derivation of his
formulae and that is why the undefinedness conditions of the existential
quantifier solve the destructive assignment problem for his purposes; a
formula which potentially destroys information is simply uninterpretable.
In order to successfully randomly assign an individual to x, the input state
has to provide the information that no value for x has yet been defined.
An alternative to van den Berg’s solution can be found in Bekki 2000b
and Bekki 2000a. In Bekki’s typed dynamic logic (TDL), the initial context
is one containing all possible (sets of) complete assignment functions. Fur-
thermore, the language does not really have an existential quantifier ac-
tion, but rather contains two special predicates: ‘FREE’ and ‘BOUND’. The
predicate ‘FREE’ tests whether an argument index x is still associated with
the full range of possibilities according to the incoming context. In other
words, ‘FREE(x)’ tests whether x is assigned the full domain of entities.
Its counterpart ‘BOUND’ is successful whenever ‘FREE’ is not. Anaphoric
noun-phrases thus carry a condition that the index associated with it is
bound, while non-anaphoric ones carry a freeness condition. The indefi-
nite ‘a man’, for instance, is derive as λP.FREE(x) ∧ MAN(x) ∧ P (x) ∧ 1(x),
where x is an index which is ‘selected properly so that it succeeds in the
free(x) test’ (Bekki 2000b, lexicon 3). That is, once the wrong index is se-
lected, the free-test will not succeed and the interpretation will result in
the empty-set.
Just like van den Berg’s partial definition of random assignment trades
destructive assignment for undefinedness, Bekki’s proposal simply trades
it in for unsatisfiability. Both van den Berg and Bekki, however, seem to
realise that in meaning derivation, the choice of indices should depend on
the context of interpretation. The ‘FREE’ predicate signals in any context
which variables are fresh and which are not, just like variables which are
defined in an information state in DPlL are never fresh, while undefined
ones are.
Van Eijck (2001) offers a solution to the destructive assignment prob-
lemwhich fully incorporates the intuition that indexation is context-driven.
In what follows, it is van Eijck’s solution I will adopt. Roughly, his proposal
is as follows. Say that the set of variable names is linearly ordered. Say,
for instance, that they are the set of natural numbers. Now we construct
actions which not just pick any fresh variable, but rather the lowest natu-
ral number that is not yet in the incoming context. This way, the first fresh
variable will be 0, the next one 1, etc. It ensures us of a clean and econom-
ical handling of variable names. If we now assume that utterances denote
context transitions, we have the relevant information for variable choice
always available, since there is a systematic way of choosing the next fresh
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variable. The following section will present such a system in much more
detail.
5.2.2 Incremental Dynamics
Incremental dynamics (van Eijck 2001) is a dynamic logic for incremental
dynamic interpretation5 which has as its main feature an essentially vari-
able free way of dynamic binding. In a series of papers (see for instance,
van Eijck 2000b and van Eijck 2000a), formal aspects and linguistic appli-
cations of this logic are discussed. In what follows, my particular interest
is its suitability to be incorporated in a bottom-up approach to natural lan-
guage interpretation.
I start with a loose presentation of the formalisms that play a crucial
role in the analysis to follow. The goal is to communicate the general idea
behind incremental dynamics and its type theoretical implementation, so
that the reader can get accustomed to the (from her point of view perhaps
slightly unorthodox) system of variable free dynamic binding.
Incremental dynamics can be seen as a semantics operating on stacks
of individuals6. A stack of individuals can be seen as a special kind of as-
signment function. It maps positions in the stack to the individual in this
position. For instance, a stack a b c is a function f mapping positions
to individuals. If we count positions from left to right and the left-most
position is called 0, then f(0) = a, f(1) = b and f(2) = c. But unlike vari-
able labels in ordinary assignment functions, the position associated with
an individual is flexible. For instance, if we combine two stacks f and g, by
pushing g on to f (i.e. attaching it on the right edge of f ), then the individ-
uals in g will have new positions associated to them. If g(i) returns some
individual d, then in the combined stack this individual can be found in po-
sition |f |+ i, where |f | is the length of stack f , as illustrated in (5.9). This
shows that stacks enable us to combine two assignments without danger
of variable clashes. The labels associated with entities are contextual, they
depend on what the stack looks like.
(5.9)
0 1 2 · · · n
e0 e1 e2 · · · en ∧
0 1 2 · · · m
e′0 e
′
1 e
′
2 · · · e′m
=
0 1 2 · · · n n+ 1 n+ 2 n+ 3 · · · n+ 1 +m
e0 e1 e2 · · · en e′0 e′1 e′2 · · · e′m
5To avoid confusion, it might be wise to remark immediately that in incremental dynamic
interpretation, it is the dynamics, rather than the interpretation, which is incremental.
6The use of the term stack rather than queue, or list, or sequence is not crucial. The formal
differences between these different notions of data structure do not really matter here. In
general, stacks are lists where the last added element is the first one to be retrieved. Queues,
on the other hand, push new material to the back of the list. Since, as we will see, we push
individuals to the top of the list, stack would be a more appropriate name for our structures,
than queue.
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Using stacks, it is possible to define an existential quantifier which does
not randomly assign, but which extends the state with another individual.
Given what we have said so far about stacks it will be clear that the label
for this new individual follows from the stack it is pushed on to. That
is, if we know what the input stack looks like, then we will automatically
know the label for the individual we are introducing. If g is a stack and
d an individual, pushing d to g will result in a stack g′, where d is on the
|g|th position, since if we start counting at zero, the top position of g is
labeled |g| − 1. A form of existential quantification is then possible which
is guaranteed to be non-destructive. Rather than assigning an individual
to a label from an independently defined domain of labels it increments the
context, hence the name incremental dynamics.
This way, quantification has become variable free. The predicate logical
formula ∃x(Px) becomes ∃;Pn, once we know that the length of the input
stack is n7. We start with the details of incremental dynamics by defining
a variable free predicate logical language.
Definition 5.8
The language LID is the smallest set such that:
∃ ∈ LID
Pv1 . . . vn ∈ LID if ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n : vi ∈ N
¬(ϕ) ∈ LID if ϕ ∈ LID
ϕ;ψ ∈ LID if ϕ ∈ LID & ψ ∈ LID
2
We interpret this simple language using the function [[·]] from formulae
in LID to relations between information states. We assume a fixed model
M = 〈De, I〉, which is left implicit in the interpretation notation. An infor-
mation state is a pair (n, f), where n is a natural number and f is a func-
tion from {0, . . . , n-1} to De. The intuition is that n represents the universe
of discourse by specifying its size. The function f collects the information
known about this universe. In the stack terminology discussed above, f is
a stack and n specifies its length. In this light, predicate-argument struc-
tures are interpreted in the way familiar from dynamic predicate logic:
they perform a test on the information state. A condition should be made
with respect to the arguments of the predicate, however. A predication
Pv1 . . . vk is undefined in context n if any of its arguments vi exceeds n.
(5.10) (n, f) [[Pv1 . . . vk]] (m, g) = ↑ :⇔ ∃1 ≤ i ≤ k : vi ≥ n
(n, f) [[Pv1 . . . vk]] (m, g) = 1 :⇔ (h, f) [[Pv1 . . . vk]] (m, g) 6= ↑ &
n = m & f = g &
〈f(v1), . . . , f(vk)〉 ∈ I(P )
7Variable free formalisms have a rich history. The key work is Quine 1960.
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Negation is also a test: it returns an incoming information state as soon
as its scope cannot be interpreted successfully.
(5.11) (n, f) [[¬(ϕ)]] (m, g) = ↑ :⇔ ∃m′, g′ : (n, f) [[ϕ]] (m′, g′) =↑
(n, f) [[¬(ϕ)]] (m, g) = 1 :⇔ (n, f) [[¬(ϕ)]] (m, g) 6=↑ &
n = m & f = g &
¬∃n′∃f ′ : (n, f) [[ϕ]] (n′, f ′)
The existential quantifier in LID is bare. It does not come with a scope, nor
does it carry an index. The action ∃ is nothing more than a push operator,
extending the context with an extra position.
(5.12) (n, f) [[∃]] (m, g) = ↑ :⇔ ⊥
(n, f) [[∃]] (m, g) = 1 :⇔ m = n+ 1 & ∃d ∈ D : g = f ∪ {〈n, d〉}
In an empty information state (0, ∅), an ∃-action will result in a context of
length one, with a single assignment (to slot 0). In general, the existential
quantifier extends the context and adds a new individual to the informa-
tion state. Combinations of formulae are interpreted by simple relation
composition.
(5.13) (n, f) [[ϕ]] ; [[ψ]] (m, g) = ↑ :⇔ ¬∃l∃h : (n, f) [[ϕ]] (l, h) 6= ↑ &
(l, h) [[ψ]] (m, g) 6= ↑
(n, f) [[ϕ]] ; [[ψ]] (m, g) = 1 :⇔ ∃l∃h : (n, f) [[ϕ]] (l, h) = 1 &
(l, h) [[ψ]] (m, g) = 1
(5.14) [[ϕ;ψ]] := [[ϕ]] ; [[ψ]]
Since pairs (n, f) can be seen as sequences of individuals of length n, we
may want to exploit this in the specification of the semantics. The function
f in a pair (n, f) is a set of pairs {〈0, d0〉, . . . , 〈n − 1, dn−1〉}. Let c, c′, . . .
range over sequences of individuals. We write c∧c′ for the stack resulting
from appending the stack c′ to c. That is, if c corresponds to (n, f) and c′
corresponds to (m, g):
Definition 5.9
Append
c∧c′ := f ∪ {〈i+ |c|, d〉 | 〈i, d〉 ∈ g}
2
We will write c∧d, where d ∈ De, for the stack resulting from pushing d to
the top of c. That is, c∧d is shorthand for c∧{〈0, d〉}. Given such an opera-
tion, we can rephrase the existential quantifier as a simple push action.
(5.15) c [[∃]] c′ = ↑ :⇔ ⊥
c [[∃]] c′ = 1 :⇔ ∃d ∈ De : c′ = c∧d
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The relational semantics of existential quantification as a push operation
satisfies the requirement of quantifying over a fresh variable in every con-
text. Such a semantics should be supplemented with a theory of how pred-
icates are combined with the right indices. For instance, ‘a man’ should
receive translation ∃;MAN(0) if uttered in an empty information state, but
∃;MAN(23) in a context counting 23 individuals. In order to establish the
link between the index supplying the argument of the predicate and the
index contributed by the determiner we need to specify the derivation pro-
cedure. Van Eijck (2000b) develops an extension of incremental dynamic
semantics with a flexible typing mechanism which enables a Montague
style semantics.8
Definition 5.10
The set of types T
C := {[e]i | i ∈ N} types of contexts
BT := C ∪ {t, ι} basic types
T := BT ∪ {〈α, β〉 | α, β ∈ T }
The set of basic types consists of the type of indices, ι, the type of truth-
values, t, and a family of types for contexts. That is, a context c is of type
[e]|c|, the type of stacks of length |c|. This means that linguistics expres-
sions will generally be associated not with a single type, but rather with a
family of types. For instance, a noun (or any other predicational element)
will be interpreted as a function from indices to context transitions, so it
will have the type family 〈ι, 〈[e]i, 〈[e]i, t〉〉〉. In what follows we will mostly
leave the size of a context implicit in its type and write [e] to generalise
over the types for information states.
With the move toward a typed semantics, I will also shift from the re-
lational perspective on incremental dynamics to a functional one. That
is, saturated expressions denote update functions of type 〈[e], 〈[e], t〉〉: they
take a stack and return a set of stacks. We will abbreviate this type by T ,
the type of context transitions.
In order to give a typed fragment using functional incremental dynam-
ics, I define functional counterparts for ‘;’ and ‘∃’, unary predicates P and
binary predicates R. We use γ :: τ to express that γ is of type τ .
8There is a rich history of compositional approaches to dynamic semantics and composi-
tional variants of DRT. See, for instance, Zeevat 1989; Asher 1993; Muskens 1994; Muskens
1996; Bos, Mastenbroek, McGlashan, Millies, and Pinkal 1994; Kuschert 1995; Kohlhase,
Kuschert, and Pinkal 1996.
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Definition 5.11
Functional semantics for Incremental Dynamics:
ϕ · ψ := λc.λc′.∃c′′(c′′ ∈ ϕc ∧ c′ ∈ ψc′′) :: T
∃ := λc.λc′.∃d(c′ = c∧d) :: T
P  := λiλc.λc′.c = c′ ∧ P (c(i)) :: 〈ι, T 〉
R := λiλj.λc.λc′.c = c′ ∧R(c(j), c(i)) :: 〈ι, 〈ι, T 〉〉
2
We have now circumvented any representational level. ∃, P  and R are
simply functions: operations on functions. The function P  is the func-
tional counterpart of the model theoretic predicate symbol P . That is,
whereas P is interpreted by the model to yield a set of individuals I(P ),
P  tests whether the argument index i points to an individual in I(P ) in
the incoming context c.
Notice that given the abbreviation T , the types begin to resemble the
Montagovian types more. For instance, nouns will be of type 〈ι, T 〉, while
determiners are of type 〈〈ι, T 〉, 〈〈ι, T 〉, T 〉〉, etc.
Here is an example derivation for the noun phrase ‘a man’:
Derivation 5.12
1. man ; λi.λc.λc′.c = c′ ∧ MAN(c(i)) = MAN :: 〈ι, T 〉
2. a ; λP.λQ.λc.((∃ · P (|c|) ·Q(|c|))c) :: 〈〈ι, T 〉, 〈〈ι, T 〉, T 〉〉
3. a man ; λQ.λc.((∃ · MAN(|c|) ·Q(|c|))c) :: 〈〈ι, T 〉, T 〉
2
Notice how the lexical entry for ‘man’ is directly translated into the func-
tion ‘MAN’. Thus, it takes an index u and returns a stack transition func-
tion which returns the input stack c if and only if the value c assigns to u
is a man. The determiner ‘a’ takes two functions P and Q of type 〈ι, T 〉 and
returns a stack transition function.
Figure 5.1 exemplifies a small fragment (compare with van Eijck 2000a,
p. 5). Here, the left-hand column represents the syntax, while the right-
hand column represents the interpretation. In general a syntactic struc-
ture P formed by combining C1, . . . , Cn is interpreted as X, which corre-
sponds to some combination of the interpretations X1 of C1 to Xn of Cn.
Given this fragment, it is easy to derive an interpretation for a simple
sentence like ‘a man loved a woman.’
Derivation 5.13
1. loved a woman; λj.(λQ.λc′.(∃ · WOMAN(|c′|) ·Q(|c′|))c′ (λi.LOVEij))
2. = λj.λc′.(∃ · WOMAN(|c′|) · LOVE(|c′|)j)c′
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S ::= S.S X ::= X1 ·X2
S ::= NP VP X ::= (X1X2)
NP ::= Det CN X ::= (X1X2)
VP ::= IV X ::= X1
VP ::= TV NP X ::= λi.(X2(λj.(X1j)i))
TV ::= love X ::= LOVE
CN ::= man X ::= MAN
CN ::= woman X ::= WOMAN
DET ::= a X ::= λP .λQ.λc.(∃ · P (|c|) ·Q(|c|))c
Figure 5.1: A small fragment
3. a man loved a woman;
λQ.λc.((∃ · MAN(|c|) ·Q(|c|))c) (λj.λc′.(∃ · WOMAN(|c′|) · LOVE(|c′|)j)c′)
4. = λc.((∃ · MAN(|c|) · λc′.(∃ · WOMAN(|c′|) · LOVE(|c′|)(|c|))c′)c)
5. = λc.((∃ · MAN(|c|) · ∃ · WOMAN(|c|+1) · LOVE(|c|+1)(|c|))c)
2
The final step deserves some explanation. It illustrates that even with-
out indices in the input, logical syntax will take care of the distribution
of indices to arguments of predication. A context transition like λc.((∃ ·
P (|c|))c) makes sure that the predicate P takes the individual introduced
by the quantifier as its argument. In context, however, the appearance of
this index might change. For instance, λc′.((∃ · [λc.(∃ ·P (|c|))c] )c′) equals
λc′.((∃ ·(∃ ·P (|c+1|))c′), since with respect to the c′ context, the quantifier
in question is preceded by another quantifier.
In sum, we saw how the shift from contexts as assignment functions to
contexts as stacks allows for an interpretive mechanism which distributes
indices ‘on the go.’ Remember that using DPL makes it impossible to for-
mulate a unique lexical entry for an expression that introduces discourse
entities. This is due to the fact that the choice of label for this entity would
be informative in one but destructive in another context. In a framework
like incremental dynamics, such a problem has disappeared, since it makes
the index-choice fully context-dependent.
5.3 Incremental dynamics and plurality
The concise guide to incremental dynamics in the previous section showed
us the basic tools: a push operator on a stack and several tests defined
on stacks. van Eijck (2001) shows that there is a natural translation from
(the non-typed version of) ID to dynamic predicate logic. In fact, this trans-
lation results in a version of dynamic predicate logic which lacks the de-
structive assignment property. This close link to DPL suggests that a re-
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formulation of Van den Berg’s dynamic plural logic in ID-style should be
straightforward. In this section I present such a reformulation.
5.3.1 Data Structure
In incremental dynamic plural logic (IDPlL), the incremental variation of
DPlL we are about to construct, van den Berg-style data structures come
down to sets of stacks of the same length. Recall that van den Berg uses
sets of partial assignments as data structure. It is not straightforward,
however, how van den Berg’s use of partiality translates to incremental
dynamics. I will follow van den Berg’s choices as closely as possible. How-
ever, apart from the notion of partiality which is inherent in stacks, in
contrast to van den Berg, I assume no undefinedness dummy value ‘?’.
That is, in IDPlL, we will use a data structure which is based on stacks
which are total: a stack c is defined on all positions i < |s| and undefined
on all other positions.
Before presenting the data structure involved in IDPlL, let us slightly
digress and review the need for partial assignments. This is a digression,
since it requires us to look ahead at our treatment of quantificational noun
phrases in chapter 6.
Van den Berg (1996b) gives three reasons for working with partial
rather than total assignments. First, it provides a natural treatment of
information increase where as the discourse continues more andmore vari-
ables (standing for ‘topics’) are defined in the state. Second, it provides a
way to represent the empty set by assigning no individual to a variable.
Third, it provides a sound way to define a notion of subset.
In incremental dynamics, there are two kinds of partiality we should
keep apart. Notice first of all that, clearly, any stack c fails to be defined
on indices i ≥ |c|. There is, however, a second way the stacks in ID (and in
parallel the states based on sets of these stacks) could involve a notion of
partiality, namely when there is undefinedness with respect to some i < |s|.
Van den Berg’s first argument for partiality plays no role in the formal-
ism presented in this chapter. Information increase follows from the very
philosophy of incremental dynamics, namely that context is incremented
by existential quantification rather than rewritten. Consequently, we do
not need to assume stacks with holes for this reason.
Related to this is the issue of emptiness. Anaphoric reference is never
empty, so the storage of an empty value for some discourse marker amounts
to the unaccessibility of that marker. In incremental dynamics this is even
clearer. The difference between the stacks c and c∧? is only that their
length seems to differ. But surely both c(|c|) and (c∧?)(|c|) are undefined. It
is then a question of ontology (with respect to the nature of ‘?’) whether c∧d
equals c∧?∧ d. In chapter 6, where we give a semantic for quantificational
noun phrases, we will show that the assumption that the introduction of
an empty set in discourse does not change the context at all yields correct
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results for anaphoric reference and entailment patterns.
The vital reason for an undefinedness value within stacks thus seems
to be the notion of subset it provides us. Let us review this argument
once more. The problem noted in chapter 4 consisted of the fact that when
introducing a subset X of say Y , the original superset Y could be in a
dependency relation with some other set (say, Z). Some of the atoms in
Z, however, are then unrelated to any of the atoms in X. For instance, if
Tom admires John F. Kennedy, Dick admires Robert Kennedy and Harry
admires Ted Kennedy, then for the subset Tom and Dick there are initially
two options. Either they each are paired with the three Kennedys, or they
are only paired with the one Kennedy the admire. In this latter case we
will need a dummy value to be inserted in the function containing Robert
Kennedy, since he is paired with neither Tom nor Dick.
So why do subsets need to preserve dependencies in the first place? The
reason is that should we mangle with the dependencies of the atoms, we
make wrong prediction about dependent pronouns. The example in (5.16),
for instance, shows that each student should be paired with his or her own
paper only.
(5.16) Every student wrote a paper.
Each advanced student submitted it to L&P.
The question is, however, why the above example should introduce a sub-
set in the first place. In chapter 6, we will develop the tools to analyse
this example as follows. First, ‘every student wrote a paper’ introduces a
context containing the relevant student-paper pairs, just like it would in
DPlL. The second sentence, however, can be seen as a quantification of a
domain parasitic on the first sentence. So, we are quantifying over the
student-paper pairs but we ignore all non-advanced students. That is, we
extend the context of student-paper pairs with another student-paper pair
if and only if the student is advanced and the paper was submitted to L&P
by him or her. The result will be that the context now contains not only
student-paper pairs, but that it is independently extended with advanced
student-submitted paper pairs. (See chapter 6 for details.) The upshot is
that, in our analysis of (5.16), the second sentence does not only (indepen-
dently) introduce a set of advanced students, it moreover (independently)
introduces a corresponding set of papers. With respect to accessibility this
means that a pronoun may either refer to all the papers or it covaries with
the advanced students. This way, no unwanted dependencies arise and the
need for a ‘?’-value disappears.
End of digression. We may now turn to the definition of the data struc-
ture we will use in IDPlL. A state or a possibility is a set of stacks of equal
length. That is, the set of states of length n is the set of sets of stacks
of length n consisting of atomic individuals. Members of this set will be
written as s, s′, etc., while the individual stacks in such states are referred
to as c, c′, etc. The type of a set of stacks of length n is [E]n. In (5.17), I
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illustrate such states.9
Definition 5.14
Possibilities in IDPlL
s :: [E]n ⇔ s ⊆ {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 | ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n → di ∈ De}
2
(5.17)
0 1 2 · · · |s|-1
s

c · · ·
c′ · · ·
c′′ · · ·
...
...
... · · · ... ...
As in ordinary incremental dynamics, the stacks are built up from left
to right. That is, the left-most position is called 0, containing the ‘oldest’
material. With respect to such states, we will write ‘s[i]’ for the collection of
all the values at position i in the stacks in s. So, s[i] = {c(i)|c ∈ s& c(i) =↓}.
(Of course, s[i] is undefined whenever i exceeds the size of s.) Also, we
abuse cardinality notation by using ‘|s|’ to refer to the (common) length
of the stacks in s. Note that we will assume all stacks to have the same
length.
It is difficult to compare a plural version of ID with DPlL, since there
are different languages involved (there are no quantified variables in ID)
and the nature of ID’s index control makes some of the partiality defini-
tions of DPlL unnecessary. I will therefore start not by constructing a
proper ‘translation’, but rather compare DPlL atomic formulae with po-
tential ID counterparts. See the appendix 5.A for some remarks on a more
formal relationship.
5.3.2 Incremental dynamic plural logic
Remember that existential quantification in DPlL was defined partially
in order to avoid variable clashes. This is not necessary in incremental
dynamics, since the quantifier is bare.
(5.18) s() s′ =↑ :⇔ ⊥
s() s′ = 1 :⇔ ∃X ∈ ℘+(De) : s′ = {c∧d|d ∈ X ∧ c ∈ s}
Just like ‘x’, the action  is independent. That is, introduction of a plurality
by  does not result in any functional dependencies. For instance, in a state
9Notice that according to this definition s is allowed to be the empty set. This means that
we should have empty sets of multiple types. I leave the formal exposition of this typing
implicit.
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in which we only have the plurality Tom and Harry, introduction of another
plurality results in a state in which all the possible pairings between the
atomic individuals in the two pluralities are represented. So, (5.19a) is an
instance of the  relation, since it introduces no dependencies, but (5.19b)
is not, since the representation of the two pluralities is not arbitrary.
(5.19) (a) th ()
t t
t d
t h
h t
h d
h h
*(b) th ()
t t
t d
h h
In order to say more about dependence and distributivity, we need a way
of accessing specific parts of a set of stacks. The set of stacks ‘si=d’ collects
those stacks from s that have ‘d’ in position i.
Definition 5.15
Sub-states
si=d :=
{ {c ∈ s|c(i) = d} i < |s|
↑ otherwise
2
The formal notion of dependence is comparable with van den Berg’s defini-
tion (see page 84).
(5.20) In information state s, j is dependent on i if:
∃d, e ∈ s[i] : si=d [j] 6= si=e [j]
Turning now to simple (static) negation and distributivity, we copy the
DPlL definition and apply it to sets of stacks.
(5.21) s(¬(ϕ)) s′ = ↑ :⇔ ∃s′ : s [[ϕ]] s′ =↑
s(¬(ϕ)) s′ = 1 :⇔ s = s′ & ¬∃s′′ : s [[ϕ]] s′′
(5.22) s(δi(ϕ)) s′ = ↑ :⇔ i ≥ |s| or ∃d ∈ s[i] : si=d [[ϕ]] s′i=d=↑
s(δi(ϕ)) s′ = 1 :⇔ s[i] = s′[i] & s(δi(ϕ)) s′ 6= ↑ &
∀d ∈ s[i] : si=d [[ϕ]] s′i=d
Given the discussion concerning indexation and variable clashes at the
start of this chapter, the index on the distributivity operator might come
as a surprise. However, we may assume that syntax will take care of the
choice for i. Basically, i is the index which represents the group the dis-
tributivity operator takes the atomic values from. Roughly, this is the
index introduced by the NP the operator is attached to. Or, if we insist the
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operator modifies the VP, the index corresponds to the index of the open
slot of the verb phrase.10
The case of predication is more difficult. Remember that in van den
Berg’s dynamic plural logic, a predication P (x) in a context in which x
was not defined is interpreted as being false. This is because F [[P (x)]]F is
valid if and only if the set {f(x)|f ∈ F & f(x) 6= ?} is in the extension of
P . In case F is undefined for x, all functions f in F will assign ? to x and
therefore F [[P (x)]]F amounts to testing whether the empty set is in I(P ).
In incremental dynamics, undefinedness is likely to be interpreted rather
differently. Given some stack s and some i > |s|, intuitively, s[i] will be un-
defined rather than return the empty set. This view will become important
in resolution (see section 5.5), since it gives us a way of identifying acces-
sibility with definedness. The idea is that in a context represented by a
stack (or a set of stacks) s, only indices i < |s| are accessible since P (i) is
only defined in those cases.11 Consequently, we need a partial definition,
since we need to ensure there are no arguments that refer to inexistent
slots.
(5.23) s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ = ↑ :⇔ max({n, . . .m}) ≥ |s|
s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ = 1 :⇔ s = s′ & s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ 6=↑ &
〈s[n], . . . , s[m]〉 ∈ I(P )
As we will soon see, we need not worry about this partiality. Reasonable
natural language fragments using the functional counterpart of the IDPlL
formalism will never derive functions that in combination with some con-
text return undefinedness. A quick way of deriving function variants of the
relational definitions above is by defining the (update) functions in terms
of ( · ) .
(5.24) Γ♠ := λs.λs′.s(Γ) s′
These functions are partial as well. For instance, (P (i))♠(s) is undefined
as soon as i ≥ |s|. By defining some of the functions separately, we can
illustrate that the need for partiality is special to predication. (We ignore
distributivity for now.) That is, given definedness:
(5.25) ∃? := λs.λs′.∃X ∈ ℘+(De) : s′ = {c∧d|c ∈ s & d ∈ X} :: T
¬?ϕ := λs.λs′.s = s′ & ϕs = ∅ :: T
ϕ · ψ := λs.⋃{ψs′|s′ ∈ ϕs} :: T
Here, in accordance with the change in data structure, we use T to abbre-
viate 〈[E], 〈[E], t〉〉, the type of state transitions. It is easy to see that for
any s of type [E], these definitions result in something of type 〈[E], t〉, a set
of states. The update function for predication will stay partial, however,
since the predicate’s arguments might not be suitable to some of the states
we apply the function to.
10In section 5.4, I show dropping the index is straightforward.
11This, once more, shows the attractiveness of doing without a ?-value.
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(5.26)
P ? := λi . . . λj.λs.
{ ↑ max({i, . . . j}) ≥ |s|
λs′.s = s′ ∧ P (s[j], . . . , s[i]) otherwise
This partiality is harmless, however, if we can show that in the fragments
we build such a situation can never occur. This is quite straightforward
since, in practice, the indices of the arguments of a predicate are deter-
mined by the length of the context. Whether or not our semantics is total
thus relies solely on the fragment we built.
Let me stress that as in our presentation of incremental dynamics in
section 5.2.2, we again have done away with any level of representation.
We only have contexts and operations on contexts to deal with. ∃?, e.g.,
does not represent a function, it is a function.12 This lack of representa-
tional level does not stop us from defining truth, validity and entailment
in the normal way.13
Definition 5.16
Truth, validity and entailment. For ϕ,ψ :: T
|=s ϕ ⇔ ϕ(s) 6= ∅ (truth)
|= ϕ ⇔ ∀s : ϕ(s) =↓→ ϕ(s) 6= ∅ (validity)
ϕ |= ψ ⇔ ∀s, s′ : s′ ∈ ϕ(s) & ψ(s′) =↓→ ψ(s′) 6= ∅ (entailment)
2
Before presenting an example fragment, it is useful to define a special
unary predicate, which enables us to count the atoms of pluralities. So for
n ∈ N:
(5.27) n? := λi.λs.
{ ↑ i ≥ |s|
λs′.s = s′ & |s[i]| = n otherwise
Figure 5.2 represents a simple plural fragment. We derive ‘two men love a
woman’ with it.
Derivation 5.17
1. loved a woman;
λj.(λQ.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · WOMAN?(|s′|) ·Q(|s′|))s′ (λi.LOVE?ij))
2. = λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · WOMAN?(|s′|) · LOVE?(|s′|)j)s′
3. two men loved a woman; λQ.λs.(∃? · 2?(|s|) · MAN?(|s|) ·Q(|s|))s
[λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · WOMAN?(|s′|) · LOVE?(|s′|)j)s′]
4. = λs.(∃?·2?(|s|)·MAN?(|s|)· [λs′.(∃?·1?(|s′|)·WOMAN?(|s′|)·LOVE?(|s′|)(|s|))s′] )s
5. = λs.(∃? ·2?(|s|) ·MAN?(|s|) ·∃?) ·1?(|s|+1) ·WOMAN?(|s|+1) ·LOVE?(|s|+1)(|s|)s
12Or, to be more precise, it is a family of functions.
13Using these definitions we may come to a deduction theorem: |= ¬(ϕ · ¬(ψ)) ⇔ ϕ |= ψ.
The proof is left to the reader.
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S ::= S.S X ::= X1 ·X2
S ::= NP VP X ::= (X1X2)
NP ::= Det CN X ::= (X1X2)
VP ::= IV X ::= X1
VP ::= TV NP X ::= λu.(X2(λv.(X1v)u))
TV ::= love X ::= LOVE?
CN ::= man X ::= MAN?
CN ::= woman X ::= WOMAN?
DET ::= a X ::= λP.λQ.λs.(∃? · 1?(|s|) · P (|s|) ·Q(|s|))s
DET ::= two X ::= λP.λQ.λs.(∃? · 2?(|s|) · P (|s|) ·Q(|s|))s
Figure 5.2: A simple plural fragment
2
We assume that, in the model, distributive predicates will be interpreted
in the plural. So, for any P : P (a) ∧ P (b) → P ({a, b}). Starting with an
empty information state, after processing ‘two men loved a woman’ we pro-
duce output states containing two stacks {〈m1, w1〉, 〈m2, w2〉}, such that:
(i) {m1,m2} is a plurality of two men, (ii) both w1 and w2 are women, (iii)
{m1,m2} is in the pluralised love relation with {w1} and {w2} and (iv)
{w1, w2} has cardinality 1. In other words: w1 = w2. As in van den Berg’s
system, without quantification we arrive at a collective reading.
It is easy to see that the above fragment will never result in unde-
finedness. The only entries that hand out indices to predicates are the
determiners and they only refer to |s| after extending s with one position.
Intuitively, this will be the general case with determiners.
5.4 Distributivity and dependency revisited
Recall that in section 5.1 I discussed two related problems. One of them,
the destructive assignment problem, was solved by adopting van Eijck’s
incremental dynamics framework. The second problem, the impossibility
of expressing dependent anaphora in terms of co-indexation of syntactic
material, will be dealt with in the current section. I claim that the contex-
tualisation of variable/index choice solves this problem as well. To show
this I turn back to the question of what the semantics of a distributivity
operator should look like in order to account for the full range of anaphoric
possibilities in distributive sentences including cases of dependency. Re-
member that there are two relevant observations. First, in the scope of a
distributivity operator, reference to both the group the operator is applied
to and to the respective atomic entities in that group is possible. So, (5.28)
is ambiguous between a reading wherein Tom thinks that he is the best,
Dick thinks that he is the best and Harry thinks that he is the best and
one in which they each think that they as a group are the best. In order
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to account for this ambiguity we need to assume that the distributivity
operator introduces an extra potential antecedent.
(5.28) [Tom, Dick and Harry]i eachj think theyi/j are the best.
The second observation regarding distributivity is that the distributivity
operator does not only introduce the possibility of reference to the cur-
rently evaluated member of a group, but also to any (singular or plural)
individual which (in discourse) has proved to be functionally dependent on
that individual, as in one of the readings of the second sentence of (5.29).
In order to account for this possibility we need to assume that distributiv-
ity operators evaluate their scope relative to specific parts of the current
information state.
(5.29) [Tom, Dick and Harry]i eachj have [two sons]k in the competition.
Theyi eachl think they? are excellent sportsmen.
The problem was how to combine both observations, since there is no index
available for the pronoun in the second sentence of (5.29). This is because
the pronoun is able to express both the functionally dependent value of
‘the two sons’, and the six sons together. But in both these readings the
antecedent is the same (i.e. in both cases the pronoun should be co-indexed
k). The extra antecedents introduced by the distributivity operators are of
no help either.
In DRT, the problem is solved by applying two principles of antecedent
formation: (i) quantificational structures allow for set abstraction and (ii)
quantification over a domain gives access to how this domain is created.
Application of the second principle, however, changes nothing with respect
to the accessibility of the original abstracted set itself. This is because
DRT has the general property that referents introduced in some DRS α
are always accessible in a subordinated DRS β. In DPlL, although, x in
the scope of δx has a value, the local context no longer gives access to the
original value of x. The same goes for any variable that is dependent on
x. Just as in DRT, for a non-representational semantics we would like the
independent value and the dependent values to be accessible at the same
time. In DPlL, this was problematic because of the destructive assignment
problem.
In IDPlL, however, the solution to this problem is straightforward now
that we have freed ourself from the burden of having to come up with an
indexation for the readings of (5.29). All we have to do is have the dis-
tributivity operator (temporarily) expand the information state with the
dependent values. That is, the specific substate used in van den Berg’s op-
erator is not the actual context of interpretation but is added to (or, rather,
in DRT terms, subordinated to) the incoming state (compare with footnote
4).
In a state s, distributivity with respect to index i makes accessible the
substates like si=d, where d is an atomic part of s[i]. Such a state is of
5.4 DISTRIBUTIVITY AND DEPENDENCY REVISITED 135
course a set of stacks itself. Assuming we have a way to combine such
states with the input state into a new set of stacks sus′, we end up with
a state wherein both functional and global values are present. Pronouns
in the scope of the distributivity operator have now their full anaphoric
potential. Ignoring definedness conditions for now, the operator is given
as:
(5.30) s(δi(ϕ)) s′ :⇔ s[i] = s′[i] &
∀x ∈ s[i] : susi=x (ϕ[i/i+|s|]) sus′i=x
Let me clarify this definition. First of all, the states in pairs 〈s, s′〉 in the
interpretation of δi(ϕ) differ at most in that the output context s′ can con-
tain more values than s due to potential existential introductions in ϕ.
However, with respect to the indices in s, the states s and s′ are equal in
the values and dependencies they contain. For each atomic value assigned
to i in the input state s, the scope ϕ is interpreted with respect to the in-
put state s extended with a substate si=x. In the definition we need to
make sure that occurences of i in ϕ are replaced by i + |s|, the slot for the
respective values x.
The question now, of course, is how to define the mode of combination
expressed by ‘u’. The combination sus′ should contain exactly the depen-
dencies that s and s′ contained. That is, no dependencies between values
of s and those in s′ should arise. This means that every stack in s′ should
be appended to every stack in s:
Definition 5.18
Append for sets of stacks
sus′ := {c∧c′|c ∈ s & c′ ∈ s′}
2
Notice a similarity to the DRT approach. The dependent values are only
made accessible in the scope of the distributor, just as in DRT these values
are only accessible in the duplex condition triggered by distributivity. An
important difference, however, is that whereas in DRT the availability of
such values is due to a stipulated principle of accessibility, in IDPlL, these
values are produced by the distributor itself.
The functional version of the operator is a predicate modifier of type
〈〈ι, T 〉, 〈ι, T 〉〉.14 This enables us to explicitly show that the index of the
14I am indebted to Paul Dekker for pointing out a flaw in an earlier proposal, which at-
tempted to define δ as a state-modifier. The problem that occurs with such a definition is that
there is no form to perform the necessary substitution operation on. One may avoid substi-
tution altogether by appending s onto si=x instead of the other way around, thus ensuring
that x is associated with i rather than with i + |s|. Unfortunately, this means that entities
introduced in the scope of δ become separated from the output state and that consequently
there is no natural way of handling state extensions in the scope of the distribution operator.
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distributivity operator is taken care of by syntax. As a VP operator, the
distributor is in no need of an index.
(5.31) δ? := λP.λi.λs.λs′. s[i] = s′[i] &
∀x ∈ s[i] : sus′i=x∈ P (i+ |s|)(susi=x)
The δ? function is subject to a definedness condition, which is closely re-
lated to that for predication: the function δ?(P )(i)(s) is defined if and only
if i < |s|. It is time for an example. Let us first derive the semantics for
our central example (5.32).
(5.32) Three students each wrote a paper.
Derivation 5.19
1. a; λP.λQ.λs′. (∃? · 1?(|s′|) · P (|s′|) ·Q(|s′|)) s′
2. paper; PAPER?
3. a paper; λQ.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|) ·Q(|s′|))s′
4. wrote; WROTE?
5. wrote a paper; λj.(λQ.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|))s′) (λi.(WROTE?i)j)
= λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|) · WROTE?(|s′|)j)s′
6. each; δ?
7. each wrote a paper; δ?(λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|) ·WROTE?(|s′|)j)s′)
8. three; λP.λQ.λs. (∃? · 3?(|s|) · P (|s|) ·Q(|s|)) s
9. students; STUDENT?
10. three students; λQ.λs.(∃? · 3?(|s|) · STUDENT?(|s|) ·Q(|s|))s
11. (5.32); λs.(∃? · 3?(|s|) · STUDENT?(|s|)·
[δ?(λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|) · WROTE?(|s′|)j)s′)](|s|))s
2
The resulting function in 11. takes a state and performs a series of state
transitions on it, including the distribution with respect to index |s| over
the 〈ι, T 〉-function corresponding to the VP.
Let us apply the resulting state transition in 11. to an empty state {〈〉}.
Consider the verb-phrase 〈ι, T 〉 function in (5.33), call it V .
(5.33) V = λj.λs′.(∃? · 1?(|s′|) · PAPER?(|s′|) · WROTE?(|s′|)j)s′
Say that b1 and b2 and b3 are three students, then one possible input for
the distributivity δ?(V )(0) is the set of three one-place stacks containing
exactly these three individuals: {〈b1〉, 〈b2〉, 〈b3〉}. Say furthermore that b1
wrote the paper p1, b2 wrote p2 and b3 wrote p3 and that no other papers
were written by these three students. Then:
(5.34) δ?(V )(0)
0
b1
b2
b3
=

0 1
b1 p1
b2 p2
b3 p3

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The scope is processed three times each time with one of the atomic stu-
dents pushed to the top of the context. So, applying V , in (5.33) to index 1
and the three extended states yields the following results:
(5.35) V (1)
0 1
b1 b1
b2 b1
b3 b1
=

0 1 2
b1 b1 p1
b2 b1 p1
b3 b1 p1

(5.36) V (1)
0 1
b1 b2
b2 b2
b3 b2
=

0 1 2
b1 b2 p2
b2 b2 p2
b3 b2 p2

(5.37) V (1)
0 1
b1 b3
b2 b3
b3 b3
=

0 1 2
b1 b3 p3
b2 b3 p3
b3 b3 p3

Take, for instance, the output set of stacks in (5.37). According to the
definition of δ?, this state is sus′ 0=b3 . That is, s′ 0=b3 equals a singleton
set of one stack assigning with b3 on position 0 and p3 on position 1: i.e.,
{〈b3, p3〉}. Similarly, the output states in (5.35) and (5.36) tell us what s′
looks like with respect to the value b1 on 0 and b2 on 0 respectively.
Crucially, the equations in (5.35) to (5.37) tell us something about the
accessibility features of the δ?-operation. They show that the scope is in-
terpreted with respect to a state which contains both the original set over
which the distribution takes place (i.e. the set in index 0) and the respec-
tive atoms (i.e. the atomic individual in 1). This shows that, in contrast
to the distributivity operator of DPlL, pronouns have access to both the
set-antecedent and to the respective atoms of that set. Outside the scope
of distributivity, only sets and, potentially, dependencies remain.
Nevertheless, it is important to be more specific about pronominal in-
terpretation and resolution. So far, we tacitly assumed some kind of un-
derspecification of pronominal reference at the semantic level. We have
remained silent about how to integrate such an approach to pronominal
interpretation in the incremental dynamic plural logic. In the coming sec-
tion, we will finally turn to how pronouns interact with the semantics.
5.5 Pronouns and accessibility
We observed before that in order to be able to resolve discourse pronouns in
such a way that both dependent readings and independent readings show
up, the pronoun needs to take its antecedent from the semantic level. This
means that not a single interpretation but a set containing all possible
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(pronominally) disambiguated interpretations should be derived. In other
words, a sentence needs to be (pronominally) disambiguated at the seman-
tic rather than at the syntactic level.
I will discuss two alternative ways of generating possible resolutions of
pronoun reference at the semantic level. The first is a simple Montagovian
approach, the second uses an underspecified interpretation for pronouns.
In both cases, all and only the reported cases of anaphora are generated.
5.5.1 A Montagovian interpretation for pronouns
The Montague-style approach to pronoun interpretation boils down to an
ambiguity in indexation. A pronoun ‘they’ is (in principle infinitely) am-
biguous. Its reference may correspond to that associated with any index.
In the current IDPlL setup, this means that the lexical entry for ‘they’
is really of list of entries of the form ‘they ; λP.P (i)’ where i is in N.
Different entries lead to different resolutions of the pronoun and many
choices will not lead to a defined interpretation at all since not all indices
are represented in the context.
By adopting a Montagovian interpretation for pronouns, we can show
how the above theory of distributivity within IDPlL accounts for the kinds
of anaphora which triggered the move to incremental dynamics.
Derivation 5.20
1. they; λPλs.P (i)(s) where i ∈ N
2. each; δ?
3. sent to L&P; SENT_TO_L&P?
4. it; λPλs.(1?(j) · P (j))(s) where j ∈ N
5. sent it to L&P; λu((λP.λs.(1?(j) · P (j))(s))(λv.(SENT_TO_L&P?v)u))
= λu.λs.(1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))(s)
6. each sent it to L&P; δ?(λu.λs.(1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))s)
= δ?(λu.1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))
7. they each sent it to L&P
; λPλs.P (i)(s) (δ?(λu.1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j)))
= δ?(λu.1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))(i)
2
This is not really a single, but rather an infinity of derivations. ‘They sent
it to L&P’ is interpreted as the set of state transitions in (5.38).
(5.38) {δ?(λu.1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))(i) | i, j ∈ N}
The functions in this set are only defined on states that are of a sufficient
size with respect to the choices made for i and j. Take, for example, the
state that resulted from our example (5.32) and apply individual functions
in (5.38) to it.
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(5.39) δ?(λu.1?(j) · SENT_TO_L&P?(u, j))(i)
0 1
b1 p1
b2 p2
b3 p3
If defined, this will result into a set of output states. It is easy to see that
the term above is only defined if i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, since outside
the scope of the distributor the size of the context is two and inside the
scope it is doubled to four. Among the eight possible resolutions, there
are two intelligible ones. (In the others, students are sent by papers, etc.)
If we choose 0 for i and 1 for j, then we get the reading where the three
papers were sent to the L&P editor three times. Choosing 0 for i and 3 for
j returns the dependent reading where the individual students sent the
papers they wrote.
The above proposal, however, is counter some motivations behind ID-
PlL. By making indexation context dependent, we expect that, in princi-
ple, there should be a way of deriving defined interpretations only. The
infinite ambiguity of the pronoun goes against the intuition that in ID-
PlL, the referential options of a pronoun that lead to definedness should
be recoverable from context. I will therefore now turn to an approach to
pronominal interpretation which assumes a pronoun can only be resolved
to antecedents that are (in some way still to be defined) accessible. This
will come at the price of having to introduce some level of representation.
5.5.2 Underspecification
So far, we have insisted that the interpretation of an expression in no way
needs to be mediated by a level of representation. In the previous sec-
tion, expressions were mapped to lambda terms which ultimately reduce
into state transitions: functions from states to sets of states. So, when we
said that ‘each’ corresponded to ‘δ?’ we expressed that ‘each’ translates to a
function of type 〈〈ι, T 〉, 〈ι, T 〉〉 abbreviated by δ?. In principle, it was unnec-
essary to map ‘each’ to an intermediate representation which interpreted
to the function in question. The question is whether such an approach is
still tenable once we try to incorporate the underspecified interpretation of
pronouns in our fragment.
In order to devise an underspecification-alternative to the Montagovian
approach discussed above, a derivation results in an underspecified rep-
resentation. These representations correspond to sets of meanings. So,
one could argue that in fact these representations are dispensable, and
that instead of deriving a function which maps states to representations,
a function mapping a state to a set of possible output states is derived.
For example, say that our underspecified semantics maps a VP like ‘sent
it to L&P’ to a function taking an index i and a state s and returning a
set of possible disambiguated VP interpretations. That is, combining the
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VP with a subject like ‘John’, it could result in a set {{s}, {∅}}. Here the
singleton set containing s is due to all the resolutions of ‘it’ such that they
were sent to L&P by John and {∅} is due to all the resolutions to objects
that were not sent to L&P by John.
An immediate problem becomes apparent. There is quite some psy-
cholinguistic evidence that pronouns are not resolved immediately when
they are encountered. Corbett and Chang (1983), for instance, show that
if a pronoun has more than one (suitable) antecedents, it remains unre-
solved until the sentence is completed. At the sentence level, however,
the underspecified interpretation does not contain any information about
which anaphoric links are potential resolutions (nor into which interpre-
tation they result). There is just the choice between an absurd and a non-
absurd output context. One could argue that this is a good result, since
it correctly represents the options that are available in terms of the se-
mantic effect of these options. (Additionally, one could argue that the res-
olution mechanism operates on more than just semantic information and
we should consequently not be worried about not representing each reso-
lution in context separately.) Examples containing a quantified pronoun,
however, show that using some level of representation is inevitable. Say,
we give the VP ‘sent it to L&P’ the underspecified interpretation as we did
above and say we combine it with a quantifier like ‘every student’. What
happens now is that we are not collecting resolutions of ‘every students
sending x to L&P’, but rather, we are quantifying over resolutions. That
is, ‘every student sent it to L&P’ could be predicted to have a resolution
verifying the sentence even if no single antecedent was sent by all the stu-
dents. (For instance, the sentence could be verified by resolving ‘it’ to a
salient set of papers for one half of the students and to a salient set of let-
ters for the others, in a situation in which half the students sent the paper
they wrote to L&P, while the other half sent the letter they wrote.)
In sum, in order to deal with the underspecification of pronominal inter-
pretation we need a level of representation which enables us to represent
open sentences. We now turn to the definition of such a representation
language. We will simply use the abbreviations of functions we introduced
above for this representational level. But now, instead of being identified
with functions, these symbols map to functions via an interpretation func-
tion.
The representation language is typed. We have three basic types: E,
T and i. If α and β are types, then so is 〈α, β〉. Assume the following
variables:
- a set VE = {s, s′, . . .} of variables of type E
- a set Vi = {i, i′, . . . , j, j′, . . . , u, u′, . . .} of variables of type i
- a set PiT = {P, P ′, . . . , R,R′, . . .} of variables of type 〈i,T〉
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The set V is the combine of these sets VE∪Vi∪ViT. Assume the following
constants:
- a set Ci_T = {MAN,WOMAN, . . . , 1, 2, . . . , SENT_TO_L&P, . . .} of con-
stants of type 〈i,T〉, or 〈i, 〈i,T〉〉, or 〈i, 〈i, 〈i,T〉〉〉 etc.
- a set Ci = N of constants of type i
- a set C ′i = {xn|n ∈ N} also of constants of type i
The intuition behind these definitions is that type E corresponds to states,
type T to state transitions and type i to indices.15 Moreover, the two sets
of constants of type i correspond to a set of ordinary indices, Ci, and a set
C ′i containing the pronominal place holders ‘xi’.
The set Ci_T is the set of predicate symbols of whatever arity and in-
cludes symbols for cardinality predicates as well as symbols for ordinary
predicates in the model. A function Ar is defined on the elements in the
set Ci_T and returns the corresponding arity. (So, for instance, Ar(2) = 1
and Ar(SENT_TO_L&P) = 2.) Now we define the language L as follows. We
abbreviate ‘α ∈ L & α :: x’ as ‘α ∈ L :: x’.
Definition 5.21
The language L
v ∈ L :: i ⇔ v ∈ Vi ∪ Ci ∪ C ′i
∃ ∈ L :: T
P (vn), . . . , (v1) ∈ L :: T ⇔ Ar(P ) = n & v1, . . . , vn ∈ L :: i &
P :: 〈i, . . . 〈i,T〉〉
¬(ϕ) ∈ L :: T ⇔ ϕ ∈ L :: T
ϕ • ψ ∈ L :: T ⇔ ϕ ∈ L :: T & ψ ∈ L :: T
δ(P )(v) ∈ L :: T ⇔ P ∈ L : 〈i,T〉 & v ∈ L :: i
λa.ψ ∈ L :: 〈x, y〉 ⇔ a ∈ V & a :: x & ψ ∈ L :: y
ϕ(ψ) ∈ L :: y ⇔ ϕ ∈ L :: 〈x, y〉 & ψ ∈ L :: x
We do not use standard β-reduction of lambda terms. The reason is
that while combining two terms, we need to make sure that the pronomi-
nal constants xi are renamed in order to avoid clashes (which would even-
tually lead to unwanted co-reference between pronouns). We do this by
having pronouns always introduce the constant x0 and by replacing such
a constant with x1+n when the form containing it is applied to a term con-
taining place holders with n as their maximal index.
15In fact, the interpretation of objects of type E, T and i will be states, transitions and
indices respectively. It might seem that these three types are odd choice for basic types,
since, obviously, T could have been defined in terms of E and a type for truth-values and E in
turn in terms of ι and a type for entities. However, this choice is meant to reflect the purpose
of the language. Since nothing in the language expresses a truth-value or an entity, there are
no such types.
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Definition 5.22
β-reduction
λγ.ϕ(ψ) =β ϕ[γ/ψ[xi/xi+m(ϕ)]xi∈pi(ψ)]
2
Definition 5.23
The set pi of place holders in a term in L
pi(∃) = ∅
pi(P ) = ∅
pi(P (vn) . . . (v2)(xi)) = {xi} ∪ pi(P (vn) . . . (v2))
pi(P (vn) . . . (v2)(v1)) = pi(P (vn) . . . (v2)) ⇔ v1 ∈ Ci
pi(¬(ϕ)) = pi(ϕ)
pi(δ(P )(xi)) = {xi} ∪ pi(P )
pi(δ(P )(v)) = pi(P ) ⇔ v ∈ Ci
pi(ϕ • ψ) = pi(ϕ) ∪ pi(ψ)
pi(λγ.ϕ) = pi(ϕ)
2
Definition 5.24
The minimum index not associated with one of the place holders in ϕ
in L
m(ϕ) =
{
0 pi(ϕ) = ∅
maxi(xi ∈ pi(ϕ)) + 1 otherwise
2
Finally, we define the language L′ which is a proper subset of L and which
is generated using the set Ci as the only set of constants of type i.
The language L is the language of underspecified representations. A
form P (xi) expresses that the argument of P needs to be resolved. The
language L′ is the target-language for resolution. Expressions in L′ will
eventually be interpreted into state transitions.
Now we turn to the resolution process. Formulae of type T in L map to
sets of formulae of L′ of the same type by replacing the dummy argument
fillers ‘xi’ with an index from Ci.
Definition 5.25
Let ϕ ∈ L :: T and ϕ′ ∈ L′ :: T.
ϕ ϕ′ ⇔ ∃X ⊆ Ci : |X| ≤ |pi(ϕ)| & ∃f : Xpi(ϕ) : ϕ′ = ϕ[xi/f(xi)]xi∈pi(ϕ)
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2
This says that there is a set of indices X such that there is a function
f mapping the place holders in ϕ to the indices in X. This function, as
it were, represents the key to the resolution of ϕ: it maps the pronoun
occurrences to their antecedent. The form ϕ′ results from substituting
each occurrence of xi in ϕ with f(xi).
Of course, many of such disambiguated forms that result from a specific
choice of f will not be proper, in the sense that they will contain unbound
indices. In IDPlL, predication over an index which exceeds the size of
the context resulted in undefinedness. Consequently, we can use the po-
tential undefinedness of IDPlL formulae to establish whether a resolution
is proper or not. The semantics of L′, it will be no surprise, is therefore
largely identical to IDPlL.
Definition 5.26
Semantics for L′
[∃] = ∃?
[P (vn) . . . (v1)] = λs.(P ?(|s|-v1, . . . , |s|-vn))s where P (vn) . . . (v1) ∈ L′ :: T
[¬ϕ] = ¬?([ϕ]) where ϕ ∈ L′ :: T
[δ(P )(v)] = δ?([P ])(|s|-v) where ϕ ∈ L′ :: T
[ϕ • ψ] = [ϕ] · [ψ] where ϕ ∈ L′ :: T & ψ ∈ L′ :: T
[ϕ(ψ)] = [ϕ]([ψ]) where ϕ(ψ) ∈ L
[λv.ϕ] = λi.λs.[ϕ(i+ |s|)](s) where v ∈ L′ :: i
2
Themost important point here is that forms in L′ use an indexationmethod
which is reminiscent of the de Bruijn notation for (variable free) lambda
calculus (de Bruijn 1972). This is necessary, since in the forms in L′ we do
not have information about the size of the context. That is, given a variable
s of type E, ‘|s|’ does not mean anything; it certainly does not correspond to
an index. In the de Bruijn-style notation an argument i will be interpreted
as the i-th position to the left of the top of the stacks. So, a determiner like
‘a’ takes two forms P and R of type iT to results in a form ‘∃ • P (0) • R(0)’
of type T, expressing that the predicates take the newly introduced slot as
their argument. In general then, at any point, 0 corresponds to the top of
the stack, 1 to the position to the left of that, etc.
Given this semantics, we can check whether an unambiguated form ϕ
in L′ is proper with respect to some state s.
Definition 5.27
Properness: Let s be a set of stacks and ϕ ∈ L′:
ϕ is proper w.r.t. s iff [ϕ]s 6=↑
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S ::= NP VP X ::= (X1X2)
NP ::= Det CN X ::= (X1X2)
VP ::= IV X ::= X1
VP ::= TV NP X ::= λu.(X2(λv.(X1v)u))
VP ::= MOD VP X ::= (X1X2)
TV ::= sent to L&P X ::= SENT_TO_L&P
NP ::= they X ::= λP.(P (x0))
NP ::= it X ::= λP.(1(x0) • P (x0))
CN ::= man X ::= MAN
CN ::= woman X ::= WOMAN
DET ::= a X ::= λP.λQ.(∃ • 1(0) • P (0) •Q(0))
DET ::= three X ::= λP.λQ.(∃ • 3(0) • P (0) •Q(0))
MOD ::= each X ::= λP.λi.(δ(P )(i))
Figure 5.3: Fragment for deriving underspecified forms
2
A resolution of a formula ϕ in L of type T, given some state s, is now the
collection of formulae ψ in L′ of type T such that ϕψ and ψ is proper in s.
Definition 5.28
Resolution
resolves(ϕ) = {ψ|ϕ ψ & ψ is proper in s}
2
Here is an example. Consider the fragment in figure 5.3. Note the follow-
ing minute differences with the fragment in figure 5.2. First of all, instead
of deriving state transitions, on sentence level a contextualised formula is
derived: a function from states to underspecified representations. Second,
the fragment only deals with sentence interpretation. This is because at
some point resolution will have to be applied in order to have the resolved
and subsequently interpreted representation update the context.
Let us turn to our running example, (5.40).
(5.40) They each sent it to L&P.
Derivation 5.29
1. they; λP.(P (x0))
2. each; λP.λi.(δ(P )(i))
3. sent to L&P; SENT_TO_L&P
4. it; λP.(1(x0) • P (x0))
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5. sent it to L&P; λu.(λP.(1(x0) • P (x0))(λv.(SENT_TO_L&P v)u))
=β λu.(1(x0) • SENT_TO_L&Px0)(u))
6. each sent it to L&P
; λP.λi.(δ(P )(i)) (λu.(1(x0) • SENT_TO_L&P(x0)(x2u)))
=β λi.δ(λj.1(x0) • SENT_TO_L&P(x0)(j))(i)
7. they each sent it to L&P
; λP.(P (x0)) (λi.(δ(λj.1(x0) • SENT_TO_L&P(x0)(j))(i)))
=β (λi.(δ(λj.1(x1) • SENT_TO_L&P(x1)(j))(i))(x0))
=β δ(λj.1(x1) • SENT_TO_L&P(x1)(j))(x2)
2
As becomes clear from this derivation, the substitution of place holders
during beta reduction is sometimes redundant (as in the final step). Still,
better safe than sorry. Moreover, this redundancy seems harmless.
The resulting formula, an underspecified representation of the inter-
pretation of (5.40), needs to be resolved in order to be interpreted. That is,
the form can be disambiguated by mapping it to a set of forms in L′.
(5.41) resolves(δ(λj.1(x1) • SENT_TO_L&P(x1)(j))(x2))
This returns a set of representations of the following form:
(5.42) δ(λk.1(j) • SENT_TO_L&P(j)(k))(i)
For a state s, i will be restricted to values not exceeding |s| − 1, while j will
not exceed (|s| − 1) × 2. These values have been established by checking
whether they result in an interpretable formula with respect to s. As in the
Montagovian approach definedness is used as a criterion for accessibility.
5.5.3 Pronouns and Entailment
What can we say about entailment patterns involving underspecified rep-
resentations? Following Beaver (1999), we will define the notion of possible
entailment. The idea is that ϕ possibly entails ψ, notation: ‘ϕ|; ψ’, if and
only if some resolution of ϕ entails some resolution of ψ.
Definition 5.30
Possible entailment. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L:
ϕ|; ψ
⇔
∀s : (∃γ ∈ resolves(ϕ) & ∃s′ ∈ [γ]s → ∃γ′ ∈ resolves′(ψ) : γ |=L′ γ′)
2
The intuition behind this definition is the following. A form ϕ possibly
entails a form ψ if for each state s if there are any resolutions, then at
least one of the resolutions of ϕ entails a resolution of ψ. Here, |=L′ is
the notion of entailment defined for L′, which is based on entailment as
defined on type T state transitions.
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Definition 5.31
Entailment. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L′:
ϕ |=L′ ψ ⇔ [ϕ] |= [ψ]
2
Also, for forms in L we have a notion of necessary entailment between
two forms which says that no matter what resolutions we choose they will
entail each other (at the level of L′).
Definition 5.32
Necessary entailment. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ L:
ϕ |=L ψ
⇔
∀s : ∀γ ∈ resolves(ϕ) : ∀s′ ∈ [γ]s : ∀γ′ ∈ resolves′(ψ) : γ |=L′ γ′
2
Of course, ϕ |=L ψ always equals ϕ |=L′ ψ in case ϕ and ψ contain no
pronominal dummies, since in that case there is only one resolution for ϕ,
namely ϕ itself, while, similarly, ψ is the only resolution for ψ.
The rather straightforward approach to reasoning with open sentences
has adequate results. For instance,
(5.43) They are mad men |; They are men
For each context in which a resolution for ‘they are mad men’ results in
truth, there will be a resolution for which ‘they are men’ results in truth
(namely, the same resolution). But, of course,
(5.44) They are mad men 6|=L They are men
since ‘They are men’ could be construed as referring to a different set of
entities as the pronoun in front of the entailment sign.
Possible entailment is not transitive, just as the consequence relation
in dynamic predicate logic is not transitive, as can be shown using the
example in (5.45) from van Benthem 1987.
(5.45)
If a man owns a house, he owns a garden.
If a man owns a garden, he sprinkles it.
?⇒ If a man owns a house, he sprinkles it.
In van Eijck 2001, the transitivity of consequence is discussed in detail.
Van Eijck is of the opinion that the intransitivity of |= in DPL and DRT
is logically speaking unintuitive. From ϕ |= ψ and ψ |= γ it should fol-
low that ϕ |= γ. One might argue, however, that linguistically speak-
ing transitivity does not hold for consequence, as is illustrated by (5.45).
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Clearly, our linguistic intuition tells us that the only possible resolution
for the consequence sentence boils down to men sprinkling their house, if
they own one. Van Eijck’s notion of consequence, however, is not totally
at odds with this linguistic intuition. What he derives is namely a form
∃ · MAN(0) · ∃ · HOUSE(0) · OWN(1, 0) |= SPRINKLE(2, 0). The index 2 is the
result of the premise that owning a house leads to owning a garden. This
garden is supposed to take the top position in the stack, so that the man
in the context is now 2 positions removed from the top of the stack. But
in the consequence, the index 2 does not correspond to anything anymore.
Van Eijck proposes to deal with formulae like this by means of existential
padding. Since the context only provides two indices for SPRINKLE(2, 0),
namely the man and the house, an extra existential quantifier is applied
to increment the context and provide a value for slot 2. This way, the third
line in (5.45) reads (in its incremental dynamic interpretation): if a man
owns a house, there is something he sprinkles.
In our current underspecification approach, possible entailment is not
transitive, due to the fact that no antecedent for ‘it’ other than the house is
accessible in the third line of (5.45). A form like SPRINKLE(2, 0) can not be
generated by resolution, since it would result in undefinedness. Possible
entailment, i.e. entailment before reference resolution, therefore follows
the linguistic intuition that the reasoning in (5.45) is false simply because
there is no resolution of the pronouns that makes it true.
If we focus instead on necessary entailment or on the entailment notion
defined for disambiguated forms in L′, we seem to get a similar result.
According to this:
∃ · MAN(0) · ∃ · HOUSE(0) · OWN(0, 1) |=L′ ∃ · GARDEN(0) · OWN(2, 0)
∃ · GARDEN(0) · OWN(2, 0) |=L′ SPRINKLE(2, 0)
∃ · MAN(0) · ∃ · HOUSE(0) · OWN(1, 0) 6|=L′ SPRINKLE(2, 0)
simply because
∃ · MAN(0) · ∃ · HOUSE(0) · OWN(0, 1) · SPRINKLE(0, 2)
is undefined in every context. But if we follow van Eijck and apply existen-
tial padding to avoid the undefinedness, then we do derive the conclusion:
∃ · MAN(0) · ∃ · HOUSE(0) · OWN(1, 0) |=L′ ∃ · SPRINKLE(2, 0)
In sum, the level of underspecified representation given by L with its
notion of possible entailment and the level of disambiguated forms given
by L′ allow for a reconciliation of linguistic and logical intuitions concern-
ing the consequence relation. In a language without pronouns (and conse-
quently without pronominal ambiguity) entailment is transitive conform
logical intuition. In the underspecification language, however, transitivity
does not hold for consequence, which does justice to the linguistic intu-
itions concerning (5.45).
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G [[x]] dH ⇔ G(x) = ∅ & ∃X : H = {g[x/d]|g ∈ G & d ∈ X}
G [[x]]+H ⇔ G [[x]] dH
G [[x]]−H ⇔ ⊥
G [[Px1, . . . , xn]] dH ⇔ G = H
G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]+H ⇔ G = H& 〈G(x1), . . . , G(xn)〉 ∈ I(P )
G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]−H ⇔ G [[Px1, . . . , xn]] dH & ¬G [[Px1, . . . , xn]]+H
G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH ⇔ G(x) = H(x) & G|x=? = H|x=? &
∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]] dH|x=d
G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH & ∀d ∈ G(x) : G|x=d [[ϕ]]+H|x=d
G [[δx(ϕ)]]−H ⇔ G [[δx(ϕ)]] dH & ¬G [[δx(ϕ)]]+H
Figure 5.4: Dynamic Plural Logic, van den Berg 1996
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we focused on the representation of dependent reference
of discourse anaphora. We saw that in order to account for all possible
kinds of anaphora, it was necessary to assume that pronoun resolution
takes place on the semantic level. Moreover, in order to avoid variable
clashes, we adopted the incremental dynamics framework and presented a
variation on van den Berg’s distributivity operator within an incremental
dynamic plural logic. We showed that this formalism allows us to predict
the reported accessibility patterns, which we illustrated using two possible
tactics of enriching the formalism with pronoun resolution.
5.A Translating IDPlL forms into DPlL forms
Here we show that the formalisms presented here are close relatives to the
dynamic plural logic of van den Berg.
I will show here that with respect to some essential actions IDPlL be-
haves the same as DPlL. The version of DPlL I’m focusing on is in figure 5.4
(cf. with section 4.1). Notice that we ignore negation for now. I will mainly
be concerned with issues of undefinedness. I will compare this version of
DPlL with the semantics defined in section 5.3.2, that is, with respect to
a semantics which includes a distributivity operator which cannot handle
the accessibility of non-functional material within its scope. I repeat the
relevant definitions.
(5.46) s() s′ =↑ :⇔ ⊥
s() s′ = 1 :⇔ ∃X ∈ ℘+(De) : s′ = {c∧d|d ∈ X ∧ c ∈ s}
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(5.47) s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ = ↑ :⇔ max({n, . . .m}) ≥ |s|
s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ = 1 :⇔ s = s′ & s(P (n, . . . ,m)) s′ 6=↑ &
〈s[n], . . . , s[m]〉 ∈ I(P )
(5.48) s(δi(ϕ)) s′ = ↑ :⇔ i ≥ |s| or ∃d ∈ s[i] : si=d [[ϕ]] s′i=d=↑
s(δi(ϕ)) s′ = 1 :⇔ s[i] = s′[i] & s(δi(ϕ)) s′ 6= ↑ &
∀d ∈ s[i] : si=d [[ϕ]] s′i=d= 1
I assume a set of variables V = {x0, x1, x2, . . . , xv} for DPlL for some fixed
v ∈ N. The sets of stacks involved in IDPlL can then easily be mapped onto
the states for plurals of DPlL.
Definition 5.33
From sets of stacks to information states for plurals:
For c ∈ D∗e :
c† := c ∪ {〈i, ?〉 | |c| ≤ i ≤ v}
Let s be a set of n-tuples:
s‡ := { {〈xi, d〉 | 〈i, d〉 ∈ c† } | c ∈ s}
2
For any stack c, c† returns a stack of v positions, where the positions not
defined in c are given the ?-value. That is, c† is a total function from
{0, . . . , v} to De ∪ {?}. For a set of stacks s, s‡ has each stack in s re-
placed by a totalised version in which natural numbers are replaced by
their corresponding variable in V . Notice that si=d corresponds to s‡|xi=d
only in case i < |s|, since si=d is undefined whenever i ≥ |s|. Furthermore:
s[i] = s‡(xi) only in case i < |s|. In case i exceeds the number of positions
in s, s[i] will be undefined whereas s‡(xi) will return the empty set.
For formulae we also need to replace the indices of IDPlL with vari-
ables. While doing so, however, we should keep track of which variables
we have used during the translation process. The following translation
procedure does exactly that, provided that we define a way to retrieve the
number of existential quantifiers in a sentence.
Definition 5.34
Translation from IDPlL to DPlL:
()n := xn
(Pi . . . j)n := Pxi . . . xj
(δi(ϕ))n := δxi((ϕ)
n)
(α;β)n := (α)n; (β)n+e(α)
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where :
e() = 1
e(Pi . . . j) = 0
e(δi(ϕ)) = e(ϕ)
e(ϕ;ψ) = e(ϕ) + e(ψ)
2
In a context s, we may translate the IDPlL formula ϕ as (ϕ)|s|.
Given these definitions it now becomes interesting to show that ϕ in
context s corresponds to (ϕ)|s| in context s†. In other words:
Lemma 5.35
s(ϕ) s′ = 1 ⇒ s† [[(ϕ)|s|]]+s′†
2
Let us start with the crucial atomic formulae, namely ‘’ versus ‘xi ’. Notice
that if s() s′ = 1, it holds that s‡(x|s|) = ∅. Also, s′[|s|] ∈ ℘+(De). Since
s′‡(x|s|) = s′[|s|], it holds that ∃X such that s′‡ = {g[x/d] | g ∈ s† & d ∈ X}.
(Compare with figure 5.4.)
For predication things are different. Van den Berg does not need to
check incoming assignments for undefinedness, since in a state G, G(x)
returns the empty set whenever all assignment functions are undefined
with respect to x. In IDPlL, we assumed that undefinedness never occurs
within a stack. Indices exceeding the size of the stack, however, make
predication uninterpretable and hence predication is only defined if the
argument-indices do not exceed this size. We did show, however, that in
natural language fragments, where determiners determine the indices of
the arguments of the predicates, no undefinedness will actually occur. The
translation, thus has to insist on proper indices for the arguments of pred-
icates. Then, it is easy to see that if s(Pi, . . . , j ) s′ is defined and true then
s‡ [[Pxi, . . . , xj ]] ds′‡, since s = s′ and hence s‡ = s′‡. Since i, . . . , j were
all defined in s, xi, . . . , xj will be defined in s‡. And thus s[n] = s‡(xn)
for all n in {i, . . . , j}. Thus, when s(Pi, . . . , j ) s′ is both defined and true,
s‡ [[Pxi, . . . , xj ]]+s′‡.
With respect to distribution, notice first that (s i=d)‡ equals s‡|xi=d,
whenever s i=d is defined (that is, when i < |s|.) It follows then that if
s(δi(ϕ)) s′ is defined, s‡ [[(δi(ϕ))|s|]] s′‡ will be defined as well. Since we as-
sumed that if i < |s| there is no c ∈ s such that c(i) =↑, the condition
G|x=? = H|x=? is vacuously true for DPlL formulae which are transla-
tions of IDPlL forms. Consequently, from s(δi(ϕ)) s′ = 1 it follows that
s‡ [[(δi(ϕ))|s|]] s′‡.
Chapter 6
Quantifier Dynamics
Let us take stock of what we have achieved so far. In the last two chapters,
we have focused on what is demanded of a dynamic semantic theory of dis-
course anaphora in accounting for some aspects of plurality and quantifi-
cation. We saw the need for a structured notion of context and argued that
careful variable management is in order. So far, we have restricted our
attention to distributivity (in particular, by focusing on the floating dis-
tributive quantifier ‘each’), while the noun phrases in our examples were
simple indefinites interpreted as existential quantifiers. In this chapter,
we will turn to quantificational noun phrases and their dynamic seman-
tics.
Recall from chapter 2, that the DRT analysis of quantificational NPs
(QNPs) successfully modelled the following aspects: (i) QNPs are distribu-
tive;1 (ii) QNPs introduce their full reference set; (iii) QNPs introduce max-
imal antecedents that correspond to indefinites in their scope; (iv) QNPs
cannot antecede pronouns in their scope, without leading to a bound vari-
able interpretation; and (v) a QNP may introduce dependencies in dis-
course.
DRT established this success by three theoretical proposals. First of
all, QNPs introduce static, distributive quantificational structures (duplex
conditions). Second, these structures in turn trigger the introduction of ref-
erents identified with abstractions over conditions in the triggering duplex
condition. Finally, subsequent quantification over such a referent identi-
fied with an abstraction triggers the accessibility of referents involved in
the abstraction. This latter principle was introduced only to account for (v)
above. Duplex conditions account for (i) and in tandem with abstraction,
they explain (iv). Abstraction by itself takes care of (ii) and (iii).
The aim of this chapter is to cover the same aspects of quantification
1Recall, however, that this is a simplifying generalisation. See footnote 14 of chapter 2. I
leave the data mentioned there for further research.
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using just a single proposal: quantificational noun phrases involve a dis-
tributive evaluation of their restrictor and scope. The specific semantics of
this distributive interpretation will take care of all referential effects.
Let us briefly look ahead and give a preview of the proposal, by ab-
stracting away from the IDPlL framework and the use of states and stacks.
Van den Berg’s approach to distributivity applied to the running example
in (6.1) can roughly be paraphrased as in (6.2).
(6.1)
(a). Three students each wrote a paper.
(b). They each sent it to L&P
(6.2)
(a). Call r a set of three students
Call r′ the set of student-paper pairs in the ‘write’ relation
containing a student in r
Every student in r should be in r′.
(b). Call r′′ the set of pairs in r′ that are also in the relation
‘sent-to-L&P’
Every student in r′ should be in r′′.
In the paraphrases, r′ and r′′ denote relations or sets of pairs. Alterna-
tively, in the terminology of chapter 5, r′ and r′′ are states of size two. The
set r is a special kind of relation, namely a unary relation, or in terms of
chapter 5, a set of one-place stacks. In the paraphrases in (6.2), distribu-
tivity is modelled by considering the student-paper pairs in the relation
instead of considering the set of students and the set of papers separately.
The idea of the approach in the current chapter is to develop this treat-
ment of distributivity into an account of distributive quantification. Con-
sider, for instance, parallel to (6.1) and (6.2), the example in (6.3) and its
paraphrase in (6.4).
(6.3)
(a). Most students wrote a paper.
(b). Exactly three students sent it to L&P.
(6.4)
(a). Call r the set of salient students
Call r′ the set of student-paper pairs in the ‘write’ relation
where the student is in r
r′ should contain a majority of the students in r
(b). Call r′′ the set of pairs in r′ that are also in the ‘sent-to-
L&P’ relation
r′′ should contain exactly three of the students in r′.
In these paraphrases, r, r′ and r′′ correspond to contexts. Notice the fol-
lowing: in (6.4), r′ contains both the students that wrote a paper and the
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papers that were written by a student. Moreover, r′′ contains the students
that sent their(!) paper to Linguistics and Philosophy. We can give similar
paraphrases if an indefinite is embedded in the restrictor of a quantifica-
tional structure.
(6.5) Most students who read a book enjoyed it.
(6.6) Call r the set of student-book pairs in the ‘read’ relation
Call r′ the set of pairs in r that are also in the ‘enjoy’ relation
r′ should contain a majority of the students in r.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 develops a strategy
for the interpretation of quantificational noun phrases; this is inspired by
van den Berg-style distributive interpretation, using the framework de-
veloped in chapter 5. Next, in section 6.2, we focus on the maxset and
the interpretation of the restrictor. This is necessary because of two com-
plications, namely the conditions on the accessibility of the maximal set
and the well-known weak/strong distinction in the interpretation of don-
key sentences. In section 6.3, we show that this proposal correctly handles
entailment patterns involving decreasing quantifiers and pronouns. In 6.4,
the findings of chapter 5 and the current chapter are combined in an expo-
sition of the full proposal.
6.1 Quantification and distributivity
The work of van den Berg, discussed in chapter 3, shows us that maxi-
malisation of reference to quantificationally embedded indefinites and de-
pendency phenomena are really two sides of the same coin. Once context
keeps track of functional dependencies, it will have to specify all values of
the indefinite. That is, a van den Bergian representation of ‘the boys who
wrote a paper’, necessarily also represents ‘the papers written by boys’,
since each boy will be paired with his paper. The key to constructing these
representations of context was distributivity, which combines updates at
the level of atomic entities to a single update involving pluralities.
As we mentioned above, quantificational noun phrases have much in
common with this view on distributivity: they are distributive, they access
and create dependencies and they trigger maximal reference to embedded
indefinites. It therefore seems a good idea to model the dynamics of quan-
tificational noun phrases on the basis of van den Berg-style distributivity.
Recall how the δ operator changed the context. Say we have a state s
and say we are interested in the set assigned to slot i. Distributing over
this set creates contexts which are formed by appending a state si=d to
s for a succession of d’s in s[i]. Each such an extended context is used to
interpret the scope of δ and results in an output state which is also an
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extension of s. The combine of all these output extensions is the output for
the distribution operation.
In distributive quantification, something similar can be observed. The
restrictor sets up a set (the maxset) and the nuclear scope considers the
atoms of the set one by one. The only difference is that in distributive
quantification it is not always necessary for all the atoms to satisfy the
scopal predicate. In fact, the output to distributive quantification is the
collection of parts of the restrictor interpretation that comply with the nu-
clear scope.
What we are interested in, then, is a way of collecting successful up-
dates. Say that we focus, for instance, on a VP ‘wrote a paper’, which
corresponds to the function ‘F = λi.λs.(∃? · PAPER?(|s|) · WROTE?(i, |s|))(s)’
and, say, that S is a salient set of students. Consider now the following:
(6.7) t = λs. ∪ {u | ∃d ∈ S : suu ∈ F (|s|)(su{〈d〉})}
Given a state s, this function unifies sets of stacks u which are potential
extensions of s with respect to F . In any state s, t(s) is a set of stacks
of two positions, representing student-paper pairs such that the student
wrote the paper. It collects those extensions of s that form the output of
F (|s|) relative to s extended with one of the students in S. In this case, t(s)
is the same set of stacks no matter what the input context is like. This is
because ‘wrote a paper’ is completely context independent. Had we chosen
a VP like ‘sent it to L&P’ for F , then different input contexts would have
resulted in different states.
We may generalise this way of collecting successful updates as follows:
(6.8) σ := λS〈e,t〉.λP〈ι,T 〉.λs. ∪ {u | ∃d ∈ S : suu ∈ F (|s|)(su{〈d〉})}
For instance, in an empty state and a world wherein s1, s2 and s3 wrote
the papers p1, p2 and p3 respectively and no other student wrote a paper,
σ(I(STUDENT))(F ) results in three student-paper pairs such that the stu-
dent wrote the paper. This is because,
F
(
0
s1
)
=
0 1
s1 p1
F
(
0
s2
)
=
0 1
s2 p2
F
(
0
s3
)
=
0 1
s3 p3
F
(
0
s4
)
= ∅
...
...
etc. etc.
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This operation can already provide the tools for the analysis of sim-
ple quantificational expressions. Take for instance ‘most students wrote a
paper’. Its interpretation will be:
(6.9) λs.λs′.s′ = suσ(I(STUDENT))(F ) & 〈I(STUDENT), s′[|s|]〉 ∈ I(MOST)
The state s′ results from extending s with all the relevant student-paper
pairs. Such a state is an output only if the set of students it contains is in
the ‘most’-relation with the total set of students, I(STUDENT). That is, the
set s′[|s|] returns the reference set. Of course, this oversimplifies the role
of the restrictor. Most importantly, the restrictor is not simply a set; it may
have dynamic effects itself. For instance, the N′ ‘students who read a book’
presents not only a set of students to the scope, but actually student-book
pairs. This is because, for each student, the VP has access to the book he
or she read. Moreover, restrictors may contain anaphoric material which
needs to find an antecedent in the incoming context. We may then use σ for
the restrictor interpretation as well. For instance, consider ‘students who
read a book’, interpreted as the 〈ι, T 〉-function ‘G = λi.λs.(∃? · BOOK?(|s|) ·
READ?(i, |s|))(s)’. As a restrictor it sets up the state σ(De)(G)(s), namely
the set of student-book pairs such that the student read the book. For
instance,
(6.10) r = σ(De)(G)({〈〉}) =
0 1
s1 b1
s2 b2
s3 b3
s4 b4
This state can subsequently be used as a base for the interpretation of the
scope. Take ‘wrote a paper’ again and its interpretation as F , above. The
VP considers student-book pairs one by one. However, we cannot use σ
to this end, since it takes sets, not sets of stacks. We therefore need a
means of collecting successful updates which is even more like δ, in that it
considers states extended with a sub-state:
(6.11) ς := λt.λi.λP.λs. ∪ {u | ∃d ∈ t[i] : suu ∈ P (i+ |s|)(suti=d)}
Let me explain what this says. The function ς takes a state t and an index
i and a function of type 〈ι, T 〉 to return a state modifier. In a state s, it
extends s with parts of t that assign a single atomic value d at i. The ex-
tensions of s, u, that result from interpreting P with respect to this atomic
individual are collected. For instance, for ‘DET students who read a book
wrote a paper’ we can now analyse the scope interpretation as ς(r)(0)(F ),
which in an empty state results in:
(6.12) r′ = ς(r)(0)(F )({〈〉}) =
0 1 2
s1 b1 p1
s2 b2 p2
s3 b3 p3
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We can now compare the set of students in r at 0 with that in r′ at 0. These
two sets are supposed to be in accordance with the relation between sets
expressed by the determiner. If this is so, r′ seems a likely candidate for
an output state of the quantificational structure. Not only is r′[0] the full
reference set (the set of students that read a book and wrote a paper), r′
also has exhaustively collected the values of the indefinites embedded in
the quantificational structure. In fact, compare r′ with the interpretation
of the following DRS in the same situation. A duplex condition correspond-
ing to ‘DET students who read a book wrote a paper’ triggers three abstrac-
tion procedures, as shown in (6.13). In this DRS, X corresponds to r′[0], Y
to r′[1] and Z to r′[2].
(6.13)
X Y Z
x y
student(x)
book(y)
read(x,y)
@
@
 
 
@
@
 
 
DET
x
z
paper(z)
wrote(z)
X=Σx.
x y z
student(x)
book(y)
read(x,y)
paper(z)
wrote(z)
Y=Σy.
x y z
student(x)
book(y)
read(x,y)
paper(z)
wrote(z)
Z=Σz.
x y z
student(x)
book(y)
read(x,y)
paper(z)
wrote(z)
In the dynamic setup we are pursuing, however, there is no need for a
separate procedure for quantification (duplex conditions in DRT) and an-
tecedent formation (abstraction in DRT). In constructing the state r′ above,
using the state r we already have all the future antecedents we need. The
truth-conditions of quantification, moreover, boil down to nothing more
than a comparison of r′ and r.
Recall, however, that DRT needed to stipulate a third principle govern-
ing plural anaphora, which said that if an abstracted set is quantified over,
the material used in the abstraction becomes accessible. In our construc-
tion of the set of stacks r (the interpretation of the restrictor), merely sets
are taken into account, so we cannot expect to be able to predict the effects
of this principle as yet.
For instance, in an example like (6.14), the second sentence needs ac-
cess to the individual papers that were introduced in the first sentence.
(6.14) Every student wrote a paper. Most students sent it to L&P.
The restrictor ‘students’ in the second sentence should therefore take its
set of students from the context, so that the VP ‘sent it to L&P’ is able to
consider student-paper pairs. This means, that instead of ‘σ’, we should
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use ‘ς ’ to set up the restrictor as well. Say, for instance that the first sen-
tence in (6.14) results in a state with the three student-paper pairs we
mentioned above (t1 in (6.15)). Say now that only the students s1 and s2
(which qualify as a majority) sent their paper to L&P. Given an obvious
resolution for the object pronoun, the following states are thus involved in
the interpretation of (6.14).
(6.15) t1 =
0 1
s1 p1
s2 p2
s3 p3
(6.16) t2 = ς(t1)(0)(STUDENT?)(t1) = t1
(6.17) t3 = ς(t2)(0)(SENT_TO_L&P
?(2, 3))(t1) =
0 1
s1 p1
s2 p2
The restrictor ‘students’ uses the input state t1 as a resource for collecting
the salient set of student plus the sets dependent on it. In effect, it returns
the input state, so t1 = t2. The scope ‘sent it to L&P’ collects those student-
paper pairs in t2 such that the student sent the paper to L&P. The state t2
is thus reduced to containing only two pairs.
We can now come to a general interpretation scheme for determiners.
Say thatQ is interpreted in the model as a relation between two sets, then:
(6.18) Q?i := λR.λS.λs.λs′.∃r, r′ : s′ = sur′ & 〈r[i], r′[i]〉 ∈ I(Q) &
r = ς(s)(i)(R)(s) &
r′ = ς(r)(i)(S)(s)
The function Q?i is of a type which is to be expected: 〈〈ι.T 〉, 〈〈ι, T 〉, T 〉〉. The
index i supplies the so-called context set for quantification (Westerståhl
1984). It makes sure that the domain of quantification is contextually
restricted with s[i]. Let us for now, for sake of simplicity, assume that
determiner functions are magically decorated with such an index. (We will
address the issue when we turn to the strong/weak distinction in section
6.2.)
In (6.18), ‘r[i]’ corresponds to the maximal set. The state r is formed
taking atoms x from s[i] and testing whether they satisfy the restrictor
condition R in s extended with si=x. The reference set is r′[i]. It is formed
by taking atoms x from r[i] and testing whether they satisfy the scope
condition S in s extended with ri=x. Since r′, rather than r, is appended to
s to yield the output state, only the reference set is introduced in discourse.
Here is an example. The function in (6.19) is the interpretation of ‘most
students wrote a paper’. It is a function taking a state s and incrementing
it with a reference set of students (at slot |s|+i) and a set of papers parallel
to this reference set.
158 QUANTIFIER DYNAMICS 6.1
(6.19) MOST?i (STUDENTS?)(λi.λs.((∃? · PAPER?(|s|) · WROTE?(i, |s|))(s)))
Say we apply this function to some state s. This is what happens: first we
take atoms d from s[i] and increment s with si=d, yielding (say) s′. Then
we form the state (λi.STUDENTS?(i))(i+ |s|)(s′). This returns either s′ or ∅,
depending on whether or not d is a student. If we collect all such updates
into a set r, this state represents the distributive update potential of the
restrictor. For the interpretation of the scope we now increment s with the
atomic parts of r. These updates result in incrementations of s containing
a student in slot |s| + 1 and they are collected in a state r′. We can now
compare how many students there are in r with how many there are in
r′. If this comparison is conform the relation expressed by ‘most’, then we
output s incremented with r′.
As another example consider the input context (6.20) to the function in
(6.21) and (6.22) respectively.
(6.20) s =
0 1
s1 p1
s2 p2
s3 p3
s4 p4
(6.21) MOST?0(STUDENT?)(λi.SENT_TO_L&P
?(i, 3))
(6.22) MOST?0(STUDENT?)(λi.SENT_TO_L&P
?(i, 1))
Whereas (6.21) corresponds to a likely resolution of ‘most students sent it
to L&P’, the function in (6.22) is likely to originate from ‘most students
sent them to L&P’ (i.e. describing the rather odd situation wherein most
students sent all four papers to L&P). Both forms are indexed with 0, that
is, the set of students in (6.20) is taken as the context set. In both forms,
then, the restrictor expands the input with a pair of a student and a paper
in s and checks whether in that expanded state the position 2(= |s| + 0)
is filled by a student. In effect, this returns s again. These same pairs
are considered for the nuclear scope. That is, the function in the second
argument position of MOST? is applied to a context which results from ap-
pending s0=d to s for students d. In such contexts, the position 3 is the
paper that paired with the student d in s, while the position 1 is the total
set of papers in s. The successful extensions s0=d are collected in a state
r′. In case students in r′ are a majority of the students in s, we get an
output, namely sur′.
The procedural nature of this exposition of the semantics of distributive
quantification is not for presentation purposes only. It illustrates a key
contrast with the interpretation of referential noun phrases. Quantifica-
tional NPs introduce a set, distributively present this set as an argument
for the VP and then check whether the determiner relation is satisfied.
Referential noun phrases, on the other hand, introduce a set, count and
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then interpret the VP with respect to this set. The two strategies can be
paraphrased as follows: for QNPs– ‘introduce atoms x ; predicate over the
atoms ; check whether the successful x’s form a witness set’ and for RNPs –
‘introduce a set X ; check whether X is a witness ; predicate over X’. Notice
how these paraphrases explain the differences between RNPs and QNPs
mentioned above. In the quantificational case, maximality, distributivity,
dependency and the inaccessibility of the reference set within the scope
follow directly. (Compare with Szabolcsi 1997 for a statement of similar
strategies within DRT terminology. See also Winter 1998.)
There is another contrast between the quantificational and the refer-
ential strategy of introducing entities in the discourse. RNPs range over
non-empty subsets of the domain of entities, while QNPs include the empty
set. This means that all downward monotone NPs will have to be analysed
as being quantificational, since they, by definition, include the empty set
in their denotation. This is not surprising, however, given that with re-
spect to many properties, downward monotone NPs systematically pair
with QNPs. For instance, they are distributive and their refset is accessi-
ble only outside of their scope.
A noun phrase like ‘no students,’ then, is analysed as the 〈〈ι, T 〉, T 〉
function ‘λP.NO?i (STUDENT?)(P )’. Notice that this function for some verb
phrase P and some state s either returns the empty set or returns s. This
is because the relation NO can only be satisfied when there is no extension
of s that satisfies the conditions in the nuclear scope. In other words, a
sentence ‘[[No N′] VP]’ is (correctly) analysed as a test.
Let us evaluate the merits of the definition in (6.18). We already estab-
lished that ς constructs states in such a way that both the refset and sets
depending on the refset are exhaustively represented in context. Moreover,
ς assures a purely distributive interpretation by considering sets atom by
atom only. Note, moreover, that the full refset is only represented in con-
text once the interpretation of the quantificational structure is completed.
In sum, the above proposal reaches results comparable to those of DRT,
using a single interpretational strategy of determiners. Let us, now, turn
to other aspects of quantificational structures. We begin with discussing
the maximal set.
6.2 The maxset
We have remained silent about the accessibility of the maximal set. The
interpretation of a quantificational noun phrase as given above predicts
the following: the maximal set is at no point accessible. The reason is that
at no point in the evaluation is the full set of successful updates with the
restrictor (systematically called ‘r’ above) taken as an input context. The
scope only considers atoms from this set and a successful quantificational
structure only increments the input state with states due to the scope.
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This begs the question as to how the maxset can sometimes function as
an antecedent. However, given that we have so far assumed that restric-
tors take their value from a salient set in the context, it follows that the
(potential) accessibility of maxset is due to the fact that it already occurs
in context. In other words, its existence was presupposed.
We will now consider two details of how restrictions are interpreted
which deserve more attention. Both deal with a (different) weak/strong
distinction in quantification. The first concerns the weak and strong read-
ings of donkey sentences. The second addresses the weak/strong distinc-
tion in the sense of intersective/non-intersective quantifiers.
6.2.1 Weak versus strong readings
The interpretation of a restrictor collects every possible extension of the
current information state that satisfies the restrictor clause. However, in
the case of complex restrictors containing indefinites, there is no straight-
forward way of choosing how to collect these extensions. For instance, the
N′ ‘boys who wrote a paper’ extends the input state with relevant boy-
paper pairs. However, when one of the boys wrote more than one paper,
there are two options: either we collect all the pairs, entering some boys
more than once into the extension (call it the ‘A’-option), or we allow exten-
sions which do not exhaustively collect all pairs, as long as all boys that
wrote a paper are in the extension (call it ‘B’). The choice between these
two ways of building up restrictions is not straightforward.
For example, in a situation with three boys writing a paper, wherein b1
wrote p1 and b2 wrote p2 and b3 wrote p3 and p4, (6.23a) gives the A-option
for extending the context, while (6.23b) and (6.23c) give two possible B-
style extensions.
(6.23) a.
0 1
b1 p1
b2 p2
b3 p3
b3 p4
b.
0 1
b1 p1
b2 p2
b3 p3
c.
0 1
b1 p1
b2 p2
b3 p4
The scope is interpreted by extending the input context with parts of one of
the above states. For instance, for the A-option, in a state s a nuclear scope
‘sent it to L&P’ will be interpreted by considering the state s, extended with
(6.23a)0=bi for i ranging over 1, 2, and 3. With respect to the third boy,
this means the scope is interpreted as follows (assuming ‘it’ to be resolved
to be dependent on the papers):
(6.24) SENT_TO_L&P(|s|, |s|+ 1)
su 0 1b3 p3
b3 p4

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In other words, according to the A-option, in order for the sentence ‘D boys
who wrote a paper sent it to L&P’ to be true, it should hold that D boys
sent all the papers they wrote to L&P.
In the ‘A’ set-up, pronominal reference to the indefinite inside the re-
strictor clause will be interpreted as exhaustive. That is, for each boy it
will retrieve all the papers he wrote. This is not the case for the ‘B’ option,
where the nuclear scope may be false for one of the papers written by a
particular boy as long as there exists another one he did sent to L&P.
All this is closely connected to the well-known distinction between weak
(or existential) versus strong (or universal) readings of quantificational
sentences. For instance, while (6.25) is preferably interpreted weakly as
being true when every guest owning one or more credit cards uses one
of his cards to pay the bill, (6.26) seems to lead to a stronger reading in
which every farmer is required to beat all the donkeys he owns. The weak
paraphrases (indicated as ∃) and the strong paraphrases (indicated as ∀)
are as in (6.27) and (6.28), after Kanazawa 1994.
(6.25) Every guest who owned a credit card, used it to pay the bill.
(6.26) Every farmer who owns a donkey, beats it.
(6.27) Q farmer who owns a donkey, beats a donkey he owns. (∃)
(6.28) Q farmer who owns a donkey, beats every donkey he owns. (∀)
In absence of conflicting information, it seems that ‘every’ triggers a strong
reading. The knowledge that it takes only one credit card to pay a bill,
weakens the reading for (6.25). Not all determiners show similar prefer-
ence patterns for weak and strong readings however. For instance, (6.29)
is only verified when no farmer beats any donkey he owns, not just some
of them. In fact, the strong reading seems impossible to obtain.
(6.29) No farmer who owns a donkey, beats it.
#"No farmer who owns a donkey beats every donkey he owns" (∀)
"No farmer who owns a donkey beats a donkey he owns" (∃)
Some downward entailing environments, however, do not seem to require
a similarly weak reading. Kanazawa (1994) points out that an example
like (6.30) seems to favor a strong reading. Krifka (1996b), however, shows
that this might be due to the fact that ‘not every’ is not a determiner, since
the semantically similar “less than 100%” pairs with other determiners
which are downward entailing in their second argument and requires an
existential interpretation.
(6.30) Not every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
"Not every farmer who owns a donkey beats every donkey he
owns" (∀)
?"Not every farmer who owns a donkey beats a donkey he owns"(∃)
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(6.31) Less than 100% of the farmers who own a donkey beat it.
?"Less than 100% of the farmers who own a donkey beat every
donkey they own" (∀)
"Less than 100% of the farmers who own a donkey beat a donkey
they own" (∃)
In our current approach, the distinction between weak and strong comes
out rather different. What we have called the ‘A’ option, where all val-
ues are bundled together and consequently pronouns in the scope have
to exhaustively refer to an indefinite in the restrictor clause, will provide
the strong reading for upward entailing quantifiers, but the weak reading
for downward monotone ones. Consider, for instance (6.32), below, and its
paraphrase in (6.33).
(6.32) No farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
(6.33) Call r the set of farmer-donkey pairs in the own relation.
Call r′ the set of pairs in r that are also in the ‘beat’ relation.
r′ should be the empty set.
This is in accordance with the ∃-paraphrase in (6.29). The weakness of
(6.33) is due to the fact that the quantificational relation (and hence its
monotonicity properties) only has its effect after processing the scope. No-
tice that the approach to the interpretation of quantificational noun phrases
set out above represents the A-approach. For the ‘B’ option, upward quan-
tifiers are interpreted as being weak, while downward ones receive a uni-
versal reading. It seems then that although all determiners prefer the
‘A’ option, sometimes a shift is made toward generating multiple environ-
ments.2
Let me briefly turn to a related issue. One would expect that the
weak/strong distinction at the sentence level also occurs on discourse level.
That is, it would not be surprising if the discourse in (6.34) were ambigu-
ous between a reading wherein all papers written by the students were not
very good and one wherein any set of papers, each of them written by one
of the boys, were not good.
(6.34) Every student wrote a paper. They weren’t very good.
Although it is difficult to get clear judgments, it seems that strong readings
are by far the more preferred ones. In fact, it is questionable whether
weak readings really exist. Intuitively, the second sentence in (6.34) is
false when one of the three students wrote one bad and one good paper.
(See van der Does 1993 for a similar speculation.)
Nevertheless, an example like (6.35) might complicate things.
2See, especially, Kanazawa 1994 and Geurts 1999 for two interesting discussions of factors
involved in the availability of and preferences for certain readings.
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(6.35) That day, all the guests wanted to leave the hotel. Unfortunately,
the banks were closed. Luckily, every guest owned a credit card.
They used them to pay their bills.
As in (6.25), (6.35) does not require a guest owning more than one credit
card to use all his cards to pay the bill. One could argue, however, that the
strong reading is not that bad for this example. It simply says that every
guest used his credit cards to pay the bill. That is, he payed by credit card
and it does not matter which of his credit cards he used. In other words,
the guest uses his credit resources to pay the bill.
The proposal in this chapter predicts that only strong readings exist
in discourse. This is again due to the way the ς-operation collects suc-
cessful updates. It does so exhaustively, so following ‘every guest owned
a credit card’, the refset is paired with all the cards owned by the guests.
Although my remarks above seem to strongly suggest that this is a wel-
come prediction, I leave it an open question as to whether or not apparent
counter-examples like (6.35) can be accounted for by other means.
6.2.2 Parasitic domains
Let us deal with the index-decoration of determiners. We suggested that a
structure Q(A)(B) is to be translated into the function Q?i (A?)(B?). Here,
the purpose of the index i was to supply the contextual restriction of the
domain of quantification (following, again, Westerståhl (1984)).
Of course, such an index decoration is not compositionally given. In ef-
fect, the quantifier is anaphoric. Or, to be more precise, in cases where the
quantifier is strong and therefore presupposes its maxset, this presupposi-
tion may be anaphorically resolved. So instead of the function Q?i (A?)(B?),
quantificational structures should correspond to underspecified represen-
tations: Qx0(A)(B).
Note however that weak quantifiers (that is, intersective ones) do not
need a contextually supplied context set. In existential-there construc-
tions, for instance, clearly no domain restriction is needed.
(6.36) There are four boys in the garden.
This example is intelligible even if no set of salient boys exist in context. In
fact, it simply reports the existence of such a salient set. Another example
is the well-known observation that the object of verbs like ‘have’ may only
be weak (see, e.g., de Hoop 1992). In (6.37), then, no salient set of windows
is assumed. The obligatorily strong determiner ‘most’ is banned from such
positions, since it requires such an antecedent.
(6.37) This house has many windows.
(6.38) *This house has most windows.
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Consequently, weak quantifiers are in need of a different interpretation,
one which has no anaphoric properties. The following provides a straight-
forward solution. Instead of taking a set from a slot in the input context,
the weak quantifier takes its values from a state {〈d〉|d ∈ De}, the state
containing only the universe.
(6.39) Q?w := λR.λS.λs.λs
′.∃r, r′ : s′ = sur′ & 〈r[i], r′[i]〉 ∈ I(Q) &
r = ς({〈d〉|d ∈ De})(0)(R)(s) &
r′ = ς(r)(i)(S)(s)
According to this definition, in the interpretation of a weak quantifier, the
maximal set (given by r) serves only as a resource for the interpretation of
the scope. It is not supposed to be given by the context and consequently
is never available for anaphora.
6.3 Entailment and emptiness
Recall from chapter 2 and 3 that pronominal reference to the refset of a
downward entailing quantifier demonstrates the non-emptiness of that
set, whereas this is not guaranteed by the antecedent quantification by
itself.
(6.40) Few senators admire Kennedy.
6⇒ Some senator admires Kennedy.
(6.41) Few senators admire Kennedy. They are very junior.
⇒ Some senator admires Kennedy
Let us, for the sake of simplicity, assume that ‘few’ is interpreted as weak,
here. (Although nothing hinges on this). That is, ‘Few senators admire
Kennedy’ is interpreted as the function in (‘6.42’)
(6.42) FEW?w(SENATOR
?)(ADMIRE_K?)
Consider now a world wherein none of the senators admire Kennedy. Then,
call r the set of one-place stacks comprising the set of senators. Then r′ is
the set of states r0=d such that d admires Kennedy. Since there is no such
d, it follows that r′ = ∅. Clearly now, r and r′ satisfy the ‘few’-relation,
so the output to (6.42) in this world for any s is s again. In other words,
(6.42) is true in this world, but given that no senator admiring Kennedy
was found, the input state was not incremented. (Or, in fact, the input
state has been incremented with the empty set.) This shows that (6.40), in
the form (6.43) below, holds.
(6.43) FEW?w(SENATOR
?)(ADMIRE_K?) 6|=
λs.∃? · SENATOR?(|s|) · ADMIRE_K?(|s|)(s)
6.4 THE FULL PROPOSAL 165
Turning now to the influence of the pronoun, the sentence ‘they are very
junior’ is represented as ‘VERY_JUNIOR(x0)’. In a world as described above,
i.e. one wherein no senator admires Kennedy, and following (6.42) in con-
text s, the resolutions of this representation are those wherein an index
i < |s| is substituted for x0. That is, there simply is no possible resolution
to the refset. Consequently, when the pronoun is resolved to the refset
of (6.42), we know that we are in a world wherein some senators admire
Kennedy. The entailment in (6.41) follows.
More formally,
(6.44) λs.(FEW?w(SENATOR
?)(ADMIRE_K?) · VERY_JUNIOR?(|s|))(s) |=
λs.∃? · SENATOR?(|s|) · ADMIRE_K?(|s|)(s)
The proof is easy. There is only a single possible output state resulting
from combining the function in front of ‘|=’ with some state s. In models
containing few, but some, Kennedy admiring senators, this function re-
turns the input state s incremented with the set of these admirers. In any
other model, the function is undefined since there is no slot |s| at the point
where VERY_JUNIOR?(|s|) is encountered. So, in those worlds, this func-
tion would have never resulted from resolution. It follows then that all
contexts resulting from applying this function to some input state yield an
output after applying λs.∃? · SENATOR?(|s|) · ADMIRE_K?(|s|)(s) to it.
Given these observations, note, however, the following: the text ‘Few
senators admire Kennedy. They are very junior.’ does not possibly-entail
‘Some senators admire Kennedy’ (put more formally in (6.45). This is be-
cause in worlds without Kennedy-admiring senators, there will be no res-
olution to the refset and ‘they’ will be forced to take a completely different
antecedent. In sum, only the resolved case, where ‘they’ picks up the ref-
erence set, allows us to infer the non-emptiness of this set.
(6.45) FEWw(SENATOR)(ADMIRE_K) · VERY_JUNIOR(0) 6 |;
∃ · SENATOR(0) · ADMIRE_K(0)
The following two patterns are left to the reader to check.
(6.46) Most students are bachelors |; They are unmarried
(6.47) Few students are bachelors 6 |; They are unmarried
We have shown here that the proposal predicts the presuppositional nature
of a pronoun, by the fact that empty values are not stored in context. Pro-
noun resolution to the refset is therefore only possible in worlds wherein
this set is not empty.
6.4 The full proposal
In this section, we will give an overview of the full account of quantification
and anaphora. Some definitions will be repeated from earlier chapters.
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In this section, we will collect all manipulations we have defined on our
notion of context, namely that of a set of stacks. Our ontology is as follows.
De is the domain of entities of type e. The set of indices of type ι is N.
Definition 6.36
States
s :: 〈〈ι, e〉, t〉 is a state ⇔ ∃n ∈ N : s ⊆ {〈d1, . . . , dn〉 | d1, . . . , dn ∈ De}
s[i] := {c(i) | c ∈ s & c(i) 6=↑}
|s| := ιn.∀c ∈ s : |c| = n
si=d :=
{ {c ∈ s | c(i) = d} i < |s|
↑ otherwise
2
This defines the states and the operations of states we have been using
in chapter 5. As we did there, we abbreviate the type 〈〈〈ι, e〉, t〉, 〈〈ι, e〉, t〉〉
as T . Let Q be a set of determiner symbols and P be a set of predicate
symbols. We consider a model M = 〈D, I〉 which is such that I(R) returns
an element in De × . . . × De for any R in Q ∪ P. We define the following
collection of functions:
Definition 6.37
State manipulation
ς := λt.λi.λP.λs. ∪ {u | ∃d ∈ t[i] : suu ∈ P (i+ |s|)(suti=d)}
Q?i := λR.λS.λs.λs
′.∃r, r′ : s′ = sur′ & 〈r[i], r′[i]〉 ∈ I(Q) &
r = ς(s)(i)(R)(s) &
r′ = ς(r)(i)(S)(s)
for Q ∈ Q
Q?w := λR.λS.λs.λs
′.∃r, r′ : s′ = sur′ & 〈r[i], r′[i]〉 ∈ I(Q) &
r = ς({〈d〉|d ∈ De})(0)(R)(s) &
r′ = ς(r)(i)(S)(s)
for Q ∈ Q
P ? := λi1, . . . , in.λs.λs′.s = s′ & 〈s[i1], . . . , s[in]〉 ∈ I(P ) for P ∈ P
∃? := λs.λs′.∃X ∈ ℘+(De) : s′ = {c∧d|c ∈ s & d ∈ X}
¬? := λs.λs′.s = s′ & ϕs = ∅
δ? := λP.λi.λs.λs′. s[i] = s′[i] &
∀x ∈ s[i] : sus′i=x∈ P (i+|s|)(susi=x)
(ϕ · ψ) := λs.⋃{ψs′|s′ ∈ ϕs}
2
Some of these functions are actually partial. Here are the definedness
conditions:
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Definition 6.38
Definedness
Q?i (R)(S)(s) = ↓ ⇔ i < |s| & R(i)(s) =↓ & S(i)(s) =↓
Q?w(R)(S)(s) = ↓ ⇔ i < |s| & R(i)(s) =↓ & S(i)(s) =↓
P ?(i1) . . . (in)(s) = ↓ ⇔ ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n : ij < |s|
δ?(P )(i)(s) = ↓ ⇔ i < |s|
2
Truth, validity and entailment are defined on functions of type T :
Definition 6.39
Truth and entailment. For ϕ,ψ :: T :
|=s ϕ ⇔ ϕ(s) 6= ∅ (truth)
|= ϕ ⇔ ∀s : ϕ(s) =↓→ ϕ(s) 6= ∅ (validity)
ϕ |= ψ ⇔ ∀s, s′ : s′ ∈ ϕ(s)→ ψ(s′) 6= ∅ (entailment)
2
The representation language L′ for context manipulation is extended to
include the atomic formulae Q, for Q ∈ Q. In L′, such a form Q is of
type T. Similarly, the underspecification language L is extended to include
the same atomic forms. (The details for these languages can be found in
section 5.5.2.) Resolution and possible entailment are as before.
Figure 6.1 gives a fragment. It only derives sentence meanings, namely
underspecified representation in the language L of type T. Interpretation
of multi-sentence discourses need a mediating resolution mechanism. Dis-
ambiguated sentence meanings, i.e. state transitions, are composed using
‘·’.
6.5 Conclusion
In this final chapter, we argued that three principles used in the DRT ap-
proach to distributive quantification and anaphora can, in the dynamic
framework, be replaced by a single interpretative strategy for quantifi-
cational noun phrases. By further making a distinction between strong
quantifiers, which are anaphoric, and weak quantifiers, which can be in-
terpreted without antecedent, we predict that the former, but not the lat-
ter group of NPs license subsequent reference to the maximal set. Finally,
since in the proposal quantificational noun phrases increment the input
context with the successful output states of the interpretation of their
scope, there is no guarantee that a downward entailing NP increments
the context at all. Consequently, context will never store an empty value.
This accounts for why pronominal reference to the reference set presup-
poses the non-emptiness of the antecedent.
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S ::= NP VP X ::= (X1X2)
NP ::= Det CN X ::= (X1X2)
VP ::= IV X ::= X1
VP ::= TV NP X ::= λu.(X2(λv.(X1v)u))
VP ::= MOD VP X ::= (X1X2)
NP ::= they X ::= λP.(P (x0))
NP ::= it X ::= λP.(1(x0) • P (x0))
CN ::= man X ::= MAN
CN ::= woman X ::= WOMAN
TV ::= sent to L&P X ::= SENT_TO_L&P
MOD ::= each X ::= λP.λi.(δ(P )(i))
DET ::= a X ::= λP.λQ.(∃ • 1(0) • P (0) •Q(0))
DET ::= three X ::= λP.λQ.(∃ • 3(0) • P (0) •Q(0))
DET ::= many X ::= λP.λQ.(MANYw(P (0))(Q(0)))
DET ::= few X ::= λP.λQ.(FEWw(P (0))(Q(0)))
DET ::= at_least_three X ::= λP.λQ.(>3w(P (0))(Q(0)))
DET ::= at_most_three X ::= λP.λQ.(<3w(P (0))(Q(0)))
DET ::= many X ::= λP.λQ.(MANYx0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
DET ::= few X ::= λP.λQ.(FEWx0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
DET ::= at_least_three X ::= λP.λQ.(>3x0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
DET ::= at_most_three X ::= λP.λQ.(<3x0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
DET ::= most X ::= λP.λQ.(MOSTx0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
DET ::= less_than_half X ::= λP.λQ.(<.5x0(P (x0))(Q(x0)))
Figure 6.1: Fragment
Concluding Summary
The starting point for this thesis was the observation that plural pronom-
inal anaphora is a very versatile phenomenon. It would be a gross over-
simplification to identify the relation between a plural pronoun and its
antecedent as a simple coreference relation. In discourse, plural pronouns
can have quantified or quantificational, that is, not strictly referential an-
tecedents. Gareth Evans’ famous example in (1), for instance, illustrated
that some plural pronouns are neither bound by, nor corefer with their
antecedents.
(1) Few senators admire Kennedy; and they are very junior.
The question was why the plural pronoun in (1) refers to the set of all
senators that admire Kennedy. Apparently, the pronoun refers to a set
constructed from sets that play a role in the first sentence, namely to the
intersection of the denotation of the restrictor (the senators) and the de-
notation of the verb phrase (the Kennedy-admirers). So, if (D(A))(B) is a
quantificational sentence, where D corresponds to the meaning of a deter-
miner, A to that of the restrictor and B to that of the VP, then A ∩ B is a
potential resolution of a subsequent (plural) pronoun. We called this set
A ∩B the reference set.
Apart from reference to the reference set, however, it turned out that
there are quite a few other types of plural pronominal anaphora. Apart
from addressing examples like (1), this dissertation focused on two such
other types of anaphora: (i) pronominal reference to the set-theoretical dif-
ference between the restrictor denotation and the denotation of the VP, the
so-called complement set A−B, as in example (2), and (ii) pronominal refer-
ence to sets directly associated with the reference set, as in the example in
(3). (Other forms of plural anaphora which I discussed were non-maximal
reference to the reference set and reference to the restrictor denotation,
A.)
(2) Few MPs attended the meeting. They went to the beach instead.
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(3) Every student wrote a paper. They weren’t very good.
Additionally, there was a use of pronouns which is strongly related to the
form of anaphora in (3). The detailed relation between students and pa-
pers, or, to put it slightly differently, the dependence of papers on students
turned out to be accessible in discourse, too.
(4) Every student wrote a paper. They submitted it to L&P.
The pronoun ‘it’ in (4) takes the indefinite ‘a paper’ as its antecedent. This
pronoun, however, is dependent on the subject pronoun ‘they’. The sec-
ond sentence in (4) means that each student who wrote a paper submitted
his or her paper to L&P. The students-paper pairs described by the first
sentence are accessed in the second sentence.
Apparently then, there are several different types of plural anaphora.
The most important goal of this thesis was to express this versatility in a
semantic theory. By far the most complete semantic theory of plural refer-
ence to date is that presented in Kamp and Reyle 1993. In this book, the
discourse representation theoretic framework is extended to deal with plu-
ral pronouns. I discussed two especially noteworthy aspects of that theory:
(i) e-type anaphora, as in (1), is treated using a principle which is inde-
pendent of other forms of discourse anaphora, and (ii) the accessibility of
dependence information in discourse (as illustrated by (4)) is analysed us-
ing a stipulated principle that allows the copying of representations under
certain specific circumstances.
Plural anaphora is thus accounted for by DRT by using two principles
which are assumed on top of DRT’s mechanism for ‘standard’ anaphora.
Representations play a crucial role in these principles. Plural e-type ana-
phora is analysed using an operation called abstraction. This operation
allows representational material from a (representation of a) quantifica-
tional sentence which is to be used to form a plural antecedent. The ac-
cessibility of dependence information, moreover, also boils down to a con-
strained license to re-use representational material.
In the literature, DRT’s emphasis on representations has lead to the
question of whether the same empirical coverage could not be achieved
without positing a level of representation. Moreover, due to the specific
top-down architecture used by DRT to create these representational struc-
tures, the need for alternative accounts which were more faithful to the
successful (bottom-up) Montague Grammar became clear. With the inven-
tion of dynamic predicate logic (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991), an im-
portant step was made to make such alternatives possible. This set off
a programme of ‘dynamic semantics’ which had the non-representational
and compositional interpretation of natural language expressions in dis-
course as its goal. In dynamic semantics, the meaning of an expression is
identified as its context-change potential. ‘Context’, however, is not used
here as referring to some sort of representation. Context is a simple model-
theoretical object, namely a (set of) assignment function(s).
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Given DRT’s successful account of plural reference, I found it interest-
ing to see what a non-representational dynamic semantic theory which
focuses on the same topic should look like. One specific aim of this disser-
tation was to discard the two DRT principles discussed above by moving to
a dynamic semantic analysis.
The existence of examples like (2), however, formed a complicating fac-
tor. Before I started to model plural pronominal reference, I therefore first
needed to investigate these examples.
The phenomenon illustrated by (2) was called complement anaphora. It
has been (and still is) studied in detail in the psycholinguistic research of
Linda Moxey, Anthony Sanford and co-authors. Their experiments show
that subjects tend to refer to the complement set following a negative (that
is, roughly, a downward monotone) quantificational expression. Within
the semantic community, the reality of complement anaphora has been
doubted several times. The likely root of this doubt is a generalisation
made by Kamp and Reyle (1993). According to them, the operation of set-
theoretical difference (like the complement set A−B) is not an admissible
operation for antecedent-formation, in contrast to constructing the union
of two sets.
There exists, however, an alternative interpretation of (2) which does
justice to Kamp and Reyle’s generalisation, namely one in which the pro-
noun does not refer to the complement set, but rather to the complete re-
strictor set, A. The second sentence in (2) would then be paraphrasable by
“generally speaking, the MPs went to the beach instead.”
Moxey and Sanford argue against such an approach. In chapter 3 of
this thesis, I followed their argumentation and showed that the idea that
complement anaphora do not involve reference to the complement set is
indeed very implausible. The existence of pronominal reference to the
complement set, however, should not be seen as a clue that complement
anaphora is a phenomenon comparable to cases of e-type anaphora as in
(1). This became evident from two observations. First of all, whenever
a pronoun can both take the reference set and the complement set as its
antecedent to yield a consistent interpretation, the resolution to the refer-
ence set will ‘win’. In other words, complement anaphora is only possible
once other forms of anaphora are excluded. Second, in contrast to refer-
ence to the complement set, reference set reference is not constrained by
the expression anteceding it. Complement anaphora can only occur once
the antecedent guarantees that the complement set is non-empty. Such a
condition does not apply to the reference set. Monotone decreasing expres-
sions, which do not guarantee the non-emptiness of the reference set, are
fine antecedents for pronominal reference set reference.
I concluded from this that the reference set is made salient by a quan-
tificational expression. An example like (1) is therefore an ordinary case
of pronominal reference, for pronouns refer to individuals or groups of in-
dividuals which are contextually highly salient. In order to refer to the
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complement set, its non-emptiness will first have to be inferred. This
necessary inference step makes the complement set principally unfit for
pronominal reference. Still, the experiments of Moxey and Sanford did
show that apart from a preference for complement set reference follow-
ing negative expressions, subjects also displayed a rhetorical preference
for giving an explanation of the negativity of the antecedent. This effect
makes the complement set a tempting antecedent. In conclusion, then,
pronominal complement anaphora is a marked form of anaphora which
owes its existence to a rhetorical preference of speakers.
This conclusion justified a reduction in the empirical coverage of the dy-
namic semantics. A model of unmarked pronominal reference is a model
that describes the introduction of salient sets in context. Pronominal refer-
ence to the complement set, however, is in need of an intervening inference
process and, consequently, does not belong to such a model. Chapters 4, 5
and 6 focused on the construction of a theory with this reduced empirical
coverage.
Chapter 4 discussed three studies from the literature: the dynamic plu-
ral predicate logic of van den Berg (1996b), the semantics for plural ana-
phora based on parametrised sum individuals from Krifka (1996a) and the
theory of anaphoric information from Elworthy (1995). These studies have
in common that they all address the dependent type of anaphora exempli-
fied in (4) and, moreover, use a structured notion of context to deal with
examples involving dependence phenomena. The chapter showed that the
proposals do not differ a lot and that the proposals of Krifka and van den
Berg, in particular, are very similar with respect to important (formal) no-
tions like dependence, independence and distributivity. These notions are
responsible for the treatment of dependence phenomena and, as such, an
elegant non-representational alternative to the DRT principles.
With respect to the data, I focused mainly on examples like (4) in chap-
ter 4, and concluded that the theory of Elworthy is too strong. It generates
a reading for (4) wherein each student submits a paper to L&P irrespec-
tive of whether or not this is his or her own paper. The theories of van
den Berg and Krifka, however, turned out to be too weak, since they can-
not explain how, in the scope of distributivity, pronouns can refer to both
sub-individuals in a group and to the original total group itself. The exam-
ple in (5), for instance, is problematic. The second sentence is ambiguous
between a reading in which each student submits the two papers he or
she wrote to L&P and (an odd) one wherein each student submits all the
written papers to L&P.
(5) Every student wrote exactly two papers. They each submitted
them to L&P.
The example in (5) played a crucial role in chapter 5. The question was how
anaphora should be represented given that in examples like (5), the same
syntactic antecedent (‘two papers’) antecedes two different resolutions of
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the pronoun, namely a dependent and an independent one. In theories like
those of van den Berg and Krifka, there is one variable which is associated
with both readings. But only one of those can be realised at one time. I
argued that the choice of the label which is associated with an individual
introduced into the context should be contextualised.
This conclusion is not new. It is related to the so-called problem of
destructive assignment, which was noticed as being an important short-
coming of dynamic predicate logic. The cause of the problem is the specific
definition of existential quantification as random assignment. That is, ex-
istential quantification over some variable x rewrites the value assigned to
x previously. Consequently, languages like dynamic predicate logic allow
values to be overwitten and information to be lost.
As a solution for the destructive assignment problem, I turned to the
framework of incremental dynamics (van Eijck 2001). In incremental dy-
namics, the labelling of values is contextualised. This is realised by replac-
ing assignment functions (sets of variable-individual pairs) with ‘stacks’,
sets of position-individual pairs. Since the position of an individual in a
stack can change when this stack is combined with another stack, the in-
dex which goes with an introduced individual is contextualised. This is
because the position of a value is always relative to the stack (i.e. the con-
text) it appears in.
Incremental dynamics is a variation on dynamic predicate logic. In
chapter 5, I presented a variation on the dynamic plural predicate logic of
van den Berg along the lines of incremental dynamics. This enabled us to
devise a distributivity operator which gives access to dependence informa-
tion without overwriting ‘old’ antecedents. Using an underspecified repre-
sentation of the interpretation of examples like (5), we can then show that
a pronoun can have two plausible resolutions, completely in accordance
with the intuitions given for these sentences.
In chapter 6, I returned to DRT and the principles it has to stipulate
in order to show that our non-representational approach may do without
such additional principles. I showed that the semantics for distributivity
which was developed in chapter 5 can be generalised to a semantics for
quantificational determiners, which at the same time captures the intro-
duction of the (maximal) reference set in context and the potential intro-
duction of dependence information. Moreover, this approach was shown
to give a straightforward account of the dynamics of monotone decreasing
quantifiers. Most importantly, however, all anaphoric effects were lexically
governed and, consequently, no additional principles needed to be assumed
to account for the range of resolutions of plural pronouns.

Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift heeft als uitgangpunt de observatie dat meervoudige pro-
nominale anafora een bijzonder veelzijdig fenomeen is. Het zou een gro-
ve oversimplificatie zijn om de relatie tussen een meervoudig voornaam-
woord en haar antecedent te karakteriseren als een coreferentie-relatie.
Een meervoudige pronomen kan in discourse namelijk gekwantificeerde
en kwantificationele en aldus niet strikt referentiële antecedenten nemen.
Het beroemde voorbeeld van Gareth Evans in (1) is een scherpe illustratie
dat sommige meervoudige pronomina noch gebonden zijn door, noch core-
feren met hun antecedent.
(1) Few senators admire Kennedy; and they are very junior.
“Er zijn weinig senatoren die Kennedy bewonderen; en ze zijn erg
jong.”
Wat uitgelegd moet worden is hoe in (1) het meervoudige voornaamwoord
verwijst naar de verzameling van alle senatoren die Kennedy bewonderen.
Het pronomen verwijst dus naar een verzameling die is geconstrueerd uit
verzamelingen die een rol spelen in de eerste zin, namelijk de doorsnede
van de denotatie van de restrictor en de denotatie van het bereik (dat is,
het gezegde). Dus, als (D(A))(B) een kwantificationele zin is, waarbij D
met de betekenis van een determinator, A met die van de restrictor en
B met die van het gezegde correspondeert, dan is A ∩ B een potentiële
resolutie voor een volgend pronomen. Deze verzameling A ∩ B wordt de
referentie-verzameling genoemd.
Behalve verwijzing naar de referentie-verzameling is er echter een gro-
te variatie aan andere soorten meervoudige pronominale anafora. Naast
aandacht voor voorbeelden als (1), concentreer ik me in dit proefschrift op
twee van die variaties: (i) pronominale referentie naar het verschil tussen
de restrictor-denotatie en de denotatie van het gezegde, de zogenaamde
complement-verzameling A−B, zie bijvoorbeeld (2) en (ii) pronominale ver-
wijzing naar verzamelingen die direct geassocieerd zijn met de referentie-
verzameling, zie (3). (Andere soorten meervoudige anafora waar ik aan-
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dacht aan besteed, zij het in mindere mate, zijn niet-maximale verwijzing
naar de referentie-verzameling en verwijzing naar de verzameling A, de
denotatie van de restrictor.)
(2) Slechts weinig parlementariërs woonden de bijeenkomst bij. Ze
hadden het veel te druk.
(3) De studenten schreven elk een artikel. Ze waren stuk voor stuk
veel te lang.
Naast de vorm van anafora in (3) is er een gebruik van discourse prono-
mina die sterk aan dit voorbeeld gerelateerd is. De gedetailleerde relatie
tussen de studenten en de artikelen, dat is de afhankelijkheid van artike-
len van studenten in (3), is namelijk eveneens toegankelijk in discourse.
(4) De studenten schreven elk een artikel. Ze stuurden het bovendien
elk naar een tijdschrift.
Het voornaamwoord ‘het’ in (4) neem het indefiniet ‘een artikel’ als zijn
antecedent. De verwijzing van dit pronomen is echter afhankelijk van de
verwijzing van pronomen ‘ze’, dat het onderwerp vormt. De tweede zin
in (4) betekent namelijk dat elke student die een artikel schreef, zijn of
haar artikel naar een tijdschrift stuurde. De koppeling tussen artikelen en
studenten in de eerste zin wordt gebruikt door de pronomina in de tweede
zin.
Meervoudige anafora blijkt dus een zeer veelzijdig fenomeen te zijn. De
belangrijkste doelstelling van dit proefschrift is om die veelzijdigheid uit te
drukken in een semantische theorie. De meest volledige bestaande seman-
tische theorie van meervoudige verwijzing is zonder twijfel die in Kamp en
Reyle 1993. In dat boek wordt het raamwerk van discourse representatie
theorie (DRT) uitgebreid met (onder andere) een behandeling van meer-
voudige pronomina. Naar mijn mening springen twee aspecten van die
theorie er uit: (i) e-type anafora zoals in (1) wordt behandeld met behulp
van een principe dat los staat van de analyse van andere vormen van dis-
course anafora en (ii) de toegankelijkheid van afhankelijkheids-informatie
in discourse (zoals te zien in (4)) wordt geanalyseerd met behulp van een
gestipuleerd principe dat onder speciale omstandigheden het kopiëren van
representaties toe staat.
Meervoudige anafora wordt in DRT dus aangepakt met twee princi-
pes die los staan van DRT’s analyse van ‘standaard’ anafora. Bij deze
principes speelt het bestaan van een representationeel niveau een cruci-
ale rol. Meervoudige e-type anaphora worden in DRT geanalyseerd met
behulp van abstractie. Deze operatie houdt in dat representationeel ma-
teriaal van een (representatie van een) kwantificationele zin gebruikt kan
worden om tot een meervoudig antecedent te komen. De toegankelijkheid
van afhankelijkheids-informatie wordt geanalyseerd door bovendien toe te
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staan dat dergelijk representationeel materiaal eveneens opgenomen mag
worden in nieuwe kwantificationele structuren.
In de literatuur heeft het sterke leunen van DRT op representaties de
vraag opgeroepen of hetzelfde empirische bereik niet behaald kan wor-
den zonder gebruik te maken van een representationeel niveau. Aange-
zien DRT’s representaties via een top-down architectuur gecreëerd wor-
den, kwam er bovendien behoefte aan alternatieven die beter passen in
de succesvolle traditie van Montague Grammatica. Met de ontwikkeling
van dynamische predikaat logica (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991) werd de
belangrijkste stap gezet om dergelijke alternatieven mogelijk te maken
en begon een programma van ‘dynamische semantiek’ dat als doel had de
semantiek van natuurlijke taalexpressies te analyseren aan de hand van
hun potentieel om de context te veranderen. ‘Context’ is hier nadrukkelijk
geen representatie maar een simpel modeltheoretisch object, namelijk een
(verzameling) toekenningsfunctie(s).
Gezien DRT’s succes op het gebied van meervoudige verwijzing, is het
interessant om te zien hoe een niet-representationele dynamische seman-
tiek die zich op hetzelfde onderwerp richt eruit moet zien. Een specifiek
doel van het proefschrift is aldus om de twee representationele DRT prin-
cipes die ik hierboven besprak overbodig te maken door een niet-represen-
tationele dynamische analyse aan te gaan.
Het bestaan van voorbeelden als in (2) blijkt echter een bemoeilijkende
factor. Voordat we aan de modellering van meervoudige verwijzing begin-
nen, moeten we dus eerst hieraan onze aandacht wijten.
Het fenomeen dat met het voorbeeld in (2) geïllustreerd wordt, wordt
complement-anafora genoemd. Dit fenomeen werd en wordt uitgebreid be-
studeerd in het psycholinguistische onderzoek van Linda Moxey, Anthony
Sanford en co-auteurs. Hun experimenten laten zien dat proefpersonen
een voorkeur hebben om te refereren aan de complement-verzameling na
een negatieve (dat is, ruwweg, een monotoon dalende) kwantificationele
expressie. Binnen de semantische gemeenschap is een aantal keer getwij-
feld aan de realiteit van complement-anafora. Ten grondslag aan die twij-
fel ligt een generalisatie die in Kamp en Reyle 1993 gedaan wordt. Volgens
Kamp en Reyle is het vormen van een verzamelingtheoretisch verschil (zo-
als in de complement-verzameling A−B) niet een geoorloofde methode om
(meervoudige) antecedenten te vormen, dit in scherp kontrast met het bij
elkaar voegen van twee verzamelingen.
Toch, een alternatieve interpretatie van voorbeelden zoals (2) die wel
voldoet aan Kamp en Reyle’s generalisatie zou er een zijn waarin het pro-
nomen niet naar de complement-verzameling verwijst maar naar de ge-
hele restrictorverzameling A. De tweede zin in (2) betekent dan zoiets
als “De parlementariërs hadden het over het algemeen te druk.” Moxey
en Sanford argumenteren zelf tegen zo een analyse. In hoofdstuk 3 van
dit proefschrift volg ik hun argumentatie en toon ik aan dat het idee dat
complement-anafora geen verwijzing naar de complement-verzameling in-
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houdt implausibel is. Het bestaan van pronominale verwijzing naar de
complement-verzameling moet echter niet gezien worden als aanwijzing
dat complement-anafora eenzelfde soort fenomeen is als het typische ge-
val van e-type anafora in (1). Dit blijkt uit twee dingen: (i) wanneer in
een contekst een pronomen zowel naar de referentie-verzameling als naar
de complement-verzameling zou kunnen verwijzen en allebei die verwij-
zingen een consistente interpretatie opleveren, dan ‘wint’ de referentie-
verzameling, (ii) in tegenstelling tot verwijzing naar de complement-verza-
meling, stelt verwijzing naar de referentie-verzameling geen eisen aan het
antecedent. Wat (i) laat zien is dat complement-anafora alleen mogelijk is
op het moment dat meer gangbare soorten anafora onmogelijk zijn. Verder
kunnen complement-anafora alleen voorkomen als het antecedent zodanig
is dat het de garantie geeft dat de complement-verzameling niet leeg is.
Voor verwijzing naar de referentie-verzameling is er niet zo een dergelijke
voorwaarde; ook monotoon dalende expressies (die niet garanderen dat de
referentie-verzameling elementen bevat) kunnen als antecedent dienen.
Ik concludeer hieruit dat de referentie-verzameling een saillant antece-
dent is en dat een voorbeeld als (1) aldus een gangbaar geval van pronomi-
nale verwijzing is. Voornaamwoorden verwijzen immers naar individuen
of groepen individuen die in de contekst in hoge mate geactiveerd zijn. Het
bestaan van een complement-verzameling moet echter eerst geïnfereerd
worden wil er naar verwezen kunnen worden. Dat maakt de complement-
verzameling in principe ongeschikt als antecedent voor voornaamwoor-
den. Echter, de experimenten van Moxey en Sanford toonden niet al-
leen aan dat proefpersonen in negatieve conteksten naar de complement-
verzameling willen verwijzen, maar ook dat die proefpersonen een reto-
rische voorkeur laten zien om de negativiteit van het antecedent te ver-
klaren. Dit zorgt ervoor dat de complement-verzameling een verleidelijke
antecedent is. Complement-anafora is aldus een gemarkeerde variant van
anafora die haar bestaan te danken heeft aan retorische voorkeuren van
sprekers.
Deze conclusie rechtvaardigt een verkleining van het empirische bereik
van de dynamische semantiek die we willen construeren. Een model van
ongemarkeerde verwijzing door pronomina is een model dat de introductie
van saillante verzamelingen in contekst beschrijft. Pronominale verwij-
zing naar de complement-verzameling, daarentegen, gebeurt met tussen-
komst van een inferentie-proces en hoort zodanig niet tot een dergelijk mo-
del. Hoofdstuk 4, 5 en 6 richten zich op de constructie van een dynamische
semantiek met een bereik dat zich beperkt tot saillante verzamelingen.
Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt drie studies uit de literatuur, namelijk de dyna-
mische meervouds-predikaatlogica uit van den Berg 1996b, de semantiek
gebaseerd op geparametriseerde pluraliteiten uit Krifka 1996a en de the-
orie van anaforische informatie uit Elworthy 1995. Deze drie voorstellen
hebben met elkaar gemeen dat ze alle drie een gestructureerde datastruc-
tuur gebruiken als context. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat de verschillen
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tussen deze systemen niet erg groot zijn en dat met name de theorieën van
van den Berg en van Krifka erg op elkaar lijken wat betreft belangrijke
(formele) noties als afhankelijkheid, onafhankelijkheid en distributiviteit.
Dergelijke noties zijn verantwoordelijk voor de behandeling van afhanke-
lijkheidsfenomenen en vormen op die manier een elegant alternatief op de
DRT principes.
Wat betreft empirisch bereik wordt er in het vierde hoofdstuk vooral
aandacht besteed aan voorbeelden als (4), hierboven. Er wordt beargu-
menteerd dat Elworthy’s theorie te sterk is. Het genereert bijvoorbeeld een
lezing voor (4) waarin elke student een paper naar een tijdschrift stuurt
ongeacht of het om zijn of haar eigen paper gaat. De theorieën van van
den Berg en Krifka, daarentegen, zijn te zwak in de zin dat ze niet kunnen
verklaren hoe de verwijzing van een pronomen zowel naar subindividuen
van een groep als naar de oorspronkelijke totale groep kan verwijzen. Pro-
blematisch is bijvoorbeeld (5). Dit voorbeeld is ambigue tussen een lezing
waarin elke student de twee artikelen die hij of zij geschreven heeft aan
een tijdschrift stuurt en een lezing waarin elke student alle geschreven
artikelen naar een tijdschrift stuurt.
(5) De studenten hebben elk precies twee artikelen geschreven. Elk
van hen heeft ze vervolgens aan een tijdschrift aangeboden.
Het zojuist omschreven probleem voor de theorieën van van den Berg en
Krifka speelt vervolgens een centrale rol in hoofdstuk vijf. Hier wordt de
vraag gesteld hoe anafora gerepresenteerd dient te worden gegeven het
feit dat hetzelfde meervoudige antecedent zowel bij een afhankelijke als
bij een onafhankelijke vorm van referentie betrokken kan zijn. Er wordt
beargumenteerd dat een (mogelijk meervoudig) individu dat in de context
geïntroduceerd is aan een label (variabele, index) toegekend moet worden
dat afhankelijk is van de context zelf.
Een dergelijke conclusie is niet nieuw. Het relateert aan het zogenaam-
de probleem van destructieve toekenning, dat met name bij dynamische
predikaat logica als een problematische complicatie is opgemerkt. Dit pro-
bleem ontstaat door de interpretatie van de existentiële kwantor als de
willekeurige toekenning van een waarde aan een variabele. Bij deze toe-
kenning wordt de ‘oude’ waarde van die variabele overschreven. Talen als
dynamische predikaat logica staan in principe dus toe dat bestaande waar-
des overschreven worden en dat er verlies van informatie optreedt.
Als oplossing voor de toekenningsproblematiek wordt in hoofdstuk vijf
het raamwerk van incrementele dynamiek (van Eijck 2001) geïntrodu-
ceerd. In incrementele dynamiek (ID) is de indexering van waardes gecon-
tekstualiseerd. Dit wordt bewerkstelligd door toekenningsfuncties (verza-
melingen van paren variabelen en waardes) te vervangen door zogenaam-
de stacks (‘stapeltjes’), dat is, verzamelingen van paren posities en waar-
des. Aangezien de positie die een individu inneemt kan veranderen als we
twee stapeltjes combineren, is daarmee de indexering van waardes gecon-
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tekstualiseerd. De positie van een waarde is immers altijd relatief aan de
stack (lees, contekst) waarin de waarde zich bevindt.
Incrementele dynamiek is een variant op dynamische predikaat logika.
In hoofdstuk 5 presenteer ik een variant van de dynamische meervouds
predikaatlogika van van den Berg, geheel volgens de ideeën van incre-
mentele dynamiek. Dit stelt ons in staat om een distributiviteits-operator
te definiëren die afhankelijkheids-informatie toegankelijk maakt zonder
‘oude’ antecedenten te overschrijven. Aan de hand van een ondergespecifi-
ceerde representatie van de interpretatie van voorbeelden als (5), kunnen
we vervolgens zien dat er twee plausibele resoluties voor het pronomen
mogelijk zijn, geheel volgens de intuities voor deze voorbeelden.
In het zesde hoofdstuk keer ik terug naar DRT en de in die theorie gesti-
puleerde principes voor meervoudige anaforische referentie en laat ik zien
dat onze niet-representationele aanpak zonder dergelijke principes kan.
Er wordt aangetoond dat de semantiek voor distributiviteit die in hoofd-
stuk 5 is geïntroduceerd gegeneraliseerd kan worden om zo tot een seman-
tiek voor kwantificationele determinatoren te komen die aan twee eisen
voldoet. Ten eerste bevat een contekst na interpretatie van een kwantifi-
cationele zin de (maximale) referentie-verzameling. Ten tweede bevat een
dergelijke contekst de afhankelijkheidsinformatie van die zin. Bovendien
wordt aangetoond dat deze aanpak op eenvoudige wijze het dynamische
karakter van monotoon dalende kwantoren kan beschrijven. Belangrijker
echter is het feit dat alle anaforische effecten lexicaal gestuurd zijn. Als
gevolg daarvan is er geen extra principe nodig dat de verscheidenheid aan
resoluties voor meervoudige pronomina verklaart.
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